Grace and Free Will: Quiescence and Control

Kittle, Simon

doi:10.12978/jat.2015-3.180813100804

Cited by 9 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 5 publications

(1 reference statement)

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“…I do not pursue this option because I am convinced that theological determinism entails, in O'Connor's words, a "direct form of divine involvement in horrendously evil human actions" (O'Connor 2016, p. 133) the result of which is to "divinize Cruelty, Wrath, Fury, Vengeance, and all the blackest vices" (Ramsay 1749, p. 406). I have offered a partial defence of this conclusions in (Kittle 2016), which is a critique of Couenhoven's (2013) defence of theological determinism; I do not discuss soft theological determinism further here.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 98%

Grace and Free Will on Quiescence and Avoiding Semi-Pelagianism

Kittle

2022

EJPR

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Several recent incompatibilist accounts of divine grace and human free will have appealed to the notion of quiescence in an attempt to avoid semi-Pelagianism while retaining the fallen person’s control over coming to faith and thus the agent’s responsibility for failing to come to faith. In this essay I identify three distinct roles that quiescence has been employed to play in the recent literature. I outline how an account of divine grace and human free will may employ quiescence to play one role without playing either of the others. I also note that getting clear about these roles allows us to see that so-called sourcehood accounts of free will do not need to appeal to quiescence to avoid semi-Pelagianism. Far from being a benefit of sourcehood accounts, however, this highlights a serious defect in such accounts; I draw out this defect, developing it into a general argument against sourcehood accounts of free will.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 98%

Grace and Free Will on Quiescence and Avoiding Semi-Pelagianism

Kittle

2022

EJPR

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“…Nevertheless, we can set the problem aside here. 23 For an extended discussion of the points made in this paragraph, see Kittle (2015). 24 This was the same problem that Timpe had with Stump's account; see Timpe (2007: 288).…”

Section: Kevin Timpementioning

confidence: 95%

Free will, grace, and anti-Pelagianism

Cyr¹,

Flummer²

2017

Int J Philos Relig

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Critics of synergism often complain that the view entails Pelagianism (or at least semi-Pelagianism), and so, critics think, monergism looks like the only live (orthodox) option. Critics of monergism often claim that the view entails that the blame for human sin ultimately traces to God. Recently, several philosophers (including Richard Cross, Eleonore Stump, and Kevin Timpe) have attempted to chart a middle path by offering soteriological accounts which are monergistic (and thus avoid Pelagianism) but maintain the resistibility of God's grace (with the aim of blocking the tracing of sin to God). In this paper, we present a challenge to such accounts of the resistibility of grace, namely that they imply that human beings are praiseworthy for omitting to resist God's grace. Even if such views escape Pelagianism as it is typically defined, they fail to avoid the worry at the heart of prominent criticisms of Pelagianism concerning the praise for a human being's salvation. At the end of the paper, we suggest three possible solutions to this problem.

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“…Kevin Timpe has offered a detailed account on which quiescence can be under the control of the agent insofar as it is an omission, not an "active choice" as Ragland requires (2007. To see other discussions of Stump's view, see Ian DeWeese-Boyd (2006), James Gibson (2014), Lynne Rudder Baker (2006, Simon Kittle (2015), andStan Tyvoll (2004). Michael Rota (2015) makes use of the concept of quiescence in his work concerning foreknowledge and free will.…”

Section: The Solutions Presentedmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Routledge Companion to Free Will

Timpe

Griffith

Levy³

2016

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Questions concerning free will are intertwined with issues in almost every area of philosophy, from metaphysics to mind to moral philosophy, and are also informed by work in different areas of science (principally physics, neuroscience and social psychology). Free will is also a perennial concern of serious thinkers, in theology and in non-western traditions as much as in contemporary academic philosophy. Because free will can be approached from so many different perspectives and has implications for so many debates, a comprehensive survey needs to encompass an enormous range of approaches. This book is the fi rst to draw together leading experts on every aspect of the debate, from those who are central to the current philosophical debate, to non-western perspectives, scientifi c contributions, and the rich history of the debate. Its 61 chapters, commissioned especially for this volume from the world's leading researchers, are framed by a General Introduction and brief section introductions for each of the six sections. A list of References, an annotated Further Reading list, and a short list of Related Topics are included at the end of each chapter.Kevin Timpe holds the W. H. Jellema Chair in Christian Philosophy at Calvin College. He has published a number of books on free will, including

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Grace and Free Will: Quiescence and Control

Cited by 9 publications

References 5 publications

Grace and Free Will on Quiescence and Avoiding Semi-Pelagianism

Grace and Free Will on Quiescence and Avoiding Semi-Pelagianism

Free will, grace, and anti-Pelagianism

The Routledge Companion to Free Will

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