Gender Differences in the Giving and Taking Variants of the Dictator Game

Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Jeon, Joo Young; Saha, Bibhas

doi:10.1002/soej.12223

Cited by 37 publications

(40 citation statements)

References 40 publications

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“…This sensitivity is in line with experiments allowing for giving and taking simultaneously, meaning that subjects are sensitive to extending the choice set towards the possibility of taking endowment from the other player [4,5,34,45,46]. However, studies for which choice options remain isomorphic in GIVE and TAKE, as in this experiment, mostly find no difference between GIVE and TAKE [3,[6][7][8][9]13]. Regarding the hypothesized effects of larger allocation to the recipient in TAKE, this is not confirmed.…”

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confidence: 64%

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Giving to versus Taking from In- and Out-Group Members

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et al. 2018

Games

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In this experiment, we test whether subjects' responses to variations in the action set in a dictator game depends on induced group identities. The action set includes choices in which the dictator can either give money to or take money from the other player. As an extension to the anonymous setting, we introduce induced group identities using the minimal group paradigm. Based on a dictator game conducted with more than 300 students in Indonesia, we implement a full factorial design in order to analyze the framing of the action set in a varied cultural context and to examine varied prevalence of social norms given a group identity context. If group identity is not salient, we find that participants are slightly more generous when they have an opportunity to give to rather than to take from the recipient. However, when participants are matched with in-group members, this result is reversed and highly significant. The result of differing responses to framing effects in within-group interactions compared to a neutral setting are largely ascribed to the varied compliance with existing social norms.1 Closely related to [4], List [5] investigates give and take options in a dictator game. However, the results are not covered here, as the choice set is not isomorphically.

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confidence: 64%

“…For instance, Korenko et al [11] find that participants are more reluctant to take money away from the other than to share their own endowment with the recipient. Also, Kettner & Ceccato [12], and Chowdhury et al [13] were able to trace deviations in behavior to framing effects by exploiting gender differences.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Giving to versus Taking from In- and Out-Group Members

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Gallier

Schlüter

et al. 2018

Games

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“…Most of this work finds that dictator behavior is not affected by who starts with the endowment (Suvoy, 2003;Dreber et al, 2013;Grossman and Eckel, 2015;Halvorsen, 2015;Hauge et al, 2016;Goerg et al, 2017). However, there is also contradictory evidence (Visser and Roelofs, 2011;Krupka and Weber, 2013), as well as studies showing that gender (Kettner and Ceccato, 2014;Chowdhury et al, 2017), stake size (Leibbrandt et al, 2015), or social norm interventions (Farrow et al, 2017) can interact with the initial endowment to change dictator behavior. 9 We first administer the games for each group.…”

Section: Choice Experimentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rhetoric matters: A social norms explanation for the anomaly of framing

Chang

Chen

Krupka

2019

Games and Economic Behavior

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“…For example, since it is possible to manipulate bids in contests by simply changing the frame, it may be useful to introduce such framing effects as “nudges” in organizations and tournaments. Finally, framing and property rights are known to have gender effects (e.g., Chowdhury, Jeon, and Saha ), which can be tested in the context of contest. In the same line we believe that the current results will provide further guidance for future research in the areas of both contest theory and behavioral conflict literature.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Property Rights and Loss Aversion in Contests

2017

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We analyze the effects of property rights and the resulting loss aversion on contest outcomes. We study three situations: in “gain” two players start with no prize and make sunk bids to win a prize; in “loss” both the players start with prizes and whoever loses the contest loses their prize; and in “mixed” only one player starts with a prize that stays with him if he wins, but is transferred to the rival otherwise. Since the differences among the treatments arise only from framing, the expected utility and the standard loss aversion models predict no difference in bids across treatments. We introduce a loss aversion model in which the property rights are made salient, and as a result the reference point varies across treatments. This model predicts average bids in descending order in the loss, the mixed, and the gain treatment; and higher bids by the player with property rights in the mixed treatment. The results from a laboratory experiment broadly support these predictions. There is no significant difference in bids in the loss (gain) treatment and bids by property rights holder (nonholder) in the mixed treatment. A model incorporating both loss aversion and social preferences explains this result. (JEL C91, C72, D23, D74)

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Gender Differences in the Giving and Taking Variants of the Dictator Game

Cited by 37 publications

References 40 publications

Giving to versus Taking from In- and Out-Group Members

Giving to versus Taking from In- and Out-Group Members

Rhetoric matters: A social norms explanation for the anomaly of framing

Property Rights and Loss Aversion in Contests

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