Energy Conservation "Nudges" and Environmentalist Ideology: Evidence from a Randomized Residential Electricity Field Experiment

Costa, Dora L.; Kahn, Matthew E.

doi:10.3386/w15939

Cited by 148 publications

(161 citation statements)

References 18 publications

(23 reference statements)

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“…However, when the same experiment was run using students in Romania, no such positive effects were observed because the Romanians did not sanction bad behavior in the PGG (84). Similarly, providing feedback on how one's energy use compares with one's neighbors had reduced consumption among American liberals but may have had the opposite effect among conservatives (80). Studying the interaction between norms and institutional policies is an important direction for future research.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Taken together, this body of work provides clear evidence that reputational incentives can be a powerful force for increasing cooperation in the field. Our paper in particular adds to efforts aimed at promoting energy conservation via nonfinancial incentives, such as providing people information about their own energy use and how it compares with the energy use of their neighbors (79)(80)(81)(82).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Powering up with indirect reciprocity in a large-scale field experiment

Yoeli

Hoffman

Rand

et al. 2013

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

241

171

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A defining aspect of human cooperation is the use of sophisticated indirect reciprocity. We observe others, talk about others, and act accordingly. We help those who help others, and we cooperate expecting that others will cooperate in return. Indirect reciprocity is based on reputation, which spreads by communication. A crucial aspect of indirect reciprocity is observability: reputation effects can support cooperation as long as peoples' actions can be observed by others. In evolutionary models of indirect reciprocity, natural selection favors cooperation when observability is sufficiently high. Complimenting this theoretical work are experiments where observability promotes cooperation among small groups playing games in the laboratory. Until now, however, there has been little evidence of observability's power to promote large-scale cooperation in real world settings. Here we provide such evidence using a field study involving 2413 subjects. We collaborated with a utility company to study participation in a program designed to prevent blackouts. We show that observability triples participation in this public goods game. The effect is over four times larger than offering a $25 monetary incentive, the company's previous policy. Furthermore, as predicted by indirect reciprocity, we provide evidence that reputational concerns are driving our observability effect. In sum, we show how indirect reciprocity can be harnessed to increase cooperation in a relevant, real-world public goods game.evolutionary game theory | experimental economics

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Powering up with indirect reciprocity in a large-scale field experiment

Yoeli

Hoffman

Rand

et al. 2013

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

241

171

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Greater transparency may enable private and corporate occupiers to take energy efficiency into account when making housing decisions. Recent evidence shows that providing feedback to private consumers with respect to their energy consumption is an effective "nudge" to improve energy efficiency [4,8]. From an economic perspective, the energy label could have financial utility for both real estate investors and tenants, as the energy savings resulting from more efficient building may result in lower operating costs and higher property values.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Economics of Energy Labels in the Housing Market

Brounen

Kok²

2010

SSRN Journal

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The residential housing market can play an important role in the reduction of global carbon emissions. This paper reports the first evidence on the market adoption and economic implications of energy performance certificates implemented by the European Union. The results show that adoption rates are low and declining over time, coinciding with negative sentiment regarding the label in the popular media. Labels are clustered among smaller, post-war homes in neighborhoods with more difficult selling conditions. We also document that the adoption rates of energy labels have a positive relation to the number of "green" voters during the 2006 national elections. Within the sample of labeled homes, the energy label creates transparency in the energy performance of dwellings. Our analysis shows that consumers capitalize this information into the price of their prospective homes. JEL codes: D12, Q51, R21

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“…First, the differences could be due to strict neoclassical preference heterogeneity. Indeed, there is significant evidence that agents have varying preferences for individually provided public goods (Saphores, Nixon, Gounseitan, and Shapiro (2007) and Costa and Kahn (2011)). Second, variation inṼ could embed heterogeneity in social norms throughout an economy, such as in Benabou and Tirole (2006).…”

Section: Modeling Preference Heterogeneitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…There are several reasons why accounting for private provision of public goods could affect the design of policy. First, there are a variety of results showing that different individuals in the economy have different values for their own public good provision (for example Costa and Kahn (2011) and Jacobsen, Kotchen, and Vandenbergh (2012)). 2 Second, reasons such as warm glow, moral suasion and impure altruism have all been shown to exist in both the lab and the field (Andreoni (1989), Levitt and List (2007)).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Public Goods Provision in the Presence of Heterogeneous Green Preferences

Jacobsen

LaRiviere²,

Price³

2014

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This paper develops a model that incorporates heterogeneity across preference structures where some agents exhibit pro-social behavior -"green" preferences in our examples -and some do not. We compare the relative performance of various policies to increase public goods provision in the presence of this heterogeneity. We find that technology standards are almost always preferable to price instruments, working counter to the usual efficiency advantage of price-based policy. We then extend the model to allow heterogeneity in both green preferences and costs of provision: we show how the two effects compete to determine optimal policy. In the context of energy conservation policy we argue that heterogeneity in green preferences may importantly reduce the efficiency costs of existing consumer-facing technology mandates.

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Energy Conservation "Nudges" and Environmentalist Ideology: Evidence from a Randomized Residential Electricity Field Experiment

Cited by 148 publications

References 18 publications

Powering up with indirect reciprocity in a large-scale field experiment

Powering up with indirect reciprocity in a large-scale field experiment

On the Economics of Energy Labels in the Housing Market

Public Goods Provision in the Presence of Heterogeneous Green Preferences

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