We introduce a method for identifying social norms, based on the property that they reflect collective perceptions regarding the appropriateness of behaviors. We demonstrate that the norms we elicit, along with a simple model combining concern for normcompliance with utility for money, predict changes in behavior across several variants of the dictator game. Our findings indicate that individuals care about monetary payoffs and the social appropriateness of any action taken. Further, we find that a social norm is best characterized as a profile of varying degrees of social appropriateness over the entire menu of actions available to a decision maker.

We introduce a method for identifying social norms, based on the property that they reflect collective perceptions regarding the appropriateness of behaviors. We demonstrate that the norms we elicit, along with a simple model combining concern for norm-compliance with utility for money, predict changes in behavior across several variants of the dictator game. Our findings indicate that individuals care about monetary payoffs and the social appropriateness of any action taken. Further, we find that a social norm is best characterized as a profile of varying degrees of social appropriateness over the entire menu of actions available to a decision maker. JEL: C91, C72, D64, and participants at several workshops, seminars, and conferences for helpful comments and suggestions. Identifying social norms using coordination games: Why does dictator game sharing vary? We introduce a method for identifying social norms, based on the property that they reflect collective perceptions regarding the appropriateness of behaviors. We demonstrate that the norms we elicit, along with a simple model combining concern for norm-compliance with utility for money, predict changes in behavior across several variants of the dictator game. Our findings indicate that individuals care about monetary payoffs and the social appropriateness of any action taken. Further, we find that a social norm is best characterized as a profile of varying degrees of social appropriateness over the entire menu of actions available to a decision maker.

This paper reports an experiment examining the effect of social norms on pro-social behavior. We test two predictions derived from work in psychology regarding the influence of norms. The first is a "focusing" influence, whereby norms only impact behavior when an individual's attention is drawn to them; and the second is an "informational" influence, whereby a norm exerts a stronger impact on an individual's behavior the more others he observes behaving consistently with that norm. We find support for both effects. Either thinking about or observing the behavior of others produces increased pro-social behavior -even when one expects or observes little pro-social behavior on the part of others -and the degree of pro-social behavior is increasing in the actual and expected pro-social behavior of others. This experiment eliminates strategic influences and thus demonstrates a direct effect of norms on behavior. Keywords: Social norms Altruism a b s t r a c tThis paper reports an experiment examining the effect of social norms on pro-social behavior. We test two predictions derived from work in psychology regarding the influence of norms. The first is a ''focusing" influence, whereby norms only impact behavior when an individual's attention is drawn to them; and the second is an ''informational" influence, whereby a norm exerts a stronger impact on an individual's behavior the more others he observes behaving consistently with that norm. We find support for both effects. Either thinking about or observing the behavior of others produces increased pro-social behavior -even when one expects or observes little pro-social behavior on the part of others -and the degree of pro-social behavior is increasing in the actual and expected pro-social behavior of others. This experiment eliminates strategic influences and thus demonstrates a direct effect of norms on behavior.

This paper reports an experiment examining the effect of social norms on pro-social behavior. We test two predictions derived from work in psychology regarding the influence of norms. The first is a "focusing" influence, whereby norms only impact behavior when an individual's attention is drawn to them; and the second is an "informational" influence, whereby a norm exerts a stronger impact on an individual's behavior the more others he observes behaving consistently with that norm. We find support for both effects. Either thinking about or observing the behavior of others produces increased pro-social behavior -even when one expects or observes little pro-social behavior on the part of others -and the degree of pro-social behavior is increasing in the actual and expected pro-social behavior of others. This experiment eliminates strategic influences and thus demonstrates a direct effect of norms on behavior. Keywords: Social norms Altruism a b s t r a c tThis paper reports an experiment examining the effect of social norms on pro-social behavior. We test two predictions derived from work in psychology regarding the influence of norms. The first is a ''focusing" influence, whereby norms only impact behavior when an individual's attention is drawn to them; and the second is an ''informational" influence, whereby a norm exerts a stronger impact on an individual's behavior the more others he observes behaving consistently with that norm. We find support for both effects. Either thinking about or observing the behavior of others produces increased pro-social behavior -even when one expects or observes little pro-social behavior on the part of others -and the degree of pro-social behavior is increasing in the actual and expected pro-social behavior of others. This experiment eliminates strategic influences and thus demonstrates a direct effect of norms on behavior.

Using coordination games, we elicit social norms directly for two different games where either an agreement to take the first best action has been reached or where no such agreement exists. We combine the norms data with separately measured choice data to predict changes in behavior. We demonstrate that including social norms as a utility component significantly improves predictive performance. Then we compare social norms to guilt aversion and lying aversion. We estimate that honoring an agreement in the double dictator game is worth giving up approximately 10% of total earnings and more than 120% in the Bertrand game. We show that informal agreements affect behavior through their direct effect on social norms as well as through an indirect effect on beliefs.

While monitoring and regulation can be used to combat socially costly unethical conduct, their intended targets are often able to avoid regulation or hide their behavior. This surrenders at least part of the effectiveness of regulatory policies to firms' and individuals' decisions to voluntarily submit to regulation. We study individuals' decisions to avoid monitoring or regulation and thus enhance their ability to engage in unethical conduct. We conduct a laboratory experiment in which participants engage in a competitive task and can decide between having the opportunity to misreport their performance or having their performance verified by an external monitor. To study the effect of social factors on the willingness to be subject to monitoring, we vary whether participants make this decision simultaneously with others or sequentially as well as whether the decision is private or public. Our results show that the opportunity to avoid being submitted to regulation produces more unethical conduct than situations in which regulation is either exogenously imposed or entirely absent.

NCT02247050; Pre-results.

This proof of concept study harnesses novel transdisciplinary insights to contrast two school-based smoking prevention interventions among adolescents in the UK and Colombia. We compare schools in these locations because smoking rates and norms are different, in order to better understand social norms based mechanisms of action related to smoking. We aim to: (1) improve the measurement of social norms for smoking behaviors in adolescents and reveal how they spread in schools; (2) to better characterize the mechanisms of action of smoking prevention interventions in schools, learning lessons for future intervention research. The A Stop Smoking in Schools Trial (ASSIST) intervention harnesses peer influence, while the Dead Cool intervention uses classroom pedagogy. Both interventions were originally developed in the UK but culturally adapted for a Colombian setting. In a before and after design, we will obtain psychosocial, friendship, and behavioral data (e.g., attitudes and intentions toward smoking and vaping) from ∼300 students in three schools for each intervention in the UK and the same number in Colombia (i.e., ∼1,200 participants in total). Pre-intervention, participants take part in a Rule Following task, and in Coordination Games that allow us to assess their judgments about the social appropriateness of a range of smoking-related and unrelated behaviors, and elicit individual sensitivity to social norms. After the interventions, these behavioral economic experiments are repeated, so we can assess how social norms related to smoking have changed, how sensitivity to classroom and school year Hunter et al. MECHANISMS Study group norms have changed and how individual changes are related to changes among friends. This Game Theoretic approach allows us to estimate proxies for norms and norm sensitivity parameters and to test for the influence of individual student attributes and their social networks within a Markov Chain Monte Carlo modeling framework. We identify hypothesized mechanisms by triangulating results with qualitative data from participants. The MECHANISMS study is innovative in the interplay of Game Theory and longitudinal social network analytical approaches, and in its transdisciplinary research approach. This study will help us to better understand the mechanisms of smoking prevention interventions in high and middle income settings.