Identifying Social Norms Using Coordination Games: Why Does Dictator Game Sharing Vary?

Abstract

We introduce a method for identifying social norms, based on the property that they reflect collective perceptions regarding the appropriateness of behaviors. We demonstrate that the norms we elicit, along with a simple model combining concern for norm-compliance with utility for money, predict changes in behavior across several variants of the dictator game. Our findings indicate that individuals care about monetary payoffs and the social appropriateness of any action taken. Further, we find that a social norm is best characterized as a profile of varying degrees of social appropriateness over the entire menu of actions available to a decision maker. JEL: C91, C72, D64, and participants at several workshops, seminars, and conferences for helpful comments and suggestions. Identifying social norms using coordination games: Why does dictator game sharing vary? We introduce a method for identifying social norms, based on the property that they reflect collective perceptions regarding the appropriateness of behaviors. We demonstrate that the norms we elicit, along with a simple model combining concern for norm-compliance with utility for money, predict changes in behavior across several variants of the dictator game. Our findings indicate that individuals care about monetary payoffs and the social appropriateness of any action taken. Further, we find that a social norm is best characterized as a profile of varying degrees of social appropriateness over the entire menu of actions available to a decision maker.

Is there an omission effect in prosocial behavior? A laboratory experiment on passive vs. active generosity

“…This indicates that prosocial preferences do not depend on the difference between commissions and omissions as attributes of the action taken by a decision maker. It has been suggested that a utility maximization framework in the presence of social norms may benefit from including actions as an argument of the utility function (see, for example, [21,22]). Our results show that prosocial preferences are stable with respect to whether the choice is active or passive.…”

“…This means that actions themselves may affect social norms and moral concerns. In line with this notion, Levitt and List [21] and Krupka and Weber [22] argue that a utility maximization framework that aims at explaining choices under social norms can benefit from including actions as an argument in the utility function. Whether an outcome follows from an active choice or from the decision maker merely allowing for the outcome to be implemented is one such difference in how outcomes come about.…”

The Demand Side in Economic Models of Energy Markets: The Challenge of Representing Consumer Behavior

“…Some authors argue [see, e.g., Camerer and Fehr (2004) or Krupka and Weber (2013)] that laboratory experiments can be used to gain at least an approximate quantification. Others, such as Levitt and List (2007), are more critical and point out that questions regarding a limited transferability of experimental situations to every-day-behavior have particular relevance for the case of adherence to social norms.…”

The Impact of Previous Action on Bargaining—An Experiment on the Emergence of Preferences for Fairness Norms

“…In recent years, experimental literature observed several different norms (e.g., [3,4]) to predict cooperative behavior. Although existing literature suggests that the establishment of norms can induce cooperation [5] (e.g., via reciprocity [6] or conditional cooperation [7]), norms are mainly added to economic research as post hoc interpretation [8]. Moreover, literature investigating how norms are formed and how one can use them to influence future behavior is scarce.…”