Big fish in small ponds: A social hierarchy analysis of intergroup bias.

Seta, John J.; Seta, Catherine E.

doi:10.1037/0022-3514.71.6.1210

Cited by 47 publications

(60 citation statements)

References 25 publications

(60 reference statements)

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“…Participants accentuate intragroup differences more than they accentuate intragroup similarities (Simon et al 1995), a pattern that attests to individual self's strivings for uniqueness. Group members disengage from successful ingroups when intragroup comparisons threaten the individual self (Seta and Seta 1996), whereas employees decide on staying or leaving their companies on the basis of personal gain (e.g., resources, satisfaction, promotion opportunities) rather than corporate identification (Rusbult et al 1988). Finally, persons allocate more resources (i.e., money) to the ingroup than the outgroup only when they are likely to maximize their own earnings via this ingroup favoritism (Gaertner and Insko 2000).…”

Section: Comparative Testingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Individual Self, Relational Self, Collective Self: Hierarchical Ordering of the Tripartite Self

2011

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The individual self comprise unique attributes, the relational self comprises partner-shared attributes, and the collective self comprises ingroup-shared attributes. All selves are fundamental components of the self-concept, with each being important and meaningful to human experience and with each being associated with health benefits. Are the selves, however, equally important and meaningful? We review a program of research that tested four competing theoretical views suggesting that the motivational hub of human experience is (a) the individual self, (b) the relational self, (b) the collective self, or (c) determined by contextual or cultural factors. The research furnished support to the view that the individual self is the primary form of self-definition. We discuss alternative explanations and implications. We end with the introduction of a theoretical model, the boomerang model, that has the potential to integrate the diverse literature on the topic.Keywords Self . Individual self . Relational self . Collective self . FeedbackThe self-concept is not a singular, monolithic cognitive structure. Instead, it comprises three fundamental components: the individual self, relational self, and collective self (Sedikides and Brewer 2001a, b). This is to say that people pursue and achieve self-definition in terms of their personal, relational, or group characteristics. Are the three selves equally indispensible to the individual? Is one more primary than the others? Does it all depend on context and culture? These are the issues we address in the present article. The Three SelvesThe individual self highlights one's unique side. It consists of attributes (e.g., traits, goals and aspirations, experiences, interests, behaviors) that differentiate the person from others. This self-representation is relatively independent of relational bonds or group memberships. The relational self, on the other hand, highlights one's interpersonal side. It consists of attributes that are shared with close others (e.g., partners, friends, family members) and define roles within the relationship. This self-representation reflects valued interpersonal attachments. Finally, the collective self highlights one's intergroup side. It consists of attributes that are shared with ingroup members and differentiate the ingroup from outgroups. This self-representation reflects membership in valued social groups.The three selves co-exist, such that persons can alternate between perceiving the self as a distinct individual, as a relational partner, or as an interchangeable group member (Sedikides and Brewer 2001a, b). In addition, each self is associated with psychological and physical health benefits, and each self is important and meaningful to human experience (Berkman et al. 1992;

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Section: Comparative Testingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Individual Self, Relational Self, Collective Self: Hierarchical Ordering of the Tripartite Self

2011

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“…The hedonic consequences of social comparison information regarding the standing of one's group have been examined in several related literatures, including research on social identity, self-categorization, relative deprivation, and performance feedback (e.g. Blanton, Crocker, & Miller, 2000;Brewer & Weber, 1994;Cialdini & Richardson, 1980;Major, Sciacchitano, & Crocker, 1993;O'Leary-Kelly, 1998;Seta & Seta, 1996;Tesser, 1988).In addition, we sought to address the previously unanswered question of how happy and unhappy people might balance favorable and unfavorable social comparisons simultaneously Ð speci®cally, how our participants would respond to the news that their team has lost, but that they personally placed ®rst; or, alternatively, that their team has won, but that they personally placed last. Hence, in both McFarland & Miller, 1994), our second hypothesis was that, after receiving feedback about whether their group won or lost, the moods and self-assessments of unhappy students would be bolstered by additional favorable social comparison information about their personal performance (i.e.…”

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confidence: 99%

Responses to hedonically conflicting social comparisons: comparing happy and unhappy people

Lyubomirsky¹,

Tucker²,

Kasri³

2001

Euro J Social Psych

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Two laboratory studies explored how self-rated unhappy and happy students balance hedonically con¯icting social comparison information, and tested whether unhappy students would be relatively more sensitive to hedonically consistent unfavorable information. In both studies, students working in teams of four competed against one other team on a novel verbal task. First, unhappy participants showed relatively greater sensitivity to undiluted unfavorable feedback Ð about group standing (e.g. your team`lost'; Study 1) and about group and individual standing (e.g. your team lost and you were placed last; Study 2). Second, unhappy students were more reactive than happy students to individual social comparison information in the context of relative group feedback. In Study 1, the moods and self-assessments of unhappy individuals (but not happy ones) after news of team defeat appeared to be buffered by the additional news of personal triumph. In Study 2, unhappy students showed relatively larger decreases in mood and ability assessments after unfavorable than after favorable individual feedback (i.e. ranking last versus ®rst), regardless of whether they additionally learned that their teams had won or lost. The role of students' attributions and perceptions of their personal contribution was also explored. Implications of these ®ndings for the links among social comparison, cognitive processes, and hedonic consequences are discussed. Copyright # 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Whether in individual or group competition, most people have experienced the joy or happiness of surpassing others and the pain or unhappiness of falling short. Participating in a triumphant sports team, receiving a high score in an entrance exam, or winning a promotion may make one feel delighted and grati®ed; conversely, playing in a¯oundering team,¯unking an exam, or losing a job to someone else may make one feel hurt and dejected. Several decades ago, Festinger (1954) proposed that people have a`drive' to evaluate their opinions and abilities and rely on social comparison information when absolute standards for assessing their performances are unavailable. Implicit in Festinger's theory is the notion that it is highly adaptive to seek social comparisons to interpret the meaning of one's performances and outcomes. Fortunately, information about how one compares with others is usually easily accessible. Most people receive a daily dose of social comparisons Ð with the circumstances, accomplishments, and setbacks of organizations, neighbors, spouses, and celebrities. Indeed, this information is so ubiquitous that it is not uncommon to be exposed to favorable and unfavorable social comparisons simultaneously Ð for example, to learn that one's track team was victorious in the latest statewide race, but that one's personal pace was the team's slowest. However, not everyone manages peer comparisons similarly. The question of how people differ in the ways that they might balance such hedonically con¯icting information, as well as in their respo...

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“…The independent variable ought to threaten separately the individual and collective self or enhance separately the individual and collective self. We excluded studies that explicitly and simultaneously directed feedback (either threatening or enhancing) to both selves (Barr & Conlon, 1994;Chen, Brockner, & Katz, 1998;Cialdini et al, 1976;Kawakami & Dion, 1993;McFarland & Buehler, 1995;Seta & Seta, 1996; H. J. Smith & Spears, 1996;Tindale, Kulik, & Scott, 1991).…”

Section: Inclusion Criteriamentioning

confidence: 99%

The "I," the "we," and the "when": A meta-analysis of motivational primacy in self-definition.

Gaertner¹,

Sedikides²,

Vevea³

et al. 2002

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

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What is the primary motivational basis of self-definition? The authors meta-analytically assessed 3 hypotheses: (a) The individual self is motivationally primary, (b) the collective self is motivationally primary, and (c) neither self is inherently primary; instead, motivational primacy depends on which self becomes accessible through contextual features. Results identified the individual self as the primary motivational basis of self-definition. People react more strongly to threat and enhancement of the individual than the collective self. Additionally, people more readily deny threatening information and more readily accept enhancing information when it pertains to the individual rather than the collective self, regardless of contextual influences. The individual self is the psychological home base, a stable system that can react flexibly to contextual influences.The right of nature . . . is the liberty each man hath to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature; that is to say, of his own life.-Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan I only regret that I have but one life to lose for my country.-Nathan Hale, spoken at his deathThe self is in a continual process of construction, it cannot be adequately made up excepting in terms of the content which it supplies for the situation in which the agent has to act. -John Dewey, Lectures on Psychological and Political EthicsThis article is concerned with a fundamental issue in psychology, education, social sciences, and humanities: Does the self-concept have a motivational hierarchy? Do all selves (i.e., self-definitions) have equal motivational potential? Which selfdefinition is motivationally primary?We distinguish among three theoretical approaches to the issue. The first approach, one example of which is Hobbes's statement, posits that the individual self is motivationally primary. The second approach, exemplified by Hale's proclamation, maintains that the collective self is motivationally primary. The third approach advocates that neither self is inherently primary. Instead, the self that is more accessible through situational or contextual influences is motivationally primary-a proposition that is in spirit with Dewey's thinking.We articulate the three theoretical approaches and review relevant research. We argue that, when considered alone, each approach appears to be supported. However, independent tests, per se, tell only part of the story. Comparative tests provide a more refined solution to the problem. We report a meta-analysis of empirical studies relevant to the issue of relative motivational status.

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Big fish in small ponds: A social hierarchy analysis of intergroup bias.

Cited by 47 publications

References 25 publications

Individual Self, Relational Self, Collective Self: Hierarchical Ordering of the Tripartite Self

Individual Self, Relational Self, Collective Self: Hierarchical Ordering of the Tripartite Self

Responses to hedonically conflicting social comparisons: comparing happy and unhappy people

The "I," the "we," and the "when": A meta-analysis of motivational primacy in self-definition.

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