Finanças comportamentais no Brasil: um estudo comparativo

Liquidity Restrictions on Investment Funds: Are they a Response to Behavioral Bias?

“…In this field, we show that the limits of rationality are not sporadic and occur enough to promote economic impacts (Milanez, 2003). Rogers, Securato and Ribeiro (2007) affirm that the assumption of rationality, inherent to the HME, goes back to the main criticism existing to the model by Fama (1970), as in the Prospect Theory developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), the use of cognitive biases is listed to explain the decisions made by individuals. For De Bondt et al (2008), literature has provided strong evidence that the premise of unlimited rationality is unrealistic.…”

“…Because of the feeling of "suffering" for a loss, compared to the "pleasure" arising from a gain, presenting different effects on the human being, and consequently, on the investor, according to the "loss aversion" bias, individuals do not necessarily assume greater risk because of higher returns (Halfeld & Torres, 2001;Rogers et al, 2007). We add to this assertion that funds with greater liquidity are not necessarily the most attractive to investors, and that investors who prefer liquidity in their portfolios are not necessarily those with better returns in the investment fund segment.…”

Avaliação de Perdas e Ganhos nas Decisões Financeiras: Uma Investigação à Luz da Prospect Theory

“…Estudos Brasileiros Envolvendo a Prospect Theory Rogers et al (2007) Eles analisaram a influência de gênero, idade, renda individual e titulação (graduação ou pós-graduação) sobre uma única parte do questionário a partir de testes estatísticos. Aqui, esse efeito foi analisado em todas as partes do documento, sendo avaliado o curso ao invés da titulação, e a renda familiar ao invés da renda individual.…”

Behavioral finance and games: simulations in the academic environment

“…Th e fl aws resulting from the use of heuristic rules were identifi ed in the article from Tversky and Kahneman (1974) and the fl aws caused by the use of mental structures were described in the work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979). For these authors and Rogers et al (2007), individuals use mental shortcuts and are subject to biases depending on the following cognitive illusions: (i) Certainty eff ect -originating from the propensity of investors to emphasize the possibilities with the greatest probability of occurrence; (ii) Refl ection/ aversion to loss eff ect -when agents tend to be risk-averse given two earnings possibilities with the same expected utility and tend to accept risk when these possibilities are presented in the domain of losses; (iii) Isolation eff ect -this occurs because, with a view to simplifying the decision, individuals ignore part of the characteristics of each choice option, centering their analysis on the components that distinguish the choice options.…”

“…Decision-making would be limited to the time for the action of deciding, the processing of this information, and regulation of the control mechanisms for emotions; therefore, it is not only rational. Individuals would use mental shortcuts constructed during their socialization process and they would be subject to biases depending on the cognitive illusions constructed (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979;Rogers, Securato, and Ribeiro, 2007), in turn depending on these cognitive and emotional factors, which occur in a social context. Th e assumption was made that cognitive fl aws would occur as in the fi ndings of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and the aim was to understand the students' experience within a social context and from their personal perspective, when they were encouraged to express themselves via metaphors, revealing the symbolism of their experiences.…”