Does Administrative Corporatism Promote Trust and Deliberation?

Abstract

How are policy processes affected by the fact that representatives of particular interests formally take part in public decision-making? This has been the central question in neocorporatist theory for several years. It is sometimes argued that corporatist does promote trust, public deliberation, and even the public interest. However, despite the theoretical focus on different modes of interest intermediation, how the causal mechanisms within corporatist arrangements actually work has been assumed, not empirically demonstrated. As Jane Mansbridge (1992b, 45) has pointed out (referring especially to Streeck and Schmitter), "Given this nuanced description of the processes of identity change that accompany group deliberation, it is puzzling that the empirical work does not address either the presence or absence of these processes." In order to address that deficiency, this article presents empirical evidence on how a corporatist organization of politics affects trust and deliberation in state activities, using Swedish public administration as a case.

Are innovative, participatory and deliberative procedures in policy making democratic and effective?

“…Although such compromises should not be viewed as less noble than consensus achieved through deliberation (Mansbridge 2003), they clearly reflect the balance of forces, not the weight of arguments (Walzer 1999: 62). Strategic bargaining as opposed to persuasion or to argumentative problem solving (Scharpf 1991) is therefore also of relevance here 37 Oeberg's (2002Holzinger (2001a), using discourse analysis techniques, tests whether mediation procedures operate along deliberative lines or whether bargaining prevails.…”

First language paradigms in conflict: Hidden dialogue in Swedish curricula 1962–2011

“…There is a long tradition of corporatism in Sweden and it is sometimes claimed that it reached its peak in the 1970s and then waned to some extent in the 1990s, at least with regard to the formal representation of interest groups in governmental institutions (Ruin 1982;Micheletti 1991;Rothstein and Bergströ m 1999;BlomHansen 2000;Ö berg 2002). However, we have seen that the 1980 curriculum is not so vague, showing a clear inclination towards a moderate version of Critical Literacy without really excluding Personal Growth.…”

Elite consensus on the Norwegian welfare state model

“…Several scholars have suggested that corporatist arrangements may contribute to a national consensus between groups with opposing interests (Katzenstein 1985;Woldendorp 1995;Siaroff 1999;Ö berg 2002). By participating in public committees and boards they learn to appreciate the functions and operations of the state and become less inclined to react on the basis of ideological standpoints.…”