Evolutionary Origins of Morality: Insights From Non-human Primates

Abstract

The aim of this contribution is to explore the origins of moral behavior and its underlying moral preferences and intuitions from an evolutionary perspective. Such a perspective encompasses both the ultimate, adaptive function of morality in our own species, as well as the phylogenetic distribution of morality and its key elements across primates. First, with regard to the ultimate function, we argue that human moral preferences are best construed as adaptations to the affordances of the fundamentally interdependent hunter-gatherer lifestyle of our hominin ancestors. Second, with regard to the phylogenetic origin, we show that even though full-blown human morality is unique to humans, several of its key elements are not. Furthermore, a review of evidence from non-human primates regarding prosocial concern, conformity, and the potential presence of universal, biologically anchored and arbitrary cultural norms shows that these elements of morality are not distributed evenly across primate species. This suggests that they have evolved along separate evolutionary trajectories. In particular, the element of prosocial concern most likely evolved in the context of shared infant care, which can be found in humans and some New World monkeys. Strikingly, many if not all of the elements of morality found in non-human primates are only evident in individualistic or dyadic contexts, but not as third-party reactions by truly uninvolved bystanders. We discuss several potential explanations for the unique presence of a systematic third-party perspective in humans, but focus particularly on mentalizing ability and language. Whereas both play an important role in present day, full-blown human morality, it appears unlikely that they played a causal role for the original emergence of morality. Rather, we suggest that the most plausible scenario to date is that human morality emerged because our hominin ancestors, equipped on the one hand with large and powerful brains inherited from their ape-like ancestor, and on the other hand with strong prosocial concern as a result of cooperative breeding, could evolve into an ever more interdependent social niche.

The dual evolutionary foundations of political ideology

“…However, this conformity is not normative 77 . While chimpanzees engage in second-party punishment of conspecifics when they have been personally affected, they do not punish third-parties who violate group-wide social norms 78 .…”

The dual evolutionary foundations of political ideology

“…copy the most common trait) [74][75][76] . 113 However, this conformity is not normative 77 . While chimpanzees engage in second-party 114 punishment of conspecifics when they have been personally affected, they do not punish 115 third-parties who violate group-wide social norms 78 .…”

“…The two dimensions of ideology are also 72 repeatedly observed across a wide range of cultures 15,32,33 , suggesting that they may be universal. This recurrent pattern of ideological variation across cultures, together with 74 heritable, stable individual differences, raises the intriguing possibility that the two 75 dimensions are not merely self-interested responses to immediate socio-cultural 76 environment 34 or historically-contingent cultural constructions 2,3 , but are at least partly 77 grounded in biology. An evolutionary approach can explain how both genes and environment 78 shape these individual differences in human social behaviour.…”

The Foraging Perspective in Criminology: A Review of Research Literature

“…Despite these concerns, it cannot be ignored that research into animal behaviour has proven to be essential for advancing our understanding of human behaviour (Hager, 2010). For example, our insight into human individual, social, and reproductive behaviours has dramatically improved due to research into these behaviours in nonhuman primates (Lindegaard et al, 2017;Brosnan, 2013;Burkart et al, 2018;Muller and Wrangham, 2009). A major advantage of applying OFT to environmental criminological questions lies in the fact that criminology lacks a formal theoretical framework that is able to explain how, when, and where behavioural strategies are enacted (Bernasco, 2009).…”