To maintain intimate relationships in the face of negative experiences, many recommend cognitive strategies that minimize the implications of those experiences for global evaluations of the relationship. But are such strategies always adaptive? Suggesting otherwise, 2 longitudinal studies spanning the 1st 4 years of 251 new marriages revealed that the effects of benevolent cognitions on relationship development depended on the initial levels of negativity in the relationship. Cross-sectionally, the tendency to make positive attributions or otherwise disengage global evaluations of the relationship from negative experiences was associated with higher levels of satisfaction in marriages characterized by more frequent negative behavior and more severe problems. Longitudinally, in contrast, such strategies only demonstrated benefits to healthier marriages, whereas they predicted steeper declines in satisfaction among spouses in more troubled marriages by allowing marital problems to worsen over time. These findings highlight the limits of purely cognitive theories of relationship maintenance and suggest that widely recommended strategies for improving relationships may harm vulnerable couples by weakening their motivations to address their problems directly.

Two experiments examined the hypothesis that social rejection and perceived groupness function together to produce multiple-victim incidents of aggression. When a rejecter’s group membership is salient during an act of rejection, the rejectee ostensibly associates the rejecter’s group with rejection and retaliates against the group. Both experiments manipulated whether an aggregate of three persons appeared as separate individuals or members of an entity-like group and whether one of those persons rejected the participant. Consistent with the hypothesis, participants who experienced both rejection and perceived groupness behaved more aggressively against the aggregate (Experiment 1) and evidenced less favorable affective associations toward the aggregate (Experiment 2) than did participants who did not experience both rejection and perceived groupness.

The individual self comprise unique attributes, the relational self comprises partner-shared attributes, and the collective self comprises ingroup-shared attributes. All selves are fundamental components of the self-concept, with each being important and meaningful to human experience and with each being associated with health benefits. Are the selves, however, equally important and meaningful? We review a program of research that tested four competing theoretical views suggesting that the motivational hub of human experience is (a) the individual self, (b) the relational self, (b) the collective self, or (c) determined by contextual or cultural factors. The research furnished support to the view that the individual self is the primary form of self-definition. We discuss alternative explanations and implications. We end with the introduction of a theoretical model, the boomerang model, that has the potential to integrate the diverse literature on the topic.Keywords Self . Individual self . Relational self . Collective self . FeedbackThe self-concept is not a singular, monolithic cognitive structure. Instead, it comprises three fundamental components: the individual self, relational self, and collective self (Sedikides and Brewer 2001a, b). This is to say that people pursue and achieve self-definition in terms of their personal, relational, or group characteristics. Are the three selves equally indispensible to the individual? Is one more primary than the others? Does it all depend on context and culture? These are the issues we address in the present article. The Three SelvesThe individual self highlights one's unique side. It consists of attributes (e.g., traits, goals and aspirations, experiences, interests, behaviors) that differentiate the person from others. This self-representation is relatively independent of relational bonds or group memberships. The relational self, on the other hand, highlights one's interpersonal side. It consists of attributes that are shared with close others (e.g., partners, friends, family members) and define roles within the relationship. This self-representation reflects valued interpersonal attachments. Finally, the collective self highlights one's intergroup side. It consists of attributes that are shared with ingroup members and differentiate the ingroup from outgroups. This self-representation reflects membership in valued social groups.The three selves co-exist, such that persons can alternate between perceiving the self as a distinct individual, as a relational partner, or as an interchangeable group member (Sedikides and Brewer 2001a, b). In addition, each self is associated with psychological and physical health benefits, and each self is important and meaningful to human experience (Berkman et al. 1992;

a b s t r a c tThe individual self, relational self, and collective self are important and meaningful aspects of identity. However, they plausibly differ in their relative importance such that one self lies closer to the motivational core of the self-concept, better represent the "home base" of selfhood, or, simply stated, is motivationally primary.Four multi-method studies tested the relative motivational-primacy of the selves. Despite their disparate methods, the studies yielded consistent evidence of a three-tiered hierarchy with the individual self at the top, followed by the relational self, and trailed at the bottom by the collective self. The same hierarchy emerged in the Eastern culture of China and the Western cultures of the US and UK. Such pancultural consistency suggests that the motivational hierarchy is a fundamental pattern of the human self.

Moral outrage-anger at violation of a moral standard-is claimed to be a prevalent and powerful moral emotion. However, evidence for moral outrage has been compromised by failure to distinguish it from personal anger-anger at harm to self-felt by victims of a moral violation. Although it does not seem possible to distinguish these two forms of anger by measurement, it is possible to do so by experimental manipulation of their distinct eliciting conditions. Extending previous research, the current study manipulated how a victim (self vs. stranger) was excluded (fairly vs. unfairly) from a favorable experience. Reported anger and behavioral retribution provided evidence of personal anger and revenge, not of moral outrage. These findings suggest that the prevalence and power of moral outrage has been exaggerated.