Giving to versus Taking from In- and Out-Group Members

Abstract

In this experiment, we test whether subjects' responses to variations in the action set in a dictator game depends on induced group identities. The action set includes choices in which the dictator can either give money to or take money from the other player. As an extension to the anonymous setting, we introduce induced group identities using the minimal group paradigm. Based on a dictator game conducted with more than 300 students in Indonesia, we implement a full factorial design in order to analyze the framing of the action set in a varied cultural context and to examine varied prevalence of social norms given a group identity context. If group identity is not salient, we find that participants are slightly more generous when they have an opportunity to give to rather than to take from the recipient. However, when participants are matched with in-group members, this result is reversed and highly significant. The result of differing responses to framing effects in within-group interactions compared to a neutral setting are largely ascribed to the varied compliance with existing social norms.1 Closely related to [4], List [5] investigates give and take options in a dictator game. However, the results are not covered here, as the choice set is not isomorphically.

Legislature Size and Welfare: Evidence from Brazil

“…Our findings have implications that extend well beyond Brazil. A general form of our argument is that it is easier for a politician to negotiate with in-group members (Abbink and Harris 2019;Alt et al 2018). Specifically, several countries have separate executive and legislative powers, such as the federal level of presidential systems, state governments, and local city councils.…”

Are strangers just enemies you have not yet met? Group homogeneity, not intergroup relations, shapes ingroup bias in three natural groups

“…Our design offers multiple advantages over the commonly used twoperson dictator game: it captures the essence of team-work that is needed to extract resources from third parties, and as such, is especially relevant in the context of our sample. Since expropriation may be more psychologically costly than giving when facing an outgroup but not when facing an ingroup [29,46], our design provides a stringent test of the difference between in-and outgroup concerns. The need to coordinate on an unfair action diffuses responsibility [45,47], therefore, behaviour is not confounded by image concerns to the extent it is in the standard dictator game [48].…”

“…For example, strong rivalry based on membership of political parties or football clubs increases ingroup favouritism [25][26][27], and members of political groups that also engage in violent conflict show a larger ingroup bias towards the rival outgroup than to strangers [28]. Furthermore, facing a member of a rival group could increase ingroup favouritism by invoking one's own group identity, that is, by increasing its salience more strongly compared to facing a member of a neutral outgroup [29][30][31][32][33][34]. Moreover, ingroup bias could per se be larger in ethnically and culturally homogeneous groups compared to heterogeneous groups [13,22,23,35,36].…”

Charitable Giving: Framing and the Role of Information

“…Similarly, some studies with student participants as recipients report no frame effect (Dreber et al 2013, Kettner and Cecatto 2014, Smith 2015, Chowdhury et al 2017, while other studies find higher transfers to the recipient under the taking frame than under the giving frame (Oxoby and Spraggon 2008, Krupka and Weber 2013, Korenok et al 2014, Brosig-Koch et al 2017). 1 Alt et al (2018) report that the impact of the frame depends on the relation between dictator and recipient: only in the case that the recipient belongs to the dictator's ingroup do they observe higher transfers to the recipient under the taking frame.…”