The end of the Cold War eliminated many of the external constraints that had straitjacketed German policy during the Cold War era. At the same time, unification augmented Germany's already substantial power base. In light of these changed geopolitical circumstances, it was only logical for the dominant theory of security studies, namely realism, to expect a reorientation in German foreign policy behavior toward unilateralism and increased levels of power politics. Yet these expectations proved wrong. This article argues that German foreign policy behavior in the post‐Cold War era can be ascribed to a foreign policy culture of reticence—a culture of restraint and accommodation that can be traced to well‐defined sets of fundamental beliefs of the German decision‐making elite. This article systematically examines these beliefs in the post‐Cold War era, relates them to foreign policy choices, and concludes with a plea for increased attention to ideational variables.

Although the end of the Cold War brought the transformation of the communist bloc, some states have resisted the ensuing wave of democratization. This study assumes that important mechanisms of continuity and change in communist states are situated in the belief systems of their leaders and that the years between 1985 and 1991 were a catalytic period. What did Fidel Castro of Cuba and Kim Il Sung of North Korea learn from the end of the Cold War? Their belief systems are examined prior to 1985 and after 1991, i.e., before and after the collapse of other communist regimes. If learning has occurred, it should be reflected in a comparison of their beliefs for these time periods. Our results from ANOVA analyses indicate that Fidel Castro engaged in some learning but Kim Il Sung did not. This finding is complemented by the results of a MANOVA analysis, which indicate that the end of the Cold War had only a modest impact on Fidel Castro and Kim Il Sung, independent of their specific personalities. We conclude by drawing attention to the ensuing debate between structural-and agent-level theorizing and by giving some suggestions for future research.

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The conventional wisdom regarding Iran and Syria is that these are belligerent states headed by hostile leaders. Rarely is an effort made to imagine how international politics are perceived from the Iranian or the Syrian perspectives, or consider how these perceptions are part of an interactive crisis in which the USA may be implicated as deeply as the regimes in Tehran and Damascus. In this article, we investigate the United States' ongoing crisis with Iran and Syria from the vantage point of their leadership. Our central research questions are: What kind of leaders are Ahmadinejad of Iran and al-Asad of Syria?More specifically, what are their cognitive diagnostic beliefs of the ensuing conflict and their prescriptive beliefs towards it? What is an appropriate strategy for the USA towards Iran and Syria? The answers to these questions speak to the conventional wisdom of Ahmadinejad and al-Asad as hostile and propose strategies for averting a dangerous escalation of the conflict. Our central goal in this article is to develop towards Iran and Syria 'realistic empathy' as we consider it 'the great corrective for all forms of warprovoking misperception'.

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Why did France and Great Britain cooperate in Operation Enduring Freedom after September 11, 2001, and fail to achieve cooperation in Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003? Operational code analysis is used to test the threat-cooperation proposition that common perceptions of a security externality and common prescriptions toward it lead to cooperation, whereas an absence of common perceptions or prescriptions leads to a lack of cooperation. Operational code analysis is well suited for this task because it conceptualizes the “self in situation,” with the self having diagnostic propensities about a security externality and prescriptive propensities toward this situation. An examination of these propensities in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom lends strong support for the threat-cooperation proposition.

Henry Kissinger once remarked, “As a professor, I tended to think of history as run by impersonal forces. But when you see it in practice, you see the difference personalities make.” It is common sense that a state’s foreign policy cannot be explained without reference to the beliefs of such leaders as Barack Obama, Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin, Angela Merkel, or Kim Jong Un, to name a few. It is, therefore, ironic that leaders have mattered little for much of the international relations discipline’s history. Structural approaches with foci on the distribution of power, international institutions and domestic politics have been dominant. To be sure, scholarship on belief systems has been present since the 1950s. Early key concepts included the decision maker’s “definition of the situation,” the “ecological environment,” and the “attitudinal prism.” This scholarship laid an important foundation; however, at the time, it did not generate competitive research programs. Agent-centered approaches remained secondary and beliefs were seen as residual variables. They were also seen as “unobservable”—difficult to assess and operationalize. Indeed, rigorous methods that would enable the scientific study of belief systems have long been absent. Over time such challenges were addressed successfully, and these efforts were catalyzed by scholarly advances and also by real-world developments. In the real world, it was mainly the end of the Cold War that illustrated the insufficiency of structural theories. Under Mikhail Gorbachev the Soviet Union took a fundamentally new course, and it gave up power. The dominant structural theories did neither predict the ensuing events nor could they explain them. They were “caught flat-footed,” as one scholar wrote. What really mattered, it seemed, was what these theories did not pay much attention to: namely decision makers’ belief-systems. Of particular relevance are decision makers’ operational code beliefs. Along with the general literature on belief systems, the operational code research program began in the 1950s. It gained still more prominence with the work of Alexander George and Ole Holsti in the 1960s and 1970s. A decision maker’s operational code is constituted by his answers to questions such as: What is the essential nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one’s political opponents? What is the best approach for selecting goals for political action? The most significant advances in the operational code research program were then made in the 1980s and beyond by Stephen Walker and his students. The progress occurred on the theoretical, methodological, and empirical plane, and through their work the research program has become, (and continues to be) a mainstay in contemporary international relations scholarship.