Do sincere apologies need to be costly? Test of a costly signaling model of apology

Ohtsubo, Yohsuke; Watanabe, Esuka

doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.09.004

Cited by 130 publications

(119 citation statements)

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“…Accordingly, the signal-reading ability might have first evolved in the partner choice context. Moreover, when players can voluntarily initiate and terminate relationships, a costly signal of benign intent after an implementation error could prevent the premature dissolution of potentially beneficial, long-term relationships [32]. Admittedly, we have no decisive answer regarding under which context the signalling system first emerged.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…This type of reputation recovery strategy, which was modelled as contrite tit-for-tat (CTFT), yields a more efficient cooperative equilibrium than the standing strategy [11]. Although CTFT accepts a 'bad' reputation at least once, people have been shown to react to their social predicaments more immediately by offering apologies [30][31][32][33] and/ or inflicting self-punishment [33][34][35][36]. Justified defectors may be inclined to use these sorts of signals to communicate their non-malicious intent.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The price of being seen to be just: an intention signalling strategy for indirect reciprocity

2016

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Cooperation among strangers is a marked characteristic of human sociality. One prominent evolutionary explanation for this form of human cooperation is indirect reciprocity, whereby each individual selectively helps people with a 'good' reputation, but not those with a 'bad' reputation. Some evolutionary analyses have underscored the importance of second-order reputation information (the reputation of a current partner's previous partner) for indirect reciprocity as it allows players to discriminate justified 'good' defectors, who selectively deny giving help to 'bad' partners, from unjustified 'bad' defectors. Nevertheless, it is not clear whether people in fact make use of second-order information in indirect reciprocity settings. As an alternative, we propose the intention signalling strategy, whereby defectors are given the option to abandon a resource as a means of expunging their 'bad' reputation. Our model deviates from traditional modelling approaches in the indirect reciprocity literature in a crucial way-we show that first-order information is sufficient to maintain cooperation if players are given an option to signal their intention. Importantly, our model is robust against invasion by both unconditionally cooperative and uncooperative strategies, a first step towards demonstrating its viability as an evolutionarily stable strategy. Furthermore, in two behavioural experiments, when participants were given the option to abandon a resource so as to mend a tarnished reputation, participants not only spontaneously began to use this option, they also interpreted others' use of this option as a signal of cooperative intent.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 97%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The price of being seen to be just: an intention signalling strategy for indirect reciprocity

2016

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“…Other scholars argue that the most effective conciliatory acts are those that are costly for the perpetrators (Ohtsubo & Watanabe, 2009). For victims, apologies that restore their power (Shnabel, Nadler, Canetti-nisim & Ullrich, 2008;Thompson, 2008), or that affirm the perpetrators' commitment to justice (Lazare, 2004) Tavuchis (1991), apologies work because they establish a shared political narrative between groups in which the perpetrators take responsibility for the harm done.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Saying sorry: Shifting obligation after conciliatory acts satisfies perpetrator group members.

Zaiser

Giner‐Sorolla

2013

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

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How are intergroup conciliatory acts (apologies and reparations) evaluated by members of the perpetrator group offering them? This research tests whether these outcomes can be predicted by obligation shifting: the perception that a conciliatory act has shifted the onus away from the perpetrators and onto the victim group. Four experiments in different contexts examined three possible outcomes for members of the perpetrator group: satisfaction with the act, negative feelings towards the victims, and support for future assistance. Across all four experiments, perceptions of obligation shifting predicted satisfaction with conciliatory acts, as did the perception that the ingroup's image had improved. Furthermore, obligation shifting alone related to more negative feelings about the victims and predicted reduced support for further acts of assistance. Image improvement perceptions did not show these effects, and sometimes were related to less negative feelings about the victims. Directly manipulating impressions of obligation shifting and image improvement (Experiment 3) showed these relationships were causal. When there were differences between types of acts on the three outcome variables, obligation shifting and image perceptions mediated these relationships. The negative implications of obligation shifting, as well as the more encouraging role of image improvement perceptions, are discussed.Keywords: obligation shifting, apologies, reparations, image improvement, satisfaction In conflict, dwelling on past wrongs can be a psychological barrier to reconciliation (Nadler & Liviatan, 2006;Scheff, 1994). This is clear from the conflicts in Northern Ireland and the Middle East, which are fed by memories of past wrongdoings by both sides (Chrighton & Iver, 1991;Lundy & McGovern, 2010). But it can also be difficult to develop positive relations between groups just by ignoring the past. Increasingly often, leaders recognize their nations' bygone wrongdoings through intergroup conciliatory acts -such as official verbal apologies or offers of reparation (Brooks, 1999;Oliner, 2008). This makes it urgent to understand the potential outcomes of such acts for intergroup relations.Most existing research on the effectiveness of intergroup conciliatory acts has focused on the reactions of the victim group -with mixed results. Apologies from an official source appear to have no effect on victim group members' forgiveness (Philpot & Hornsey, 2008), which is troubling given that forgiveness is an important predictor of reconciliation after conflict (Noor, Brown, Gonzalez, Manzi, & Lewis, 2008). However, other research has also suggested that offers of help from transgressor group members can increase willingness to reconcile, so long as there is a high level of trust toward the transgressing group (cf. Nadler & Liviatan, 2006).Other factors can also influence a victim group's satisfaction with a verbal apology: which emotions are expressed, (Giner-Sorolla, Castano, Espinosa, & Brown, 2008;Giner-Sorolla, Kamau, & Castano, 2010...

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“…Most of the existing research in this area (but see Fischbacher & Utikal 2010) is either exclusively theoretical (Lewicki & Bunker 1996;Mishra 1996;Lewicki & Wiethoff 2000;Ren & Gray 2009;Gillespie & Dietz 2009), based on anecdotal or archival evidence (Elsbach 1994;Knight & Pretty 1999), surveys (Slovic 1993), diary studies (Conway & Briner 2002) fictional vignettes (Tomlinson et al 2004), videotaped dramatizations (Kim et al 2004(Kim et al , 2006, or experimental designs using deception (Gibson et al 1999;Bottom et al 2002;Nakyachi & Watabe 2005;Schweitzer et al 2006;Ohtsubo & Watanabe 2009). …”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Building and rebuilding trust with promises and apologies

Schniter

Sheremeta

Sznycer

2013

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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Using trust games, we study how promises and messages are used to build new trust where it did not previously exist and to rebuild damaged trust. In these games, trustees made non-binding promises of investment-contingent returns, then investors decided whether to invest, and finally trustees decided how much to return. After an unexpected second game was announced, but before it commenced, trustees could send a one-way message. This design allowed us to observe the endogenous emergence and natural distribution of trust-relevant behaviors and focus on naturally occurring remedial strategies used by promise-breakers and distrusted trustees, their effects on investors, and subsequent outcomes. In the first game 16.6% of trustees were distrusted and 18.8% of trusted trustees broke promises. Trustees distrusted in the first game used long messages and promises closer to equal splits to encourage trust in the second game. To restore damaged trust, promise-breakers used apologies and upgraded promises. On average, investments in each game paid off for investors and trustees, suggesting that effective use of cheap signals fosters profitable trust-based exchange in these economies.

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Do sincere apologies need to be costly? Test of a costly signaling model of apology

Cited by 130 publications

References 38 publications

The price of being seen to be just: an intention signalling strategy for indirect reciprocity

The price of being seen to be just: an intention signalling strategy for indirect reciprocity

Saying sorry: Shifting obligation after conciliatory acts satisfies perpetrator group members.

Building and rebuilding trust with promises and apologies

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