Conflict, Religious Identity, and Ethnic Intolerance in Croatia

Kunovich, Robert M.; Hodson, Randy

doi:10.2307/3005570

Cited by 43 publications

(38 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Though religion grew in popularity in the 1990s, its strongest adherents are not the populations likely to be in a dominant societal position in the years to come. Also, though religion may be a contributing factor to ethnic nationalism for years to come, Robert Kunovich and Randy Hodson's (1999) rejection of the resurgent religiosity hypothesis suggests a more limited impact of religiosity per se on nationalism and national intolerance. As well, with growing entrepreneurship – negatively correlated with ethnic nationalism – there may be a further shift away from ethnic nationalism (Agocs and Agocs 1993).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Nationalism, liberalism and liberal nationalism in post‐war Croatia^*

Massey

Hodson

Sekulić

2003

Nations and Nationalism

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article analyses ethnic nationalism and liberalism as expressed in the views of Croatians in the aftermath of the 1991-5 war -a war during which ethnicnationalist rhetoric played a large role. Because the war was part of systemic change in the nation, including the adoption of more democratic and capitalist social formation, we also anticipated economic and political liberalism to be present among a sizeable portion of the population. We provide an analysis of the structural conditions fostering these sentiments, an analysis potentially applicable to a range of societies presently in transition. Based on 1996 survey interviews (N 5 2,202) conducted throughout Croatia, we show that ethnic nationalism in the Croatian context is more widely shared than is liberalism. The effect of religious fundamentalism, educational attainment and media exposure are as predicted, based on theories of liberalism and nationalism. Wartime experiences and position in the occupational system have a weaker and more mixed influence than hypothesised. Perhaps most importantly, we find that three out of five Croatians embrace both ethnic-national views and views that are distinctly liberal, suggesting that liberal nationalism is now dominant in Croatia. The characteristics of groups holding differing views suggest that recent events and current changes in Croatia bode positively for continued growth of liberal sentiments, but this will not necessarily be at the expense of ethnic nationalism.Post-war Croatia provides an opportunity to examine several critical issues regarding state disintegration and nation formation. As with many nations in transition since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Croatia appears poised between two political agendas. On the one hand, it can continue in the postTudjman era to pursue a politics of ethnic identity that promotes interests and rights associated with being Croatian, assigning all others to the status of

show abstract

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Nationalism, liberalism and liberal nationalism in post‐war Croatia^*

Massey

Hodson

Sekulić

2003

Nations and Nationalism

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Religious leaders were deeply entangled with Southern political and legal authorities that officially sanctioned Jim Crow segregation (Ayers 1995; Feldman 2005). The overlapping of racial/ethnic and religious cleavages often intensifies inter-group struggles by merging religious and racial identities (Hechter 1999; Kunovich and Hodson 1999; Williams 1994). In this context, traumatic social change and economic threat -- as was experienced in the post-Reconstruction American South – are further prone to heighten ethnic intolerance among religious adherents (Hodson et.…”

Section: Lynching Religion and Moral Communitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Practicing What They Preach? Lynching and Religion in the American South, 1890–1929

Bailey

Snedker

2011

American Journal of Sociology

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This project employs a moral solidarity framework to explore the relationship between organized religion and lynching in the American South. We ask whether a county’s religious composition impacted its rate of lynching, net of demographic and economic controls. We find evidence for the solidarity thesis using three religious metrics. First, our findings show that counties with greater religious diversity experienced more lynching, supporting the notion that a pluralistic religious marketplace with competing religious denominations weakened the bonds of a cohesive moral community and might have enhanced white racial solidarity. Second, counties in which a larger share of the black population worshipped in churches controlled by blacks experienced higher levels of racial violence, indicating a threat to the prevailing moral community or inter-group racially based solidarity. Finally, we find a lower incidence of lynching in counties where a larger share of church members belonged to denominations with racially mixed denominations, suggesting that cross-racial solidarity served to reduce racial violence.

show abstract

“…When game theory and deterrence theory are used to study international conflicts (e.g., Putnam 1988) they are seldom amenable to the inclusion of culture or religion variables. Some have gone so far as to rule out religious causes altogether (e.g., Kunovich and Hodson 1999;McGarry and O'Leary 1995). It does not, however, measure the possibility of religious-oriented causes or outcomes.…”

Section: Explaining Religious Persecutionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Religious Persecution in Cross-National Context: Clashing Civilizations or Regulated Religious Economies?

2007

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Despite the high visibility of religiously charged international social conflicts, the unique role of religion often is overlooked in social science research and theory. Some studies ignore religion, others conflate religion with other identities. Virtually all lack adequate data. We respond to these deficiencies by testing a theory-driven model of a particular form of social conflict, religious persecution. We investigate the proposition that religious regulation leads to religious persecution. Using measures coded from the 2003 International Religious Freedom Reports, we consider how both social regulation and government regulation of religion in 143 countries affect the level of religious persecution. We also consider and test competing hypotheses, particularly Huntington's clash-of-civilizations thesis. We find strong support for the religious economies arguments and only limited support for the clash-of-civilizations thesis and other competing arguments.

show abstract

Conflict, Religious Identity, and Ethnic Intolerance in Croatia

Cited by 43 publications

References 0 publications

Nationalism, liberalism and liberal nationalism in post‐war Croatia^*

Nationalism, liberalism and liberal nationalism in post‐war Croatia^*

Practicing What They Preach? Lynching and Religion in the American South, 1890–1929

Religious Persecution in Cross-National Context: Clashing Civilizations or Regulated Religious Economies?

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About

Conflict, Religious Identity, and Ethnic Intolerance in Croatia

Cited by 43 publications

References 0 publications

Nationalism, liberalism and liberal nationalism in post‐war Croatia*

Nationalism, liberalism and liberal nationalism in post‐war Croatia*

Practicing What They Preach? Lynching and Religion in the American South, 1890–1929

Religious Persecution in Cross-National Context: Clashing Civilizations or Regulated Religious Economies?

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About

Nationalism, liberalism and liberal nationalism in post‐war Croatia^*

Nationalism, liberalism and liberal nationalism in post‐war Croatia^*