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Abstract:Community forestry or social forestry (henceforth referred collectively as SF) programs have become new modes of forest management empowering local managers and hence, allowing integration of diverse local practices and support of local livelihoods. Implementation of these initiatives, however, face multiple challenges. State-prescribed community programs, for example, will remain isolated efforts if changes in the overall economic and social governance frameworks, including the devolution of rights to local users is lacking. Financial sustainability of these measures remains often uncertain and equity issues inherent to groups and communities formed for SF, can be exacerbated. In this article, we pose the question: Whose interests do SF policies serve? The effectiveness of SF would depend on the motivations and aims for a decentralization of forest governance to the community. In order to understand the underlying motivations behind the governments' push for SF, we examine national policies in Vietnam and Indonesia, changes in their policies over time and the shift in discourses influencing how SF has evolved. Vietnam and Indonesia are at different sides of the spectrum in democratic ambitions and forest abundance, and present an intriguing comparison in the recent regional push towards SF in Southeast Asia. We discuss the different interpretations of SF in these two countries and how SF programs are implemented. Our results show that governments, influenced by global discourse, are attempting to regulate SF through formal definitions and regulations. Communities on the other hand, might resist by adopting, adapting or rejecting formal schemes. In this tension, SF, adopted to serve the interest of local people, in practice has not fulfilled its promise.

ABSTRACT. Reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD+) has gained increasing global attention because of its potential to reduce carbon emissions and improve forest governance. Reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation requires successful inclusive decision making and accountability. However, there have been limited empirical studies that examine the effectiveness of the current participatory mechanism used in REDD+. Our research analyzes the participation of policy actors in the development of the REDD+ instrument in Vietnam. We are interested in how the political context and the different interests of actors influence the degree of participation in national REDD+ policy decision making. We explored participation through the analysis of the mechanisms, e.g., how actors involve and participate in decision making, and dynamics of participation, e.g., highly centralized policy event vs. donor led event. The study aims to answer three research questions: (1) Who is involved in national REDD+ policy making and what are their interests in participating in core political events? (2) What level of participation do the different political actors have in core political events? and (3) To what extent do the outcomes, e.g., regulations and strategies, of REDD+ policy events incorporate different preferences of policy actors? Our findings highlighted the dominant role of government agencies in REDD+ policy making, which leaves limited political space for nonstate actors, e.g., NGOs and civil society organizations (CSOs), in Vietnam to exert an influence on the final policy outputs. Even in this highly centralized context, however, we found evidence to suggest that some political space in decision making is given to nonstate actors. Within this space, such actors are able to propose alternative policy options. Ensuring inclusive decision making and accountability in the Vietnam context requires a shift in current governance from traditional top-down approaches to a more participatory form of decision making.

Intermediaries are seen as important actors in facilitating payments for environmental services (PES). However, few data exist on the adequacy of the services provided by intermediaries and the impacts of their interventions. Using four PES case studies in Vietnam, this paper analyses the roles of government agencies, non-government organizations, international agencies, local organizations and professional consulting firms as PES intermediaries. The findings indicate that these intermediaries are essential in supporting PES establishment. Their roles are as service and information providers, mediators, arbitrators, equalizers, representatives, watchdogs, developers of standards and bridge builders. Concerns have been raised about the quality of intermediaries' participatory work, political influence on intermediaries' activities and the neutral status of intermediaries. Although local organizations are strongly driven by the government, they are important channels for the poor to express their opinions. However, to act as environmental services (ES) sellers, local organizations need to overcome numerous challenges, particularly related to capacity for monitoring ES and enforcement of contracts. Relationships amongst intermediaries are complex and should be carefully examined by PES stakeholders to avoid negative impact on the poor. Each of the intermediaries may operate at a different level and can have different functions but a multi-sector approach is required for an effective PES implementation.

Global conservation discourses and practices increasingly rely on market-based solutions to fulfill the dual objective of forest conservation and economic development. Although varied, these interventions are premised on the assumption that natural resources are most effectively managed and preserved while benefiting livelihoods if the market-incentives of a liberalised economy are correctly in place. By examining three nationally supported payment for ecosystem service (PES) schemes in Vietnam we show how insecure land tenure, high transaction costs and high opportunity costs can undermine the long-term benefits of PES programmes for local households and, hence, potentially threaten their livelihood viability. In many cases, the income from PES programmes does not reach the poor because of political and economic constraints. Local elite capture of PES benefits through the monopolization of access to forestland and existing state forestry management are identified as key problems. We argue that as PES schemes create a market for ecosystem services, such markets must be understood not simply as bald economic exchanges between ‘rational actors’ but rather as exchanges embedded in particular socio-political and historical contexts to support the sustainable use of forest resources and local livelihoods in Vietnam.