The Dynamics of Climate Agreements

Harstad, Bård

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1485838

Cited by 33 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 80 publications

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“…6 Following a route that is complementary to ours, some authors have studied ongoing negotiations, although in contexts where the whole dynamics of the economy is common knowledge and perfectly foreseen. In that vein, Beccherle and Tirole (2011), Harstad (2012a, 2012b, and Battaglini and Harstad (2015) analyze Markovperfect equilibria of dynamic games of complete information. In this setup, countries can limit global warming either by decreasing consumption or by making some nonverifiable technological investments.…”

Section: On This Issue See Aldy and Stavins (2007)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Harstad (2012a) derives optimal dynamic contracts when efficient renegotiation is feasible. Harstad (2012b) highlights the costs of short-term agreements. Winkler (2011) andGersbach, Hummel, andWinkler (2011) propose solutions to the free rider problem with attractive self-enforcing properties, but do not deal with the issue of participation.…”

Section: On This Issue See Aldy and Stavins (2007)mentioning

confidence: 99%

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A Mechanism Design Approach to Climate-Change Agreements

Martimort

Sand‐Zantman

2015

Journal of the European Economic Association

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We take a mechanism design perspective to investigate how environmental agreements should account for multilateral externalities, incentive compatibility, and voluntary participation by sovereign countries. The optimal mechanism involves a tradeoff between a free rider problem in the effort provision of participating countries and the necessity of inducing countries to ratify the agreement. This mechanism can be approximated by a simple menu with attractive implementation and robustness properties. Limits on enforcement and commitment might nevertheless hinder the performance of this menu, making the "business as usual" scenario more likely. (JEL: Q54, D82, H23)

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Section: On This Issue See Aldy and Stavins (2007)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: On This Issue See Aldy and Stavins (2007)mentioning

confidence: 99%

A Mechanism Design Approach to Climate-Change Agreements

Martimort

Sand‐Zantman

2015

Journal of the European Economic Association

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“…One is our interest in the effect of TRIPS on the international adoption of existing technologies and on the IEA formation process. Given this focus on diffusion, we do not consider upstream innovation and investments into national or international R&D programs as in Harstad (2016), Benchekroun and Ray Chauduri (2015), Hoel and de Zeeuw (2010), and Barrett (2006). Connected to this, our paper features a firm -rather than a countryholding IPRs in an advanced technology.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Climate Policy Hold‐Up: Green Technologies, Intellectual Property Rights, and the Abatement Incentives of International Agreements

Goeschl

Perino

2017

Scandinavian J Economics

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The success of global climate policies over the coming decades depends on the diffusion of 'green' technologies. This requires that international environmental agreements (IEAs) and trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPs) interact productively.Using a simple and tractable model, we highlight the strategic reduction in abatement commitments on account of a hold-up effect. In anticipation of rent extraction by the innovator signatories might abate less than non-signatories turning the IEA 'brown'.Self-enforcing IEAs have fewer signatories and diffusion can reduce global abatement under TRIPs. Countries hosting patent holders extract rents from TRIPs, but may be better off without them.JEL codes: Q54, Q55, O34, O33, L12

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“… 2 See, for example, Dutta and Radner, (2004), Polasky and Tarui, (2005), Polasky et al ., (2006), Bretschger and Smulders, (2007), Tarui, (2007), Tarui et al ., (2008), Pindyck, (2009), Breton et al ., (2010), Harstad, (2010), Heal and Tarui, (2010). …”

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confidence: 99%

Environmental context and termination uncertainty in games with a dynamic public bad

Pevnitskaya¹,

Ryvkin²

2012

Envir. Dev. Econ.

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We employ a laboratory experiment to investigate the effects of environmental context and termination uncertainty on decisions in a dynamic game with a public bad. Every period the subjects decide on their own production level that generates private revenue and ‘emissions’. Emissions accumulate over time and act as a public bad. We characterize and use as benchmarks the Markov perfect equilibrium and social optimum and find that observed decisions are between the two predictions. We find no significant effect of termination uncertainty on decisions in any except the last few rounds where, in a fixed-end setting, subjects allocate their entire endowment to production. We find a strong effect of environmental context which partially substitutes for experience. The effect of experience is most pronounced in the fixed-end treatment where production allocations and the level of the public bad become lower after the restart.

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The Dynamics of Climate Agreements

Cited by 33 publications

References 80 publications

A Mechanism Design Approach to Climate-Change Agreements

A Mechanism Design Approach to Climate-Change Agreements

The Climate Policy Hold‐Up: Green Technologies, Intellectual Property Rights, and the Abatement Incentives of International Agreements

Environmental context and termination uncertainty in games with a dynamic public bad

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