2006
DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2005.08.005
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Recursive Nash bargaining over a productive asset

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Cited by 38 publications
(28 citation statements)
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References 10 publications
(30 reference statements)
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“…12 Hoel (1993) studies a di¤erential game with an emission tax, while Yanase (2006) derives the optimal contribution-subsidy. Houba et al (2000) study negotiations (over …sh quotas) in a di¤erential game where the agreement lasts forever, while Sorger (2006) lets the agreement last only one period. Investments or R&D are not allowed, so the contract is complete.…”
Section: Dynamic Gamesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…12 Hoel (1993) studies a di¤erential game with an emission tax, while Yanase (2006) derives the optimal contribution-subsidy. Houba et al (2000) study negotiations (over …sh quotas) in a di¤erential game where the agreement lasts forever, while Sorger (2006) lets the agreement last only one period. Investments or R&D are not allowed, so the contract is complete.…”
Section: Dynamic Gamesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…dePaz, Marín-Solano, and Navas (2013), Dockner and Jørgensen (1984), Hamalainen, Haurie, and Kaitala (1986), Leitmann (1974), Marin-Solano (2014) and Yeung and Petrosyan (2005) studied continuous-time cooperative differential games with nontransferable payoffs. Sorger (2006) presented a recursive Nash bargaining solution for a discrete-time NTU cooperative dynamic game involving a productive asset. Predtetchinski (2007) considered the strong sequential core for stationary NTU cooperative dynamic games.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…utility functions) but heterogeneous in their time preferences. Sorger (2006), Marín-Solano and Shevkoplyas (2011), de-Paz et al (2013), Ekeland et al (2013) and Marín-Solano (2015) propose different approaches in the study of time-consistent equilibria in case players are asymmetric, not just in their discount rates, but also in their utility functions.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%