The Prospects for Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) in Vietnam: A Look at Three Payment Schemes

Abstract

Global conservation discourses and practices increasingly rely on market-based solutions to fulfill the dual objective of forest conservation and economic development. Although varied, these interventions are premised on the assumption that natural resources are most effectively managed and preserved while benefiting livelihoods if the market-incentives of a liberalised economy are correctly in place. By examining three nationally supported payment for ecosystem service (PES) schemes in Vietnam we show how insecure land tenure, high transaction costs and high opportunity costs can undermine the long-term benefits of PES programmes for local households and, hence, potentially threaten their livelihood viability. In many cases, the income from PES programmes does not reach the poor because of political and economic constraints. Local elite capture of PES benefits through the monopolization of access to forestland and existing state forestry management are identified as key problems. We argue that as PES schemes create a market for ecosystem services, such markets must be understood not simply as bald economic exchanges between ‘rational actors’ but rather as exchanges embedded in particular socio-political and historical contexts to support the sustainable use of forest resources and local livelihoods in Vietnam.

Payments for environmental services and community-level socioeconomic wellbeing: Comparing programs in Vietnam and Australia

“…Wunder (2013) suggests this is common among current PES schemes. McElwee (2012) and To et al (2012) both found that because of state intervention, other PES schemes in Vietnam are not underpinned by market mechanisms either, although they have come closer than the two examples examined in this report. The two examples in this report could be considered more community-based and employment-based, in that communities or individuals are paid to actively engage in protecting and managing land, rather than for merely owning and maintaining land that provides environmental services.…”

“…The precise role of the government in the PES scheme in the study village was unclear. However, other studies have found that the role of the state in environmental management is often more limiting than empowering (KimDung et al 2013;To et al 2012). This suggests that outside organisations can impinge on the ability of PES programs to deliver socioeconomic benefits to communities, even if they are the driving force behind the programs.…”

Ten Years of REDD+: A Critical Review of the Impact of REDD+ on Forest-Dependent Communities

“…A quantitative study of Sheng et al [48] shows that depending on the government objective in REDD+ implementation, such as social equity, environmental priority or poverty alleviation, different incentive and tax structures need to be implemented depending on the respective objective. However, there is a general consensus that the negative impacts of REDD+ on livelihoods should be minimized, its benefits are equitably shared, and there is an adequate participation of local communities in the implementation of REDD+ [47,49].…”

“…Effectiveness of REDD+ depends on the ability and interest of local communities to sustainably manage their forests and enhance carbon stocks [55]. A study of To et al [49] on PES, tenure, and poverty reduction in Vietnam reveals that households with unclear tenure, being often the poorest in their respective communities, have been excluded altogether from the benefits of PES schemes. In this case, the PES schemes actually impacted the poorest households negatively, and exacerbated income inequality.…”

“…Unequal distribution of income; people losing access to the forests; people losing forest tenure rights; people having less farmland; intra-and inter-community conflicts; REDD+ does not cover the opportunity costs; marginalization; discrepancies among definitions [8,11,26,35,[45][46][47][48][49][51][52][53][54][55]59,60].…”