Empathizing with Rogue Leaders: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Bashar al-Asad

Malici, Akan; Buckner, Allison L.

doi:10.1177/0022343308096156

Cited by 17 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…In modern operational code studies, it is possible to infer a leader’s preferences regarding the outcomes of settlement, deadlock, domination and submission, as seen in Figure 1, for the Self and Other based on their master beliefs in operational code analysis (P-1, I-1 and P-4). A leader’s master beliefs are compared to the scores of 164 speeches by a norming group of world leaders (Malici and Buckner, 2008). Based on the comparison with this norming group, a researcher can make predictions about the likelihood of a particular leader’s strategies for conflict or cooperation (Walker et al, 2011).…”

Section: Operational Code Analysis: Theory and Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

European populist radical right leaders’ foreign policy beliefs: An operational code analysis

Özdamar

Ceydilek

2019

European Journal of International Relations

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Despite the significance of the subject, studies on the foreign policy preferences of European populist radical right leaders are scarce except for a handful of examples. Are European populist radical right leaders more hostile than other world leaders or comparatively friendly? Do they use cooperative or conflictual strategies to achieve their political goals? What are the leadership types associated with their strategic orientations in international relations? Using the operational code construct in this empirical study, we answer these questions and depict the foreign policy belief systems of seven European populist radical right leaders. We test whether they share a common pattern in their foreign policy beliefs and whether their foreign policy belief systems are significantly different from the norming group of average world leaders. The results indicate that European populist radical right leaders lack a common pattern in terms of their foreign policy belief systems. While the average scores of the analysed European populist radical right leaders suggest that they are more conflictual in their world views, results also show that they employ instrumental approaches relatively similar to the average group of world leaders. This article illuminates the microfoundations of strategic behaviour in international relations and arrives at conclusions about the role of European populist radical right leaders in mainstream International Relations discussions, such as idealism versus realism. In this sense, the cognitivist research school complements and advances structural accounts of international relations by analysing leadership in world affairs.

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Section: Operational Code Analysis: Theory and Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

European populist radical right leaders’ foreign policy beliefs: An operational code analysis

Özdamar

Ceydilek

2019

European Journal of International Relations

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“…Malici and Buckner (2008) derive the operational code of Ahmedinejad from thirteen speeches and their results are similar to mine.…”

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confidence: 73%

“…I am trying to see the situation through the eyes of the Iranian regime. This can be termed as “realistic empathy” (Malici and Buckner 2008). It does not mean to approve or legitimize the Iranian regime’s behavior.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Dealing or Dueling with the United States? Explaining and Predicting Iranian Behavior during the Nuclear Crisis

Devlen¹

2010

International Studies Review

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The purpose of this article is to understand and predict the Iranian behavior during the nuclear crisis. The model presented here provides a simple framework for structuring strategic interaction (game theory), a way to capture the beliefs of the actors prior to the crisis and deduce likely behavior from them (operational code analysis), and identify key factors (large‐group identity and political survival) to monitor real time to determine preferences independent from observed behavior. The main finding of this analysis is that Iranians would like to negotiate a settlement but they have a very conflictual view of the United States. They fear that if they show willingness to negotiate, the United States could exploit it. This lack of trust and the relatively low cost of maintaining the current deadlock prevent the Iranians coming to the table.

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“…According to TIP (Marfleet and Walker 2006;Walker 2004; see also Malici and Buckner 2008: 790-791), I-1 and P-4a reflect a decision making elite's thinking about what they want and what they perceive as attainable. What the decision maker thinks they want and can achieve produces their preferences over foreign policy outcomes.…”

Section: Operational Code Beliefsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Of Six Minds on the Matter: A Psychology-based Typology of Hawkish and Dovish Decision Makers

Brown¹

2011

PsycEXTRA Dataset

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Foreign policy elites are often labeled "hawks" or "doves," and states' foreign policies can vary widely depending on whether hawks or doves prevail. Yet seldom asked is this question: why are some elites hawks and others doves? I seek to answer this question. A few previous studies also address this question. However, they typically suffer one or both of the following shortcomings. First, they often overlook variations among elites within the hawk and dove categories. Second, they typically fail to systematically assess the characteristics distinguishing hawks from doves. I provide an improvement by systematically assessing the characteristics distinguishing hawks from doves and exploring differences among elites within the two categories. Specifically, I propose a psychology-based six-fold typology comprising three hawkish and three dovish decision maker types. I distinguish among the types via differing operational codes, personality traits, hypothesized susceptibilities to cognitive errors/biases, and hypothesized foreign policy positions. To test my typology's validity, I examine content analysis of selected George W. Bush administration officials' verbal behavior. This facilitates determining if elites are classifiable via my typology. To test my typology's hypotheses, I use congruence analysis of selected elites' decision making leading up to the 2003 United States-led invasion of Iraq. This qualitative analysis allows me to determine the errors and biases to which examined elites are susceptible and the elites' policy positions. I would like to offer to my committee heartfelt thanks for their assistance with what has been a long process. Juliet Kaarbo, co-chair of my committee, has been generous beyond all reasonable expectation. She has patiently encouraged, guided, and helped me even as her career took her across the Atlantic. I owe her a tremendous debt of gratitude. Mark Joslyn, also co-chair of my committee, has given me crucial moral support. Further, he and Donald Haider-Markel have played key roles in shepherding this project. I cannot overstate the importance of their support and the support of my entire committee. Above all, I thank my wife and family. They have tirelessly stood by me over the years, and the completion of my dissertation would not have been possible without them. v Table of Contents Introduction 1-14 Chapter 1: Theoretical Framework 15-98 Chapter 2: Research Design 99-130 Chapter 3: Quantitative Analysis of Personality Trait and Beliefs 131-170 Chapter 4: Qualitative Analysis of Decision Making 171-227 Chapter 5: Conclusion 228-233 References 234-246 Appendix A 247

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Empathizing with Rogue Leaders: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Bashar al-Asad

Cited by 17 publications

References 27 publications

European populist radical right leaders’ foreign policy beliefs: An operational code analysis

European populist radical right leaders’ foreign policy beliefs: An operational code analysis

Dealing or Dueling with the United States? Explaining and Predicting Iranian Behavior during the Nuclear Crisis

Of Six Minds on the Matter: A Psychology-based Typology of Hawkish and Dovish Decision Makers

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