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Two laboratory studies explored how self-rated unhappy and happy students balance hedonically con¯icting social comparison information, and tested whether unhappy students would be relatively more sensitive to hedonically consistent unfavorable information. In both studies, students working in teams of four competed against one other team on a novel verbal task. First, unhappy participants showed relatively greater sensitivity to undiluted unfavorable feedback Ð about group standing (e.g. your team`lost'; Study 1) and about group and individual standing (e.g. your team lost and you were placed last; Study 2). Second, unhappy students were more reactive than happy students to individual social comparison information in the context of relative group feedback. In Study 1, the moods and self-assessments of unhappy individuals (but not happy ones) after news of team defeat appeared to be buffered by the additional news of personal triumph. In Study 2, unhappy students showed relatively larger decreases in mood and ability assessments after unfavorable than after favorable individual feedback (i.e. ranking last versus ®rst), regardless of whether they additionally learned that their teams had won or lost. The role of students' attributions and perceptions of their personal contribution was also explored. Implications of these ®ndings for the links among social comparison, cognitive processes, and hedonic consequences are discussed. Copyright # 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Whether in individual or group competition, most people have experienced the joy or happiness of surpassing others and the pain or unhappiness of falling short. Participating in a triumphant sports team, receiving a high score in an entrance exam, or winning a promotion may make one feel delighted and grati®ed; conversely, playing in a¯oundering team,¯unking an exam, or losing a job to someone else may make one feel hurt and dejected. Several decades ago, Festinger (1954) proposed that people have a`drive' to evaluate their opinions and abilities and rely on social comparison information when absolute standards for assessing their performances are unavailable. Implicit in Festinger's theory is the notion that it is highly adaptive to seek social comparisons to interpret the meaning of one's performances and outcomes. Fortunately, information about how one compares with others is usually easily accessible. Most people receive a daily dose of social comparisons Ð with the circumstances, accomplishments, and setbacks of organizations, neighbors, spouses, and celebrities. Indeed, this information is so ubiquitous that it is not uncommon to be exposed to favorable and unfavorable social comparisons simultaneously Ð for example, to learn that one's track team was victorious in the latest statewide race, but that one's personal pace was the team's slowest. However, not everyone manages peer comparisons similarly. The question of how people differ in the ways that they might balance such hedonically con¯icting information, as well as in their respo...

Increasing evidence suggests that multiple cognitive and motivational processes underlie individual differences in happiness (Lyubomirsky, 2001(Lyubomirsky, , 2008. One behavior that is associated with (un)happiness is self-reflection or dwelling. We hypothesized that unhappy individuals would be inclined to dwell about themselves, and that this behavior would have a variety of adverse consequences. Three studies tested the prediction that, unlike their happier peers, unhappy participants would be sensitive to unfavorable achievement feedback, likely to dwell about its implications and, hence, show impaired attention during important academic tasks. The results of Studies 1 and 2 showed that unhappy participants who had "failed" relative to peers subsequently displayed increased interfering thoughts; spent the most time performing a portion of the graduate record examination; and later demonstrated impaired reading comprehension. Study 3 experimentally induced versus inhibiting dwelling and found that the manipulation only impacted unhappy students. Implications of our results for the consequences of dwelling for work and social functioning, as well as for detracting from enduring happiness, are discussed.

Women with a ruminative style-a tendency to focus repetitively on the meaning, causes, and consequences of their distress-were hypothesized to delay seeking a diagnosis from a healthcare professional for a potentially dangerous breast symptom relative to women without a ruminative style. In Study 1, 147 female "ruminators" and "non-ruminators" read a vignette in which they imagined they had just discovered a change in their breast, completed measures of affect, and reported their intentions to seek care for this breast symptom. Ruminators were significantly less likely to intend to call the doctor immediately after finding an imaginary breast lump than were non-ruminators. In Study 2, 70 women breast cancer survivors recalled the dates related to their symptom finding and their affective responses to symptom finding. Ruminators delayed the presentation of their breast cancer symptoms to a healthcare professional 39 days longer than did non-ruminators. Furthermore, in both studies, the effects of ruminative style on delay appeared to be moderated in part by the experience of positive mood at the time of symptom discovery. The results of these two studies have significant applied implications, suggesting that ruminative response styles play a role in the delay of presentation of health symptoms.