Stump and Timpe have recently proposed Thomistic based solutions to the traditional problem in Christian theology of how to relate grace and free will. By taking a closer look at the notion of control, I subject Timpe's account -itself an extension of Stump's account -to extended critique. I argue that the centrepiece of Timpe's solution, his reliance on Dowe's notion of quasi-causation, is of no help in addressing the problem. As a result, Timpe's account fails to avoid Semi-Pelagianism. I canvass two alternatives, each of which adheres to the broad theological assumptions made by Stump and Timpe. I conclude that both proposals fail, although I argue that one comes as close as it is possible to get to a solution given the assumptions made.
Philosophers disagree over whether dispositions can be intrinsically finked or masked. Choi suggests that there are no clear, relevant differences between cases where intrinsic finks would be absurd and those where they seem plausible, and as a result rejects them wholesale. Here I highlight two features of dispositional properties, which, when considered together, might provide an explanation for when dispositions can be subject to intrinsic finks and when not. Words: 3982A disposition is finkish if it is caused to disappear in just those circumstances that would normally see the disposition manifest. Lewis gives the example of a fragile glass protected by a sorcerer who has resolved to protect it by altering its fragile microstructure should it ever be struck (Lewis 1997, 147). A disposition is masked when some factor -the mask -inhibits the disposition's being manifested despite the paradigm stimulus conditions obtaining, but which does so without removing the disposition. For example, the potentially lethal effects of arsenic can be masked if, when one consumes arsenic, one also takes its antidote.Some philosophers think that finks and masks can be intrinsic to the object which possesses the disposition Handfield 2008). According to the deniers, if an object which prima facie possesses disposition D also has an intrinsic property P which would cause disposition D to be lost if the stimulus conditions for D are realised, then instead of attributing to the object disposition D and explaining its lack of manifestation by appeal to the intrinsic fink P, we should simply deny that the object has disposition D. Similarly for masks: if an object prima facie possesses a disposition E and also possesses an intrinsic property Q which interferes with the manifestation of E then we should not say that the object has disposition E that is masked by intrinsic property Q, we should just deny the object has the disposition. The debate is not idle. Choi's recent proposal for distinguishing between dispositional and categorical properties relies on denying the possibility of intrinsic finks (Choi 2005). On the other hand, Smith's dispositionalist account of the ability to do otherwise (and the associated compatibilist defence of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities) (2003), and Martin & Heil's dispositionalist account of rulefollowing (1998), both rely on the possibility of intrinsic finks. One of Clarke's examples of an intrinsic fink is as follows: suppose a man is strong and so possesses the power to lift heavy objects. He may subsequently gain an intrinsic property which saps his strength, but only when he Simon Kittle Post-print. Please cite published version in: Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):372-380 (2015)
No abstract
This Element considers the relationship between the traditional view of God as all-powerful, all-knowing and wholly good on the one hand, and the idea of human free will on the other. It focuses on the potential threats to human free will arising from two divine attributes: God's exhaustive foreknowledge and God's providential control of creation.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
hi@scite.ai
10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614
Henderson, NV 89052, USA
Copyright © 2024 scite LLC. All rights reserved.
Made with 💙 for researchers
Part of the Research Solutions Family.