When is an alternative possibility robust?

Kittle, Simon

doi:10.1111/ejop.12369

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 13 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Incompatibilists typically endorse similar conditions as necessary for free will, but deny that they are sufficient. They tend to also require either that agents are able, in a robust sense, to choose otherwise (Kane 2000(Kane , 2002(Kane , 2004Moya 2006Moya , 2007Moya , 2011Ekstrom 2003;Elzein 2017;Franklin 2018;Kittle 2018) or else that agents are, in some sense, the "ultimate sources" of their own choices (Stump 1999a(Stump , b, 2003Pereboom 2000Pereboom , 2001Pereboom , 2003Zagzebski 2000Zagzebski , 2010Timpe 2007Timpe , 2008Shabo 2010;Widerker 2006Widerker , 2009. Meeting these conditions is typically thought to require the falsity of determinism.…”

Section: Epiphenomenalism and Freedom Of The Willmentioning

confidence: 99%

Free Will & Empirical Arguments for Epiphenomenalism

Elzein¹

2019

Agency and Causal Explanation in Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

While philosophers have worried about mental causation for centuries, worries about the causal relevance of conscious phenomena are also increasingly featuring in neuroscientific literature. Neuroscientists have regarded the threat of epiphenomenalism as interesting primarily because they have supposed that it entails free will scepticism. However, the steps that get us from a premise about the causal irrelevance of conscious phenomena to a conclusion about free will are not entirely clear. In fact, if we examine popular philosophical accounts of free will, we find, for the most part, nothing to suggest that free will is inconsistent with the presence of unconscious neural precursors to choices. It is only if we adopt highly nonnaturalistic assumptions about the mind (e.g. if we embrace Cartesian dualism and locate free choice in the non-physical realm) that it seems plausible to suppose that the neuroscientific data generates a threat to free will.

show abstract

Section: Epiphenomenalism and Freedom Of The Willmentioning

confidence: 99%

Free Will & Empirical Arguments for Epiphenomenalism

Elzein¹

2019

Agency and Causal Explanation in Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Widerker 2006;Pereboom 2009;Moya 2011). I have defended a theory of robustness in depth in (Kittle 2018).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

How (not) to think about the sense of ‘able’ relevant to free will

Kittle

2021

Inquiry

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This essay is an investigation into the sense of 'able' relevant to free will, where free will is understood as requiring the ability to do otherwise. I argue that van Inwagen's recent functional specification of the relevant sense of 'able' is flawed, and that explicating the powers involved in free will shall likely require paying detailed attention to the semantics and pragmatics of 'can' and 'able'. Further, I argue that van Inwagen's promise-level ability requirement on free will is too strong. I also argue that Mele's conjecture that the strength of the ability to perform the 'alternative' action (i.e. to refrain, to decide otherwise) be no higher than the strength of the ability exercised in performing an action is mistaken. I suggest there is an asymmetry in the strengths of the abilities which make up the n-way power that comprises free will, and that this looks to have some interesting consequences for the connection between the abilities required for free will and, e.g., the 'up to us' locution.

show abstract

The Robustness Requirement on Alternative Possibilities

Cyr

2022

J Ethics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In a series of recent papers, Justin Capes and Philip Swenson (together) and Michael Robinson (independently) have proposed new versions of the flickers of freedom reply to Frankfurt-style cases (FSCs). Both proposals claim, first, that what agents in FSCs are morally responsible for is performing a certain action on their own, and, second, that agents in FSCs retain robust alternative possibilities-alternatives in which the agent freely omits to perform the pertinent action on their own. In this paper, I argue that, by attending to the details of the omissions in question, it becomes clear that agents in FSCs lack robust alternatives of this sort, for in the alternative sequences such agents do not freely omit. Since the problem for these recent proposals arises from their attempt to show that agents in FSCs retain robust alternatives, I go on to consider whether the flicker theorist might be better off either revising or rejecting the robustness requirement on alternative possibilities. I argue that neither alternative is available to the flicker theorist, and yet I also point out that the reasons why these alternatives are unavailable serve to highlight what exactly is at issue in the debate between leeway and sourcehood theorists, namely the grounds of our freedom.

show abstract

When is an alternative possibility robust?

Cited by 4 publications

References 13 publications

Free Will & Empirical Arguments for Epiphenomenalism

Free Will & Empirical Arguments for Epiphenomenalism

How (not) to think about the sense of ‘able’ relevant to free will

The Robustness Requirement on Alternative Possibilities

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About