Endorsement and assertion

Abstract

Scientists, philosophers, and other researchers commonly assert their theories. This is surprising, as there are good reasons for skepticism about theories in cutting-edge research. I propose a new account of assertion in research contexts that vindicates these assertions. This account appeals to a distinct propositional attitude called endorsement, which is the rational attitude of committed advocacy researchers have to their theories. The account also appeals to a theory of conversational pragmatics known as the Question Under Discussion model, or QUD. Hence, I call the theory the EQUD model. Motivating this account is a recognition that the speech act of assertion has two roles to play in research contexts. The first is the advocacy role, in which researchers assert a theory in order to advocate for it. The second is the evidential role, which is used to add to the common stock of information available to a field of inquiry. The EQUD model provides an account of warranted assertion for both these roles in research contexts. This success provides support for the theory of endorsement. It also provides support for information updating accounts of assertion.

How to endorse conciliationism

“…In order to resolve this apparent tension, I propose that we recognize a distinct doxastic attitude, one which is appropriately governed by rational norms concerning collective inquiry. I call this attitude endorsement, and the norms which govern it inclusive epistemic rationality (Fleisher 2018(Fleisher , 2019. As I will argue below, this theory of endorsement provides a solution to both versions of self-undermining.…”

Against Methodological Gambling

“…A potential objection could nevertheless be raised that the value of withholding judgement may in some cases be equivalent to that of endorsing a false claim, particularly if the results obtained by EMT are used in practical decision-making where (1) u(F) < u(W) < u(T) 11 We interchangeably refer to believing and endorsing a claim or a result because we assume that the triangulator will only (publicly) endorse some claim if she believes it. Other more complicated cases of the interplay between beliefs and endorsements are outside of the scope of this paper (for more details see Fleisher, 2018Fleisher, , 2019.…”

Should agents be immodest?

“…There could be contexts in which some types of insincerity can be epistemically permitted. Fleisher (2019), for instance, has argued that scientists can publicly endorse ideas that they do not fully believe. Even if they have a low degree of confidence in their own theories, they can make a significant contribution to the advancement of science.…”