Can negotiations prevent fish wars?

The Dynamics of Climate Agreements

“…12 Hoel (1993) studies a di¤erential game with an emission tax, while Yanase (2006) derives the optimal contribution-subsidy. Houba et al (2000) study negotiations (over …sh quotas) in a di¤erential game where the agreement lasts forever, while Sorger (2006) lets the agreement last only one period. Investments or R&D are not allowed, so the contract is complete.…”

Renewable resource management, user heterogeneity, and the scope for cooperation

“…Regarding the costs of adopting a harvesting technology, we impose the simplifying assumptions that 2 By focusing on the range of Pareto-improving contracts, we do not address the question which contract will actually be selected. Hence, we ignore bargaining problems (see for example Houba et al 2000). 3 The only paper we are aware of that also finds that heterogeneity does not necessarily complicate obtaining efficient outcomes is that of Gaspart and Seki (2003).…”

Recursive Nash bargaining over a productive asset

“…The papers by Houba et al (2000) and Flamini (2004Flamini ( , 2005 are the most relevant ones. Houba et al (2000) study an alternating-offers bargaining model of common property resource extraction in which the agents have logarithmic instantaneous utility functions. As long as no agreement is reached between the two players, they extract the resource according to their non-cooperative threat strategies.…”

“…Once an agreement has been reached, both parties stick to the agreed cooperative solution path forever. Houba et al (2000) demonstrate that, in a stationary Markov-perfect equilibrium consisting of linear strategies, agreement is achieved within a single period and they analyze how the implicit welfare weights corresponding to that equilibrium depend on the time-preference profile of the two players. In particular, they prove that the more patient a player is, the less weight is attached to his or her utility function in the cooperative solution.…”