Building and rebuilding trust with promises and apologies

Abstract

Using trust games, we study how promises and messages are used to build new trust where it did not previously exist and to rebuild damaged trust. In these games, trustees made non-binding promises of investment-contingent returns, then investors decided whether to invest, and finally trustees decided how much to return. After an unexpected second game was announced, but before it commenced, trustees could send a one-way message. This design allowed us to observe the endogenous emergence and natural distribution of trust-relevant behaviors and focus on naturally occurring remedial strategies used by promise-breakers and distrusted trustees, their effects on investors, and subsequent outcomes. In the first game 16.6% of trustees were distrusted and 18.8% of trusted trustees broke promises. Trustees distrusted in the first game used long messages and promises closer to equal splits to encourage trust in the second game. To restore damaged trust, promise-breakers used apologies and upgraded promises. On average, investments in each game paid off for investors and trustees, suggesting that effective use of cheap signals fosters profitable trust-based exchange in these economies.

Conflicted emotions following trust-based interaction

“…Discovery that another has foregone short-term rewards in the pursuit of a long-term exchange relationship, for example by providing resource or assistance, presents a fortunate relationship building opportunity for the recipient. Appreciation or gratitude can signal one's favorable valuation of the other and pre-commitment or propensity to cooperate with them (Hirshleifer, 1987;Tooby & Cosmides, 2008), encouraging future trust much in the way that "promises" do (Schniter, Sheremeta, & Sznycer, 2013). Experimental evidence supports this functional account of appreciative and grateful feelings (Tesser, Gatewood, & Driver, 1968;McCullough et al, 2001;Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005;Algoe, Haidt, & Gable, 2008).…”

The Problem with All-or-Nothing Trust Games: What Others Choose Not to Do Matters in Trust-Based Exchange

“…There are many early examples of often-cited studies (Camerer and Weigelt, 1988;Dasgupta, 1988;Kreps, 1990), as well as more recent studies (Malhotra and Murnighan, 2002;Schniter et al, 2013), referring to games with binary choices as "trust games". While the aforementioned research furthers understanding of trust and reciprocity, our results demonstrating disparate behavior between different trust games suggest caution should be taken when extending results from one game to the other.…”

Violação E Recuperação Da Confiança Do Cliente Após O Duplo Desvio

“…Tais táticas são apresentadas no Quadro 1. Cremer (2010), Ferrin et al (2007), Kam (2009), Kim et al (2004), Kim et al (2006), Kim et al (2013), Laer e Ruyter (2010), Mattila (2009), Schniter et al (2012, Schweitzer et al (2006), Tomlinson et al (2004), Tomlinson (2012), Utz et al (2009), Vasalou et al (2008).…”