Ending Up in Pizza: Accountability as a Problem of Institutional Arrangement in Brazil

Taylor, Matthew M.; Buranelli, Vinícius C.

doi:10.1353/lap.2007.0013

Cited by 17 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…Studies of the Brazilian MP fall into similar camps. While some scholars examine the challenges presented by prosecutors' excessive discretion and limited accountability (Arantes 2002; Sadek & Cavalcanti 2003; Hochstetler & Keck 2007; Kerche 2007; Nóbrega 2007; Taylor & Buranelli 2007), others take discretion for granted and call attention to prosecutors' ability to make the law matter (McAllister 2008) and break the endless regress (Mueller 2006).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Relational regulation in the Brazilian Ministério Publico: The organizational basis of regulatory responsiveness

Coslovsky¹

2011

Regulation & Governance

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Recent research on regulatory enforcement has been showing that the best way to enforce protective regulations is to thoroughly adapt the remedy to the problem at hand. Unfortunately, this is far from easy, as organizations and work environments all too often encourage street-level bureaucrats to standardize and simplify their practices. In an attempt to bridge this gap, many scholars equate responsiveness to preprogrammed escalation. This article analyzes how the Brazilian Ministério Público (MP) promotes a more ambitious form of responsiveness, here called relational regulation. While most of the formal features of the MP encourage routinization, groups of reformist prosecutors identify important cases, recruit external allies, and jointly devise innovative and contextspecific solutions to problems of non-compliance. Crucially, this mode of action is not an anomaly, the result of individual proclivities or specific and formal job assignments. Rather, it is systematically produced by a mostly parallel and covert organization that operates within and expands beyond the MP itself. These two logics -routinized and custom-made responses -compete, cooperate, interpenetrate, and find common ground within the same organizational umbrella, and through their interaction they create an enforcement agency that is more robust, reliable, and responsive than allowed by current theory.r ego_1099 70..89

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Relational regulation in the Brazilian Ministério Publico: The organizational basis of regulatory responsiveness

Coslovsky¹

2011

Regulation & Governance

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“…This is consistent with Power and Taylor's conclusion (2011, 259) that “after analyzing other countries experiences … Brazil not only is doing fairly well but may be on the cusp of a very positive equilibrium, if it can push itself over the hump and improve the overall performance of its web of accountability.” For a slightly earlier, less optimistic conclusion, focusing specifically on the failure to impose sanctions in political corruption cases, see Taylor and Buranelli ().…”

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confidence: 99%

Transnational Anticorruption Law in Action: Cases from Argentina and Brazil

Davis¹,

Jorge²,

Machado³

2015

Law soc. inq.

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Debates over whether transnational and international legal institutions are fair, effective, or legitimate responses to corruption of local public officials have an important empirical dimension. We use case studies to examine whether foreign legal institutions serve as fair, effective, and legitimate complements to local anticorruption institutions. We refer to this set of claims as the “institutional complementarity theory.” The first case study centers on proceedings concerning bribes paid by subsidiaries of Siemens AG, a German company, to obtain and retain a contract to provide national identity cards for the Argentine government. The second case study examines events stemming from overbilling in the construction of a courthouse in Brazil. Analysis of these cases suggests that the institutional complementary theory is credible. At the same time, the findings suggest that local institutions have greater potential, and foreign institutions have more limited potential, than the theory assumes.

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Fronting Up to the State: Constructing a ‘Politics of Rights’

Earle¹

2017

Transgressive Citizenship and the Struggle for Social Justice

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Ending Up in Pizza: Accountability as a Problem of Institutional Arrangement in Brazil

Cited by 17 publications

References 0 publications

Relational regulation in the Brazilian Ministério Publico: The organizational basis of regulatory responsiveness

Relational regulation in the Brazilian Ministério Publico: The organizational basis of regulatory responsiveness

Transnational Anticorruption Law in Action: Cases from Argentina and Brazil

Fronting Up to the State: Constructing a ‘Politics of Rights’

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