Interest Group Access to the Bureaucracy, Parliament, and the Media

Abstract

A key issue for interest groups and policymakers is the ways through which organized interests voice their interests and influence public policy. This article combines two perspectives on interest group representation to explain patterns of interest group access to different political arenas. From a resource exchange perspective, it argues that access to different political arenas is discrete as it is determined by the match between the supply and demands of interest groups and gatekeepers—politicians, bureaucrats, and reporters. From a partly competing perspective, it is argued that access is cumulative and converges around wealthy and professionalized groups. Based on a large‐scale investigation of group presence in Danish political arenas, the analyses show a pattern of privileged pluralism. This describes a system where multiple political arenas provide opportunities for multiple interests but where unequally distributed resources produce cumulative effects (i.e., the same groups have high levels of arena access).

Samfundslederskab i en fragmenteret tidsalder

“…Det vil ske ved hjaelp af en raekke bidrag til institutionel teori (Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972;Kingdon, 2001), herunder ikke mindst Vivian Schmidts diskursive institutionalisme. Udgangspunktet er, at diskurser, medier og den politiske kommunikation af nye ideer fylder mere end tidligere i moderne politikskabelse (Binderkrantz, Christiansen, & Pedersen, 2015;Aagaard, 2017;Aagaard & Blach-Ørsten, 2018). I afsnittets anden del vil jeg så beskrive samfundsledernes rolle med udgangspunkt i teori om policy entrepreneuere (Mintrom & Vergari, 1996).…”

“…Policy sfaeren kan ses som hjemsted for 'eliternes elite' (Etzioni-Halevy, 1990) Det vil sige toppen af de ministerielle departementer, toppolitikere, udvalgte eksperter og formaend m/k for de privilegerede organiserede interesser (Binderkrantz et al 2015). Disse aktører har typisk Aagaard / Samfundslederskab i en fragmenteret tidsalder stor indflydelse på (re)produktionen af samfundets institutionelle struktur.…”

“…parlament og embedsvaerk og indirekte via medierne. Disse organisationer repraesenterer stadig trods alt forskellige interesserer, og derfor er styreformen blevet betegnet som 'privilegeret pluralisme' (Binderkrantz et al 2015). Aagaard & Blach-Ørsten (2018) argumenterer, at der side om side med denne privilegerede pluralisme er opstået en 'policy professionel stat', hvor en saerlig gruppe af veluddannede, medievante og politisk kompetente personer på tvaers af de naevnte interesseorganisationer såvel som public affairs-branchen tilvejebringer fagligt input og nye ideer til policysfaeren.…”

“…Denne form for lobbyisme kaldes også "direkte lobbyisme" eller 'inside lobbyism'. I en medialiseret tidsalder får lobbyismen dog en ny dimension, hvor det handler om at påvirke beslutningstagere indirekte via medierne ved at skabe omtale omkring en helt bestemt sag (Binderkrantz et al, 2015;Binderkrantz & Pedersen, 2017;Blach-Ørsten & Kristensen, 2016;Aagaard & Blach-Ørsten, 2018). Denne form for lobbyisme kaldes også indirekte lobbyisme, medie-lobbyisme eller 'outside lobbyism'.…”

studying policy advocacy through social network analysis

“…Putting IGs strategies into their policy-making context implies focusing on all institutional venues where binding decisions are made (as proposed in section 'Tracing Groups' Advocacy During An Entire Policy Process') and to consequently apply a 'process tracing' method (e.g., grasping a full law-making process in the administrative and parliamentary stages; see Pedersen et al, 2014). It certainly also implies looking at informal arenas without power of making binding decisions (e.g., media, street protest, consultative experts' committee) and where the advocacy strategies and policy influence of IGs is more indirect and difficult to grasp (Binderkrantz et al, 2015).…”