Avarice and Ambition in Congress: Representatives' Decisions to Run or Retire from the U.S. House

Abstract

Over two centuries ago, Adam Smith wrote of two passions that motivate those seeking public distinction: avarice and ambition. By investing these categories with appropriately concrete meaning, we develop a model of House members' career decisions. Like other individuals contemplating retirement options, politicians act with an eye to their financial interests, but not all financial interests are alike. The financial factor that matters most involves perennial considerations of post-retirement pension benefits, not fleeting opportunities to exploit ethically questionable sources of outside income. Second, we embed in the model a theory of intra-institutional ambition. Members impute value both to leadership positions they expect to retain and positions they expect to obtain. Majority members well-positioned to exert future legislative leverage are less likely to retire. Finally, several sources of electoral insecurity increase retirement probability. In the main, members may be reelection-seekers but will not pay any price to seek something they may not find.

Pay for politicians and candidate selection: An empirical analysis

“…Groseclose and Krehbiel (1994), Hall and Van Houwelling (1995) and Diermeier et al (2005) examine the effects of financial incentives on the related question of whether incumbents re-run for office. Gagliarducci et al (2008) study the interplay between serving in politics and outside earnings.…”

Carreras legislativas discretas en contextos de débil institucionalización partidista: Propuesta teórica y evidencia empírica aplicada a la legislatura de Ecuador, 1979-2007

“…La presencia de este tipo de carreras se evidencia de forma más clara en contextos institucionales estables y en los que se pretende una mayor profesionalización de los legisladores, entendido este concepto como la sedimentación de destrezas para el manejo de los temas propios de la vida política (Berry et al 2000;Mejía Acosta 2003). Entre los principales factores que explican la presencia de carreras legislativas estáticas están el tipo de relación existente entre el partido y el actor político o el grado de aversión al riesgo del legislador (Dutton 1975;Frantzich 1978;Hall y Van Houweling 1995;Nacif 1997 Como un punto intermedio entre las carreras ascendentes y estáticas, hallamos las de naturaleza regresiva, verificadas cuando el legislador, una vez concluido su período, continúa su trayectoria política en un cargo circunscrito a la arena seccional, provincial o departamental. Este tipo de patrón de comportamiento no está incluido en la tipología de Schlesinger (1966) pues su trabajo parte del supuesto de que el incremento del nivel de representación popular del cargo lleva implícito el aumento de poder para el actor político.…”

Prior Margins of Victory and Legislative Careers: Competing Risks Regression Analysis in South Korean National Assembly, 1988–2015

“…This leads to our second hypothesis, that being a marginal candidate is more likely to be associated with the possibility of being forced out of the legislative offices during their term in office. (Brace, 1985;Groseclose and Krehbiel, 1994;Hall and Van Houweling, 1995;Jacobson and Dimock, 1994;Kiewiet and Zeng, 1993). Moore and Hibbing (1988) argue that, aged members, electorally vulnerable members, minority party members, or ideological misfits in relation to their party are more inclined to leave Congress.…”

“…Furthermore, being a committee chair is expected to be negatively associated with the risk of being defeated in the next election. Additionally, a high probability of securing a leadership position makes it less likely that an incumbent will undertake voluntary retirement (Hall and Van Houweling, 1995). However, Kiewiet and Zeng (1993) note that institutional positions do not appear to influence career decisions, such as retirement, reelection, and seeking higher office.…”