Further thoughts about a Frankfurt-style argument

Pereboom, Derk

doi:10.1080/13869790902838795

Cited by 15 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…By using the phrase 'cognitively sensitive' I intend to draw on Pereboom's recent work on the robustness criteria (Pereboom 2009(Pereboom , 2012. I therefore use the phrase as a placeholder for the precise conditions which the agent needs to satisfy in order to be 'cognitively sensitive'.…”

Section: Abilities: Non-intentional Vs Doxastic Weak Vs Reliablementioning

confidence: 99%

Robustness and Up-to-us-ness

Kittle

2017

Disputatio

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Frankfurt-style cases purport to show that an agent can be morally responsible for an action despite not having any alternatives. Some critics have responded by highlighting various alternatives that remain in the cases presented, while Frankfurtians have objected that such alternatives are typically not capable of grounding responsibility. In this essay I address the recent suggestion by Seth Shabo that only alternatives associated with the ‘up to us’ locution ground moral responsibility. I distinguish a number of kinds of ability, suggest which kinds of abilities ground the truth of the ‘up to us’ locution, and outline how these distinctions apply to the indeterministic buffer cases.

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Section: Abilities: Non-intentional Vs Doxastic Weak Vs Reliablementioning

confidence: 99%

Robustness and Up-to-us-ness

Kittle

2017

Disputatio

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“…Finally, the twin world condition allows another aspect of the debate over the Frankfurt-style counter-examples to be side-stepped: namely, whether the ‘sign’ used as an indicator of an impending decision – which the counterfactual interveners uses as a marker of whether to intervene or not – is sufficiently robust to count as evidence of an alternate possibility (Elzein 2013 ; Pereboom 2009 ). To explain, briefly: where the ‘sign’ (which is different in different author’s examples) 2 indicates to Black (or whoever or whatever is the counterfactual intervener) that Jones (or whoever it happens to be) is about to decide to do something contrary to Black’s wishes then Black intervenes, thereby limiting Jones’ decision to one possibility only, which is of course congruent with Black’s wishes.…”

Section: The Case Of Incongruence and Dispensing With The Flicker Of mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Principle of Alternate Possibilities as Sufficient but not Necessary for Moral Responsibility: A way to Avoid the Frankfurt Counter-Example

Young

2016

Philosophia

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The aim of this paper is to present a version of the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) which is not susceptible to the Frankfurt-style counter-example. I argue that PAP does not need to be endorsed as a necessary condition for moral responsibility and, in fact, presenting PAP as a sufficient condition maintains its usefulness as a maxim for moral accountability whilst avoiding Frankfurt-style counter-examples. In addition, I provide a further sufficient condition for moral responsibility – the twin world condition – and argue that this provides a means of justifying why the protagonist in Frankfurt-style scenarios (e.g., Jones) is still felt to be morally responsible. I conclude with the claim that neither the amended PAP nor the twin world condition is necessary for the ascription of moral responsibility; rather, what is necessary is simply that one of these conditions is satisfied.

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“…Thus Joe's situation diverges in a crucial respect from paradigm examples of derivative responsibility. This is an indication that the application of the alternative‐possibilities schema to Joe in the way suggested by Widerker's objection is not appropriate (Pereboom 2009).…”

Section: Mere Derivative Responsibility?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Revising the example accordingly would respond to Widerker's objection, since we are less likely to suppose that he is morally responsible for his decision to evade taxes only derivatively on his so imagining. Let me wait until introducing the next objection before presenting an example that features this sort of revision (for a version of Tax Evasion revised in this way, see Pereboom 2009). At the same time, I don't think this revision is necessary, and one might object to this change, as Moya does, by claiming that Joe is then not sufficiently responsive to moral reasons (Moya 2011: 19–20).…”

Section: Mere Derivative Responsibility?mentioning

confidence: 99%

FRANKFURT EXAMPLES, DERIVATIVE RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE TIMING OBJECTION¹

Pereboom¹

2012

Philosophical Issues

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Further thoughts about a Frankfurt-style argument

Cited by 15 publications

References 14 publications

Robustness and Up-to-us-ness

Robustness and Up-to-us-ness

The Principle of Alternate Possibilities as Sufficient but not Necessary for Moral Responsibility: A way to Avoid the Frankfurt Counter-Example

FRANKFURT EXAMPLES, DERIVATIVE RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE TIMING OBJECTION¹

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Further thoughts about a Frankfurt-style argument

Cited by 15 publications

References 14 publications

Robustness and Up-to-us-ness

Robustness and Up-to-us-ness

The Principle of Alternate Possibilities as Sufficient but not Necessary for Moral Responsibility: A way to Avoid the Frankfurt Counter-Example

FRANKFURT EXAMPLES, DERIVATIVE RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE TIMING OBJECTION1

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FRANKFURT EXAMPLES, DERIVATIVE RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE TIMING OBJECTION¹