Individual Self, Relational Self, Collective Self: Hierarchical Ordering of the Tripartite Self

Abstract

The individual self comprise unique attributes, the relational self comprises partner-shared attributes, and the collective self comprises ingroup-shared attributes. All selves are fundamental components of the self-concept, with each being important and meaningful to human experience and with each being associated with health benefits. Are the selves, however, equally important and meaningful? We review a program of research that tested four competing theoretical views suggesting that the motivational hub of human experience is (a) the individual self, (b) the relational self, (b) the collective self, or (c) determined by contextual or cultural factors. The research furnished support to the view that the individual self is the primary form of self-definition. We discuss alternative explanations and implications. We end with the introduction of a theoretical model, the boomerang model, that has the potential to integrate the diverse literature on the topic.Keywords Self . Individual self . Relational self . Collective self . FeedbackThe self-concept is not a singular, monolithic cognitive structure. Instead, it comprises three fundamental components: the individual self, relational self, and collective self (Sedikides and Brewer 2001a, b). This is to say that people pursue and achieve self-definition in terms of their personal, relational, or group characteristics. Are the three selves equally indispensible to the individual? Is one more primary than the others? Does it all depend on context and culture? These are the issues we address in the present article. The Three SelvesThe individual self highlights one's unique side. It consists of attributes (e.g., traits, goals and aspirations, experiences, interests, behaviors) that differentiate the person from others. This self-representation is relatively independent of relational bonds or group memberships. The relational self, on the other hand, highlights one's interpersonal side. It consists of attributes that are shared with close others (e.g., partners, friends, family members) and define roles within the relationship. This self-representation reflects valued interpersonal attachments. Finally, the collective self highlights one's intergroup side. It consists of attributes that are shared with ingroup members and differentiate the ingroup from outgroups. This self-representation reflects membership in valued social groups.The three selves co-exist, such that persons can alternate between perceiving the self as a distinct individual, as a relational partner, or as an interchangeable group member (Sedikides and Brewer 2001a, b). In addition, each self is associated with psychological and physical health benefits, and each self is important and meaningful to human experience (Berkman et al. 1992;

Using constant comparison method and qualitative data to understand participants' experiences at the nexus of tourism, sport and charity events

“…the members of one's cycling pack), and the collective self (e.g. event participants) (Sedikides, Gaertner & O'Mara, 2011).…”

Social Identity: The Cause of Distinction Between Group-Reference and Self-Reference Effects

“…According to the literature, the SRE represents the individual self and the GRE represents the collective self. Recently, scholars have argued that although the individual self and the collective self are both fundamental parts of self-construal, their self-representation is not equal because the individual self is at the core of self-construal (Sedikides, Gaertner, & O'Mara, 2011;Shepperd, Malone, & Sweeny, 2008). Similar to how, in self-reference tasks, participants are asked to process information related to "I," information processing with reference to groups is aimed at addressing information related to "we" if self and in-group overlap.…”

Identity coactivation: Person and situation influences and the mediating role of experienced conflict

“…Likewise, levels of self‐representation (a situational variable in our model and a “psychological feature of the situation” within the CAPS framework) and their interrelationships have been described and empirically validated (Ashforth, Rogers, & Corley, ; Brewer & Gardner, ), but aside from speculations about salience shifts (Ashforth & Johnson, ), studies have not investigated the impact of level of self‐representation on the cognitive and affective response to a coactivation experience. Finally, there is good reason to believe that strong identification with a particular identity will make it more likely that the identity will be used as a lens for meaning making (Stryker & Burke, ), and some evidence suggests that identities at the individual level are more central than identities at relational or collective levels (Sedikides, Gaertner, & O'Mara, ). However, we are not aware of research that considers identification with two coactivated identities in producing cognitive and emotional responses.…”