“…11 I owe this point to an anonymous referee; and see also Pereboom (2009Pereboom ( , 2012-on 'dialectically unsatisfying' responses to his position-of which more below. Fully dealing with this point requires a consideration of the material forthcoming in the section entitled "Robustness, Intensionality, Right vs Good: A Tension".…”
Section: The Basic Response To Tax Evasion 2mentioning
confidence: 97%
“…Nevertheless, this section's dilemma argument is as much an attempt to bring critical pressure to bear towards clarifying this example as it is an attempt at knock-down refutation of it. Of note is thatPereboom (2012) returns to Tax Exemption 2 ('moral reasons') despite, in 2009, having stated that Tax Exemption 3 was his preferred variant of the case.…”
Three recent 'state of the art' Frankfurt cases are responded to: Widerker's Brain-Malfunction-W case and Pereboom's Tax Evasion cases (2 & 3). These cases are intended by their authors to resurrect the neo-Frankfurt project of overturning the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) in the teeth of the widespread acceptance of some combination of the WKG (Widerker-Kane-Ginet) dilemma, the Flicker of Freedom strategy and the revised PAP response ('Principle of Alternative Blame', 'Principle of Alternative Expectations'). The three neo-Frankfurt cases of Pereboom and Widerker shown to be insufficient for their intended purpose. Of central importance to any account of responsibility is that this applies at the level of the Right and not the Good. Arguments of Carlos Moya are expanded and augmented by considerations from Chisholm, Lucas, Dummett and Lockie (2003) to show that a number of severe problems remain for anyone attempting to resurrect the Frankfurt project.
“…11 I owe this point to an anonymous referee; and see also Pereboom (2009Pereboom ( , 2012-on 'dialectically unsatisfying' responses to his position-of which more below. Fully dealing with this point requires a consideration of the material forthcoming in the section entitled "Robustness, Intensionality, Right vs Good: A Tension".…”
Section: The Basic Response To Tax Evasion 2mentioning
confidence: 97%
“…Nevertheless, this section's dilemma argument is as much an attempt to bring critical pressure to bear towards clarifying this example as it is an attempt at knock-down refutation of it. Of note is thatPereboom (2012) returns to Tax Exemption 2 ('moral reasons') despite, in 2009, having stated that Tax Exemption 3 was his preferred variant of the case.…”
Three recent 'state of the art' Frankfurt cases are responded to: Widerker's Brain-Malfunction-W case and Pereboom's Tax Evasion cases (2 & 3). These cases are intended by their authors to resurrect the neo-Frankfurt project of overturning the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) in the teeth of the widespread acceptance of some combination of the WKG (Widerker-Kane-Ginet) dilemma, the Flicker of Freedom strategy and the revised PAP response ('Principle of Alternative Blame', 'Principle of Alternative Expectations'). The three neo-Frankfurt cases of Pereboom and Widerker shown to be insufficient for their intended purpose. Of central importance to any account of responsibility is that this applies at the level of the Right and not the Good. Arguments of Carlos Moya are expanded and augmented by considerations from Chisholm, Lucas, Dummett and Lockie (2003) to show that a number of severe problems remain for anyone attempting to resurrect the Frankfurt project.
“…However, a neuroscientist has, unbeknownst to him, implanted a device in his brain, which, were it to sense his vividly imagining the punishment scenario, would stimulate his brain so as to causally determine the decision to vote for the tax cut. Jones's imagination is not exercised in this way, and he decides to vote in favor while the device remains idle (Pereboom, , pp. 308–309).…”
Section: Pereboom and His Robustness Criterionmentioning
According to some, free will requires alternative possibilities. But not any old alternative possibility will do. Sometimes, being able to bring about an alternative does not bestow any control on an agent. In order to bestow control, and so be directly relevant qua alternative to grounding the agent's moral responsibility, alternatives need to be robust. Here, I investigate the nature of robust alternatives. I argue that Derk Pereboom's latest robustness criterion is too strong, and I suggest a different criterion based on the idea that what agents need to be able to do is keep open the possibility of securing their blamelessness, rather than needing to directly ensure their own blamelessness at the time of decision.
“…By using the phrase 'cognitively sensitive' I intend to draw on Pereboom's recent work on the robustness criteria (Pereboom 2009(Pereboom , 2012. I therefore use the phrase as a placeholder for the precise conditions which the agent needs to satisfy in order to be 'cognitively sensitive'.…”
Section: Abilities: Non-intentional Vs Doxastic Weak Vs Reliablementioning
Frankfurt-style cases purport to show that an agent can be morally responsible for an action despite not having any alternatives. Some critics have responded by highlighting various alternatives that remain in the cases presented, while Frankfurtians have objected that such alternatives are typically not capable of grounding responsibility. In this essay I address the recent suggestion by Seth Shabo that only alternatives associated with the ‘up to us’ locution ground moral responsibility. I distinguish a number of kinds of ability, suggest which kinds of abilities ground the truth of the ‘up to us’ locution, and outline how these distinctions apply to the indeterministic buffer cases.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
