Renewable resource management, user heterogeneity, and the scope for cooperation

Erdlenbruch, Katrin; Tidball, Mabel; Soest, Daan van

doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2007.04.004

Cited by 11 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…Our results indicate that income inequality did not have any significant effect on the participation of the forest users. This runs contrary to the theoretical predictions, which assert a significant (negative or positive) relationship between income heterogeneity and cooperation [80][81][82][83][84][85]. This may be attributed to the unreliability of income data collected from the field.…”

Section: Effect Of Social Heterogeneitycontrasting

confidence: 62%

Role of Community and User Attributes in Collective Action: Case Study of Community-Based Forest Management in Nepal

Negi¹,

Pham

Karky

et al. 2018

Forests

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A growing literature on collective action focuses on exploring the conditions that might help or hinder groups to work collectively. In this paper, we focus on community-based forest management in the inner Terai region of Nepal and explore the role of community and user attributes such as group size, social heterogeneities, forest user' perception on forests, and affiliation to the user group, in the collective action of managing community forests. Household surveys were carried out with 180 households across twelve community forest users' groups. We first measured ethnic diversity, income inequality, landholding inequality, and user perception towards the use and management of community forests to understand their effect on the participation of forest users in the management of community forests. Our results show that among the studied variables, group size (number of forest users affiliated to the community forests) and perception of the management of their community forests are strong predictors of forest user participation in community forest management. Income inequality and ethnic diversity were found to have no significant association. Land inequality, however, was found to decrease participation in the management and use of community forests. These community and user attributes play a crucial role in the success of collective action and may vary from community to community. Hence they need to be duly considered by the practitioners prior to any community-based project interventions for stimulating successful collective action.Forests 2018, 9, 136 2 of 20 management (CFM) is considered as one of the successful models of community-based forest governance [4]; the success of which depends on many factors, such as socio-economic heterogeneity, institutional setting, leadership, property rights regimes, degree of decentralization, community characteristics, technology, and market influence etc. [5,6]. The premise of the CFM asserts that communities or groups of forest users collectively engage in the management of the forest. Hence, the involvement and participation of the forest users has been deemed integral for the functioning of CFM as collective action in forest management [7][8][9][10].Over the years, many case studies have emerged in the literature, suggesting that some communities are more successful than others in achieving success in collective action [11][12][13][14][15][16]. This has sparked a notable debate among scholars on the diverse conditions and factors that may facilitate and/or hinder the collective action [17]. While there is consensus on the fact that a certain set of variables such as physical and socio-economic environment, local governance structures, social capital, community's willingness to participate, tenure rights etc. influence the likelihood of collective action [18], there is no consensus about the particular effect that these variables have. The communities managing the forests worldwide may differ in their capacity, interests, and perceptions regarding community forestry [...

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Section: Effect Of Social Heterogeneitycontrasting

confidence: 62%

Role of Community and User Attributes in Collective Action: Case Study of Community-Based Forest Management in Nepal

Negi¹,

Pham

Karky

et al. 2018

Forests

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“…In economic terms, coordination is generally not Paretoimproving (i.e. harmful to no one) when sectors are asymmetrical (Hutton et al 2001;Erdlenbruch et al 2008). Accordingly, asymmetry in our models led coordinated management to focus on particular high-growth species (e.g.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 95%

The value of coordinated management of interacting ecosystem services

et al. 2012

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Coordinating decisions and actions among interacting sectors is a critical component of ecosystem-based management, but uncertainty about coordinated management's effects is compromising its perceived value and use. We constructed an analytical framework for explicitly calculating how coordination affects management decisions, ecosystem state and the provision of ecosystem services in relation to ecosystem dynamics and socio-economic objectives. The central insight is that the appropriate comparison strategy to optimal coordinated management is optimal uncoordinated management, which can be identified at the game theoretic Nash equilibrium. Using this insight we can calculate coordination's effects in relation to uncoordinated management and other reference scenarios. To illustrate how this framework can help identify ecosystem and socio-economic conditions under which coordination is most influential and valuable, we applied it to a heuristic case study and a simulation model for the California Current Marine Ecosystem. Results indicate that coordinated management can more than double an ecosystem's societal value, especially when sectors can effectively manipulate resources that interact strongly. However, societal gains from coordination will need to be reconciled with observations that it also leads to strategic simplification of the ecological food web, and generates both positive and negative impacts on individual sectors and non-target species.

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“…Others have shown how more moderate levels of coordination among agents can lead conditions away from the Nash equilibrium and toward greater economic returns (Costello and Deacon 2007). Incentives for coordination can be created by pooling yields or profits (Gaspart and Seki 2003) and/or driven exogenously (e.g., via regulation); a challenge is formalizing costs to contracting coordination and integrating them into the analysis of harvest strategies (Johnson and Libecap 1982, McCarthy et al 2001, Potter 2003, Erdlenbruch et al 2008). With TURFs, the level of coordination necessary PLATE 1.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Matching spatial property rights fisheries with scales of fish dispersal

White

Costello

2011

Ecological Applications

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Regulation of fisheries using spatial property rights can alleviate competition for high-value patches that hinders economic efficiency in quota-based, rights-based, and open-access management programs. However, efficiency gains erode when delineation of spatial rights constitutes incomplete ownership of the resource, thereby degrading its local value and promoting overexploitation. Incomplete ownership may be particularly prevalent in the spatial management of mobile fishery species. We developed a game-theoretic bioeconomic model of spatial property rights representing territorial user rights fisheries (TURF) management of nearshore marine fish and invertebrate species with mobile adult and larval life history stages. Strategic responses by fisheries in neighboring management units result in overexploitation of the stock and reduced yields for each fishery compared with those attainable without resource mobility or with coordination or sole control in fishing effort. High dispersal potential of the larval stage, a common trait among nearshore fishery species, coupled with scaling of management units to only capture adult mobility, a common characteristic of many nearshore TURF programs, in particular substantially reduced stock levels and yields. In a case study of hypothetical TURF programs of nearshore fish and invertebrate species, management units needed to be tens of kilometers in alongshore length to minimize larval export and generate reasonable returns to fisheries. Cooperation and quota regulations represent solutions to the problem that need to be quantified in cost and integrated into the determination of the acceptability of spatial property rights management of fisheries.

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Renewable resource management, user heterogeneity, and the scope for cooperation

Cited by 11 publications

References 14 publications

Role of Community and User Attributes in Collective Action: Case Study of Community-Based Forest Management in Nepal

Role of Community and User Attributes in Collective Action: Case Study of Community-Based Forest Management in Nepal

The value of coordinated management of interacting ecosystem services

Matching spatial property rights fisheries with scales of fish dispersal

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