The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-pro t purposes provided that:• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in DRO • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.Please consult the full DRO policy for further details. AbstractConsidering a differentiated mixed duopoly we show that when privatization and pollution tax are used together environmental damage will be non-monotone in the level of privatization, and optimal privatization is always partial privatization.Whether privatization will improve the environment or not depends on the public firm's concern for environment. If the public firm is unconcerned about environment, the socially optimal privatization will also damage the environment most. But when the public firm is concerned about environment, privatization will improve the environment. Generally, the relationship between optimal privatization and product substitutability is also non-monotone and inverted U-shaped.Key words: Privatization, differentiated mixed duopoly, environmental damage, environmental tax, social welfare. Pollution Tax, Partial Privatization and Environment AbstractConsidering a differentiated mixed duopoly we show that when privatization and pollution tax are used together environmental damage will be non-monotone in the level of privatization, and optimal privatization is always partial privatization.Whether privatization will improve the environment or not depends on the public firm's concern for environment. If the public firm is unconcerned about environment, the socially optimal privatization will also damage the environment most. But when the public firm is concerned about environment, privatization will improve the environment. Generally, the relationship between optimal privatization and product substitutability is also non-monotone and inverted U-shaped.

There has been increasing 'flexibilisation', in the formal labour markets of both developed and developing countries. Labour institutions and globalisation are often taken to be causally related to this phenomenon, but the evidence remains inconclusive. In India, there has been an increasing use of temporary workers employed through contractors (contract workers), who are not represented by trade unions and who do not fall under the purview of the labour laws that are applicable to directly employed workers (formal workers) in formal labour markets. We develop a model of labour demand where firms choose a mix of contract workers and formal workers, rather than formal workers alone. Then we test the model using state-industry-year panel data for Indian manufacturing from 1998 to 2005. We find that both pro-worker labour institutions and increased import penetration lead to greater use of contract labour in Indian manufacturing.

We run between-subject dictator games with exogenously specified “give” or “take” frames involving a balanced pool of male and female dictators and constant payoff possibilities. We find the following: Females allocate more under the taking frame than under the giving frame. Males allocate more under the giving frame than under the taking frame. In the taking frame females are more generous than males. But in the giving frame both are equally generous. Finally, when the combined population of males and females is considered, giving is found to be equivalent to “not taking,” because the opposing gender effects offset each other

We show under general demand and cost conditions that in a mixed duopoly with pollution the government can implement the socially optimal outputs and abatements by a tax-subsidy scheme and keeping the public firm fully public. The scheme requires taxing outputs and subsidizing abatements at different rates, unlike a pollution tax. Our result improves on the shortcoming of a pollution tax to implement the social optimum. We also show that when the private firm is partly foreign-owned, the government will adopt some privatization and will not implement the social optimum, though the social optimum is implementable.

Two bookmakers compete in Bertrand fashion while setting odds on the outcomes of a sporting contest where an influential punter (or betting syndicate) may bribe some player(s) to fix the contest. Zero profit and bribe prevention may not always hold together. When the influential punter is quite powerful, the bookies may coordinate on prices and earn positive profits for fear of letting the 'lemons' (i.e., the influential punter) in. On the other hand, sometimes the bookies make zero profits but also admit match-fixing.