Of Six Minds on the Matter: A Psychology-based Typology of Hawkish and Dovish Decision Makers

Abstract

Foreign policy elites are often labeled "hawks" or "doves," and states' foreign policies can vary widely depending on whether hawks or doves prevail. Yet seldom asked is this question: why are some elites hawks and others doves? I seek to answer this question. A few previous studies also address this question. However, they typically suffer one or both of the following shortcomings. First, they often overlook variations among elites within the hawk and dove categories. Second, they typically fail to systematically assess the characteristics distinguishing hawks from doves. I provide an improvement by systematically assessing the characteristics distinguishing hawks from doves and exploring differences among elites within the two categories. Specifically, I propose a psychology-based six-fold typology comprising three hawkish and three dovish decision maker types. I distinguish among the types via differing operational codes, personality traits, hypothesized susceptibilities to cognitive errors/biases, and hypothesized foreign policy positions. To test my typology's validity, I examine content analysis of selected George W. Bush administration officials' verbal behavior. This facilitates determining if elites are classifiable via my typology. To test my typology's hypotheses, I use congruence analysis of selected elites' decision making leading up to the 2003 United States-led invasion of Iraq. This qualitative analysis allows me to determine the errors and biases to which examined elites are susceptible and the elites' policy positions. I would like to offer to my committee heartfelt thanks for their assistance with what has been a long process. Juliet Kaarbo, co-chair of my committee, has been generous beyond all reasonable expectation. She has patiently encouraged, guided, and helped me even as her career took her across the Atlantic. I owe her a tremendous debt of gratitude. Mark Joslyn, also co-chair of my committee, has given me crucial moral support. Further, he and Donald Haider-Markel have played key roles in shepherding this project. I cannot overstate the importance of their support and the support of my entire committee. Above all, I thank my wife and family. They have tirelessly stood by me over the years, and the completion of my dissertation would not have been possible without them. v Table of Contents Introduction 1-14 Chapter 1: Theoretical Framework 15-98 Chapter 2: Research Design 99-130 Chapter 3: Quantitative Analysis of Personality Trait and Beliefs 131-170 Chapter 4: Qualitative Analysis of Decision Making 171-227 Chapter 5: Conclusion 228-233 References 234-246 Appendix A 247

Uncharacteristic foreign policy behavior: Sharon’s decision to withdraw from Gaza

“…Based on this discussion, a fruitful line of inquiry may seek if some hardliners are more amenable to change than others who could not show any flexibility (also, Aronoff, 2014). For instance, Brown (2017) suggests some possible gradations of hawkishness and dovishness. While Sharon may not have turned into a dove, had he become a bird of another feather?…”

Features of foreign policy birds: Israeli prime ministers as hawks and doves

“…If high scores in both traits is a defining feature of a hawk, such leaders perceive the world as “centered around a set of adversaries that are viewed as “evil” and intent on spreading their ideology or extending their power at the expense of others; leaders perceive that they have a moral imperative to confront these adversaries” (Hermann, 2003: 200). Like Hermann’s analysis of these two traits, according to Snyder and Diesing (1977), because hawks see the world as a threatening place, they must be strong and exploit weaknesses (see also Brown, 2017). As to doves, there is no direct connection in Hermann’s own discussion; Snyder and Diesing portray doves viewing the world as potentially harmonious and mention their efforts in seeking accommodation.…”

“…For instance, if we follow the simple argument that hawks are conflictual and doves are accommodative, Hermann (1974: 205) proposes that leaders with high conceptual complexity are likely to rely more on cooperation, and make increased use of diplomacy. More specifically, others argue that hawks perceive their opponents in monolithic terms and, unlike doves, are unable to distinguish various factions that may exist among them (Snyder and Diesing, 1977; also, Brown, 2017). Essentially, this indicates an ability, or lack thereof, to see the shades of gray in actors, events, the political world – the very definition of conceptual complexity.…”

“…In his analysis, Robison utilizes two additional indices (P-2: value realization, and I-2: tactical orientation). Finally, Brown’s (2017) discussion utilizes both operational code and LTA; he captures the same three operational code indices as Malici. As discussed below, LTA offers a fitting framework for the purposes of this article; furthermore, relevant works allow direct connections to the personality traits in LTA.…”