We examine the impacts of increased US gasoline taxes in a model that links the markets for new, used, and scrapped vehicles and recognizes the considerable heterogeneity among households and cars. Household choice parameters derive from an estimation procedure that integrates individual choices for car ownership and miles traveled. We find that each cent-per-gallon increase in the price of gasoline reduces the equilibrium gasoline consumption by about 0.2 percent. Taking account of revenue recycling, the impact of a 25-cent gasoline tax increase on the average household is about $30 per year (2001 dollars). Distributional impacts depend importantly on how additional revenues from the tax increase are recycled. (JEL D12, H22, H25, L62, L71)

This paper employs an empirically estimated model to study the equilibrium effects of an increase in the US corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards. I identify and model heterogeneity across firms and find that the profit impacts of CAFE fall almost entirely on domestic producers. The welfare analyses consider the simultaneous household decision of vehicle and miles traveled, allowing direct comparison with a gasoline tax. Finally, I consider dynamic impacts in the used car market. I find these comprise nearly half the gross welfare cost of CAFE and fall disproportionately on low-income households. Contrary to previous results, the overall welfare costs are regressive. (JEL H24, L51, L62)

No abstract

Fourteen U.S. states recently pledged to adopt limits on greenhouse gases (GHGs) per mile of light-duty automobiles. Previous analyses predicted this action would significantly reduce emissions from new cars in these states, but ignored possible offsetting emissions increases from policy-induced adjustments in new car markets in other (non-adopting) states and in the used car market.Such offsets (or "leakage") reflect the fact that the state-level effort interacts with the national corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standard: the state-level initiative effectively loosens the national standard and gives automakers scope to profitably increase sales of high-emissions automobiles in non-adopting states. In addition, although the state-level effort may well spur the invention of fuel-and emissions-saving technologies, interactions with the federal CAFE standard limit the nationwide emissions reductions from such advances. Using a multi-period numerical simulation model, we find that 70-80 percent of the emissions reductions from new cars in adopting states are offset by emissions leakage.This research examines a particular instance of a general issue of policy significance -namely, problems from "nested" federal and state environmental regulations. Such nesting implies that similar leakage difficulties are likely to arise under several newly proposed state-level initiatives.

We estimate the sensitivity of scrap decisions to changes in used car values -the "scrap elasticity" -and show how it influences used car fleets under policies aimed at reducing gasoline use. Large scrap elasticities produce emissions leakage under efficiency standards as the longevity of used vehicles is increased, a process known as the Gruenspecht effect. To explore the magnitude of this leakage we assemble a novel dataset of U.S. used vehicle registrations and prices, which we relate through time via differential effects in gasoline cost: A gasoline price increase or decrease of $1 changes used vehicle prices and alters the number of fuel-efficient vs. fuel-inefficient vehicles scrapped by 18%. These relationships allow us to provide what we believe are the first estimates of the scrap elasticity itself, which we find to be about -0.7. When applied in a model of fuel economy standards, the central elasticities we estimate suggest that 12-17% of the expected fuel savings will leak away through the used vehicle market. This considerably reduces the cost-effectiveness of the standard, rivaling or exceeding the importance of the often-cited mileage "rebound" effect.