Evolutionary Game Analysis of Tripartite Cooperation Strategy under Mixed Development Environment of Cascade Hydropower Stations

Chen, Yun; Hu, Zhigen; Quan, Liu; Chen, Shu

doi:10.1007/s11269-020-02537-0

Cited by 14 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…Evolutionary game theory has been put forward for decades (Gao et al, 2019;Chen et al, 2020). The hypothetical agent of the game is bounded rational, which is very suitable for studying the behavior evolution between individuals.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Resources Sharing Behavior of Science and Technology Service Platform: An Evolutionary Game Approach

Li¹,

Zhang²,

Sang³

2023

OJBM

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As the increasingly complex demand for scientific and technological innovation and explosive growth of scientific and technological resources, all participants of the scientific and technological service platform need to actively share resources to provide support for scientific and technological innovation activities. Therefore, it is of great practical significance to use evolutionary game theory to study the sharing behavior of science and technology resources of users of science and technology service platforms. This paper provides an evolutionary game model based on the analysis of user resource sharing behavior of science and technology service platform, discusses the dynamic evolution process and influence factors of game equilibrium strategy of science and technology resource sharing behavior. The results show that the less the extra cost of positive sharing, the more the extra benefits and the less the defection benefits are, the more users in the platform will choose the positive resource sharing strategy. The research results have an important guiding role in establishing and managing the science and technology service platform, and in making decision about science and technology resource sharing behavior.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Resources Sharing Behavior of Science and Technology Service Platform: An Evolutionary Game Approach

Li¹,

Zhang²,

Sang³

2023

OJBM

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“…Each reservoir included in the upper Yangtze River cooperation system is responsible for multiple simultaneous missions, such as flood control, power generation, and shipping 7 , 8 , etc. The operation of reservoirs affects the competition-relation benefits of multiple departments 34 . For example, when facing a flood, the objective of Changjiang Water Resources Commission (CWRC) of the Ministry of Water Resources (i in the Fig.…”

Section: Challengesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Realizing the full reservoir operation potential during the 2020 Yangtze river floods

Zhang

Dou

et al. 2022

Sci Rep

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Five severe floods occurred in the Yangtze River Basin, China, between July and August 2020, and the Three Gorges Reservoir (TGR) located in the middle Yangtze River experienced the highest inflow since construction. The world’s largest cascade-reservoir group, which counts for 22 cascade reservoirs in the upper Yangtze River, cooperated in real time to control floods. The cooperation prevented evacuation of 600,000 people and extensive inundations of farmlands and aquacultural areas. In addition, no water spillage occurred during the flood control period, resulting in a world-record annual output of the TGR hydropower station. This work describes decision making challenges in the cooperation of super large reservoir groups based on a case-study, controlling the 4th and 5th floods (from Aug-14 to Aug-22), the efforts of technicians, multi-departments, and the state, and reflects on these. To realize the full potential of reservoir operation for the Yangtze River Basin and other basins with large reservoir groups globally, we suggest: (i) improve flood forecast accuracy with a long leading time; (ii) strengthen and further develop ongoing research on reservoir group cooperation; and (iii) improve and implement institutional mechanisms for coordinated operation of large reservoir groups.

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“…Guo and Li construct a tripartite evolutionary game model between the government, private sector, and owners and combine SD to simulate the evolution process, which can be helpful to explore the collaboration mechanism of participants in the PPP model of the old community renovation project [36]. Based on the mixed development environment of cascade hydropower stations, Chen et al establish a tripartite evolutionary game model, which aims to explore the directions and conditions for cooperative and noncooperative strategies evolving into steady states and promote the joint operation of cascade hydropower stations [37].…”

Section: Tripartite Evolutionary Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Game Models on Multiagent Collaborative Mechanism in Responsible Innovation

Yang

Wang

2020

Scientific Programming

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Innovation is a game process; in particular, the behavior among multiple agents in responsible innovation is susceptible to the influence of benefits, risks, responsibilities, and other factors, resulting in unstable collaborative relationships. Therefore, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model including the government, enterprises, and the public, combined with system dynamics modeling to simulate and analyze the tripartite behavior strategy and sensitivity to relevant exogenous variables. The study shows that the tripartite game eventually converges to a stable state of the government active supervision, enterprises making responsible innovation, and the public’s positive participation. The positive participation of the public drives rapidly the game to a steady state, while the behavioral strategies of enterprises are more susceptible to the behavior of the government. Supervision cost, penalty amount, and value compensation are the most critical factors influencing the change of the corresponding agents’ behavior strategy, and the final strategic stability of tripartite is affected by multiple exogenous variables.

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Evolutionary Game Analysis of Tripartite Cooperation Strategy under Mixed Development Environment of Cascade Hydropower Stations

Cited by 14 publications

References 39 publications

Resources Sharing Behavior of Science and Technology Service Platform: An Evolutionary Game Approach

Resources Sharing Behavior of Science and Technology Service Platform: An Evolutionary Game Approach

Realizing the full reservoir operation potential during the 2020 Yangtze river floods

Evolutionary Game Models on Multiagent Collaborative Mechanism in Responsible Innovation

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