Luego de tres décadas de gobiernos elegidos por sufragio universal, ecuador presenta serias deficiencias en las dimensiones constitucional y social de la democracia. si bien existen elecciones libres y limpias, el irrespeto a las instituciones democráticas, la ausencia de un estado de derecho consolidado y marcadas asimetrías sociales dan cuenta de los deficitarios rendimientos del régimen. a pesar de que el presidente correa ha contado con todas las condiciones para propiciar un cambio en las formas de gobernar el país, las viejas prácticas caudillistas, la violación de la ley y el clientelismo son aún rasgos esenciales de la vida política en el ecuador.
While judicial turnover in Latin American high courts is often the result of political realignments within the executive branch, the judiciary may also be sensitive to realignments in the legislative branch. The authors use data from the Ecuadorian Constitutional Court to show that under some circumstances, congressional deputies will seek to remove judges further from their own ideal points as the composition of the legislative coalition changes. This provides some of the first empirical evidence of the role legislatures play in Latin American judicial instability and may be broadly generalizable to other countries with similar institutional profiles and rates of interbranch crisis.
RESUMENEn el 2013 Rafael Correa afianzó las bases del modelo autoritario-competitivo iniciado en 2007. Más allá de la infraestructura y la inversión pública -que cualquier gobierno con recursos económicos también pudo realizar-, la administración de Correa se caracterizó este año -al igual que en los previos aunque ahora con más intensidad-por la persecución a todo aquel que planteara una opinión contraria a su gestión. En dicho escenario político, el último escollo que queda a Correa para consolidar su permanencia en el poder luego de 2017 es la reforma constitucional que permita la reelección indefinida -o al menos por un período adicional-. Si las condiciones políticas y económicas no varían en el corto plazo, Ecuador tendrá al menos hasta 2021 un gobierno caracterizado por muchas obras públicas y pocas libertades. Más allá de la coyuntura, la gran aceptación popular que genera el modelo autoritario-competitivo de Correa es una de las preguntas clave que debería orientar la investigación científica sobre Ecuador en el futuro inmediato.Palabras clave: Ecuador, autoritarismo competitivo, democracia, Rafael Correa, instituciones políticas.
ABSTRACT
During 2013 the President Correa strengthened his authoritarian-competitive model initiated at 2007. Regardless of infrastructure and public investment -that any government with economic resources could also have done-the Correa administration was characterized by the persecution of any person with opinions contrary to his performance in office. Given this political
The approving of a new constitucional design characterized by the displacement of the principal institutions of democratic representation and the reinforcement of negative incentives to cooperation among legislative, executive and judiciary reflect the main logic in the new Ecuadorian political arena. Paradoxically, actors from the old political party system, pork barrel, and the ancient political caudillismo constantly criticized by president Correa are the fundamental features of the sedimentation period of the "revolución ciudadana" (citizen's revolution). Considering this context and through an analyses of critical events, this article offers a panorama of the political, economic, and social issues observed in Ecuador in 2008.
AbstractThis article develops and utilises an ideal point index of judges to explain why they may cast conviction-based votes in contexts of institutional instability. In it, I modify the classic argument that an increase in institutional instability causes a commensurate increase in the likelihood of strategic voting. By instead proposing a curvilinear relationship between these two variables, the article proposes that, irrespective of the term length of the judges, an increase in institutional instability increases the probability of strategic voting only to a given point, after which, paradoxically, a greater degree of job uncertainty tends to favour conviction voting. This scenario provides incentives for the emergence of ‘judges without robes’: attorneys who accept appointments as judges for a limited time, and who use the judicial arena to improve their personal prestige and portfolio of clients who will return to them for future consultation.
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