Marked increases were obtained in the levels of ribosomal and soluble RNA fractions in winter wheat submitted to cold acclimation temperatures. In comparison, the change in the rRNA and sRNA of spring wheat, grown under similar conditions, were less pronounced.With the cold acclimation treatment, sRNA accumulated by winter wheat shows an important change in its (G + C)/ (A -f-V + U) ratio, whereas no change in base composition is observed in the sRNA of spring wheat or the rRNA of both spring and winter wheat.It is suggested that in winter wheat, cold acclimation temperatures potentiate increased synthesis of specific sRNAs, this possibly being part of the increased capacity for protein synthesis associated with cold acclimation.

It seems that epistemically rational agents should avoid incoherent combinations of beliefs and should respond correctly to their epistemic reasons. However, some situations seem to indicate that such requirements cannot be simultaneously satisfied. In such contexts, assuming that there is no unsolvable dilemma of epistemic rationality, either (i) it could be rational that one's higher-order attitudes do not align with one's first-order attitudes or (ii) requirements such as responding correctly to epistemic reasons that agents have are not genuine rationality requirements. This result doesn't square well with plausible theoretical assumptions concerning epistemic rationality. So, how do we solve this puzzle? In this paper, I will suggest that an agent can always reason from infallible higher-order reasons. This provides a partial solution to the above puzzle.

The homogenate was filtered through 12 layers of gauze, and the filtrate was centrifuged for 5 min at 100g to remove nuclei and cell debris. Plastids were isolated from the supernatant by sedimentation at 10OOg for 12 min. Plastid pellets were then washed once by resuspension in the homogenization buffer and sedimented as before.Isolation of RNA. Total nucleic acid was prepared from seedling tissues by SDS'-phenol extraction at 4 C. Tissues were homogenized for 1 min in a Virtis blender, in presence of glycine buffer (0.1 M glycine, 0.1 M NaCl, 0.01 M EDTA, pH 9.5), phenol, SDS, and bentonite (7).Homogenate was filtered through four layers of gauze, and the filtrate was stirred for 15 min; after centrifugation (5000g for 10 min) the aqueous layer was removed and the phenol extraction was repeated once. Nucleic acids were precipitated from the final supernatant solution by addition of sodium acetate (2% final concentration) and 2.5 volumes of 95% (v/v) cold ethanol. The precipitate was then dissolved in glycine buffer and reprecipitated as before with ethanol in order to purify further the RNA and to remove phenol; this step was repeated twice. Final precipitates were stored in 95% (v/v) ethanol at -20 C.Total nucleic acid at different developmental stages was obtained by measuring the absorbance, at 260 nm, of the purified RNA.

An experiment examined the interaction between nitrogen and irrigation on a sward of Lolium multiflorum (Italian ryegrass). Between rates of 100 and 200 units of nitrogen per acre, the response to nitrogen over the whole season was not increased by irrigation. Positive and negative interactions occurring in different periods cancelled each other out. Between rates of 200 and 400 units of nitrogen per acre, irrigation substantially increased the response to nitrogen, negative interactions being small relative to positive interactions. The results suggest that the moisture status of the upper few inches of the soil is an important factor in determining response to applied nitrogen. Response to nitrogen was increased when irrigation improved the moisture status of this zone.The supply of nitrogen and of water to grass swards are two major factors determining yield. The combined effect of these two factors has frequently been examined on swards containing both grass and clover (Robinson

Epistemically immodest agents take their own epistemic standards to be among the most truth-conducive ones available to them. Many philosophers have argued that immodesty is epistemically required of agents, notably because being modest entails a problematic kind of incoherence or self-distrust. In this paper, I argue that modesty is epistemically permitted in some social contexts. I focus on social contexts where agents with limited cognitive capacities cooperate with each other (like juries).

Is epistemic inconsistency a mere symptom of having violated other requirements of rationality-notably, reasons-responsiveness requirements? Or is inconsistency irrational on its own? This question has important implications for the debate on the normativity of epistemic rationality. In this paper, I defend a new account of the explanatory role of the requirement of epistemic consistency. Roughly, I will argue that, in cases where an epistemically rational agent is permitted to believe P and also permitted to disbelieve P (relative to a body of epistemic reasons), the consistency requirement plays a distinct explanatory role. I will also argue that such a type of permissiveness is a live possibility when it comes to rational epistemic standards. Keywords Rationality • Consistency • Epistemic reasons • Requirements • PermissivenessLinda believes that P and she also believes that ~P. She displays a kind of epistemic irrationality-she is inconsistent. Here is how we can define the requirement she violates:Consistency: Rationality requires that, if A believes that P at time t, A does not believe ~P at time t. Now, why is Linda irrational? Does her violating Consistency explain why she is irrational? Perhaps her inconsistency is just a symptom or a by-product of her having violated other requirements of epistemic rationality. Indeed, there are two main explanations of why Linda is irrational:

What is structural rationality? Specifically, what is the distinctive feature of structural requirements of rationality? Some philosophers have argued, roughly, that the distinctive feature of structural requirements is coherence. But what does coherence mean, exactly? Or, at least, what do structuralists about rationality have in mind when they claim that structural rationality is coherence? This issue matters for making progress in various active debates concerning rationality. In this paper, I analyze three strategies for figuring out what coherence means in the debates on structural rationality. I argue that these strategies face problems.

It has been argued that an epistemically rational agent's evidence is subjectively mediated through some rational epistemic standards, and that there are incompatible but equally rational epistemic standards available to agents. This supports Permissiveness, the view according to which one or multiple fully rational agents are permitted to take distinct incompatible doxastic attitudes towards P (relative to a body of evidence). In this paper, I argue that the above claims entail the existence of a unique and more reliable epistemic standard. My strategy relies on Condorcet's Jury Theorem. This gives rise to an important problem for those who argue that epistemic standards are permissive, since the reliability criterion is incompatible with such a type of Permissiveness.