Structural Rationality and the Property of Coherence

Daoust, Marc‐Kevin

doi:10.1111/papq.12404

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 79 publications

(96 reference statements)

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“…He says that, in cases of Level-Splitting, inter-level incoherent attitudes are structurally irrational, but not substantively irrational. 37 I raise another (tangential) worry against this account of coherence in Daoust (2022).…”

Section: A Worry For Worsnip's Vindication Of the Normativity Of Stru...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Imperfection, Accuracy, and Structural Rationality

Daoust

2022

Erkenn

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Structural requirements of rationality prohibit various things, like having inconsistent combinations of attitudes, having means-end incoherent combinations of attitudes, and so on. But what is the distinctive feature of structural requirements of rationality? And do we fall under an obligation to be structurally rational? These issues have been at the heart of significant debates over the past fifteen years. Some philosophers have recently argued that we can unify the structural requirements of rationality by analyzing what is constitutive of our attitudes (Lee 2020; Worsnip 2018a). It has also been suggested that, in the course of good first-personal deliberation, agents should treat structurally irrational combinations of attitudes as off-limits (Worsnip 2021). In this paper, I raise a worry for these two theses concerning structural rationality. Roughly, I argue that some imperfect epistemic agents (like us) can be disposed to have structurally irrational combinations of attitudes. Also, when these imperfect agents deliberate, they should not treat structurally irrational combinations of attitudes as offlimits. Given our imperfections, being structurally irrational can very well be the best option we have. More generally, these observations reveal that structural rationality should not always be theorized independently from more "substantive" norms, like responsiveness to reasons or expected value optimization.

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Section: A Worry For Worsnip's Vindication Of the Normativity Of Stru...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Imperfection, Accuracy, and Structural Rationality

Daoust

2022

Erkenn

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“…Structural rationality, on the other hand, is a matter of having the right relations hold between one's mental states, independently of the reasons for having those states. Exactly how the relationship between the two is to be understood is a contentious issue.Note that this essay is primarily about structural rationality and how it connects to aesthetics, although I will say something about the relationship between rational requirements and aesthetic reasons in the final sections of the essay.2 For a recent analysis on the property of coherence and what it might mean for proponents of structural rationality, see Daoust (2022).3 This claim is most notably defended by Broome (2013a; 2013b).…”

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“…2 For a recent analysis on the property of coherence and what it might mean for proponents of structural rationality, see Daoust (2022).…”

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The Aesthetic Enkratic Principle

Marín

2022

British Journal of Aesthetics

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There is a dimension of rationality, known as structural rationality, according to which a paradigmatic example of what it means to be rational is not to be akratic. Although some philosophers claim that aesthetics falls within the scope of rationality, a non-akrasia constraint prohibiting certain combinations of attitudes is yet to be developed in this domain. This essay is concerned with the question of whether such a requirement is plausible and, if so, whether it is an actual requirement of aesthetic rationality. Ultimately, this paper defends the view that aesthetics is no different from other domains in that it requires coherence between a subject’s mental states (in the aesthetic case, between what is judged and what is aesthetically liked).

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Positive illusion and the normativity of substantive and structural rationality

2022

Philosophical Explorations

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To explain why we should be structurally rational-or mentally coherent-is notoriously difficult. Some philosophers argue that the normativity of structural rationality can be explained in terms of substantive rationality, which is a matter of correct response to reason. I argue that the psychological phenomena-positive illusions-are counterexamples to the substantivist approach. Substantivists dismiss the relevance of positive illusions because they accept evidentialism that reason for belief must be evidence. I argue that their evidentialist stance would imply that we are caught in unsolvable dilemmas arising from positive illusions.

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Structural Rationality and the Property of Coherence

Cited by 4 publications

References 79 publications

Imperfection, Accuracy, and Structural Rationality

Imperfection, Accuracy, and Structural Rationality

The Aesthetic Enkratic Principle

Positive illusion and the normativity of substantive and structural rationality

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