Should agents be immodest?

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

2022

Self Cite

What is structural rationality? Specifically, what is the distinctive feature of structural requirements of rationality? Some philosophers have argued, roughly, that the distinctive feature of structural requirements is coherence. But what does coherence mean, exactly? Or, at least, what do structuralists about rationality have in mind when they claim that structural rationality is coherence? This issue matters for making progress in various active debates concerning rationality. In this paper, I analyze three strategies for figuring out what coherence means in the debates on structural rationality. I argue that these strategies face problems.

“…14 Daoust (2021), Lewis (1971), Joyce (2009), Elga (2010), Lasonen-Aarnio (2015. 15 Davidson, McKinsey and Suppes (1955).…”

Section: The Requirement-based Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Requirement-based Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

Structural Rationality and the Property of Coherence

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

2022

Self Cite

“…Specifically, the Erratic Juror should use his unorthodox standards when facing a specialty 16 See Lewis (1971). See Daoust (2021) for discussion in jury contexts.…”

Section: A Partial Solution To the Puzzlementioning

confidence: 99%

Optimizing Individual and Collective Reliability: A Puzzle

2022

Social Epistemology

Self Cite

Many epistemologists have argued that there is some degree of independence between individual and collective reliability (e.g., Kitcher 1990;Mayo-Wilson, Zollman, and Danks 2011;Dunn 2018). The question, then, is: To what extent are the two independent of each other? And in which contexts do they come apart? In this paper, I present a new case confirming the independence between individual and collective reliability optimization. I argue that, in voting groups, optimizing individual reliability can conflict with optimizing collective reliability. This can happen even if various conditions are held constant, such as: the evidence jurors have access to, the voting system, the number of jurors, some independence conditions between voters, and so forth. This observation matters in many active debates on, e.g., epistemic dilemmas, the wisdom of crowds, independence theses, epistemic democracy, and the division of epistemic labour.

“…For instance, according to Christensen, (2013), epistemic modesty can be permitted in cases where various epistemic ideals (e.g., ideals of coherence, good reasoning and evidence-responsiveness) conflict with each other. Relatedly, DiPaolo (2018) and Daoust (2020) argue that modesty can be part of the best non-ideal option available to agents.…”

Section: Joyce Writesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic Consequentialism, Veritism, and Scoring Rules

Côté-Bouchard

2021

Erkenn

Self Cite

We argue that there is a tension between two monistic claims that are the core of recent work in epistemic consequentialism. The first is a form of monism about epistemic value, commonly known as veritism: accuracy is the sole final objective to be promoted in the epistemic domain. The other is a form of monism about a class of epistemic scoring rules: that is, strictly proper scoring rules are the only legitimate measures of inaccuracy. These two monisms, we argue, are in tension with each other. If only accuracy has final epistemic value, then there are legitimate alternatives to strictly proper scoring rules. Our argument relies on the way scoring rules are used in contexts where accuracy is rewarded, such as education.