T his article examines a fundamental aspect of democracy: the relationship between the policy positions of candidates and the choices of voters. Researchers have suggested three criteria--proximity, direction, and discounting--by "A key characteristic of democracy," Dahl (1971, 1) noted, is the "responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens." Two mechanisms play central roles in promoting responsiveness, thereby fostering congruence between the preferences of voters and the policy positions of candidates. Voters in a democracy can select candidates that represent their views, and candidates can compete for votes by strategically taking positions that appeal to the electorate. Both mechanisms are important; each depends on the criteria voters use to judge politicians on the issues.A lively debate has focused on three theories about how voters judge the policy stances of candidates. The first, proximity theory, assumes that citizens prefer candidates whose positions are closest to their own. For example, a voter who favors a 5% increase in government spending on health care will be happiest with a candidate who advocates the same level of spending. The more a candidate's position diverges from the voter's, the less satisfied the voter will feel. The presumed positive relationship between proximity and satisfaction, Michael Tomz is Associate Professor,
Over two centuries ago, Adam Smith wrote of two passions that motivate those seeking public distinction: avarice and ambition. By investing these categories with appropriately concrete meaning, we develop a model of House members' career decisions. Like other individuals contemplating retirement options, politicians act with an eye to their financial interests, but not all financial interests are alike. The financial factor that matters most involves perennial considerations of post-retirement pension benefits, not fleeting opportunities to exploit ethically questionable sources of outside income. Second, we embed in the model a theory of intra-institutional ambition. Members impute value both to leadership positions they expect to retain and positions they expect to obtain. Majority members well-positioned to exert future legislative leverage are less likely to retire. Finally, several sources of electoral insecurity increase retirement probability. In the main, members may be reelection-seekers but will not pay any price to seek something they may not find.
We consider the consequences of the Senate electoral cycle and bicameralism for distributive politics, introducing the concept of contested credit claiming, i.e. that members of a state’s House and Senate delegations must share the credit for appropriations that originate in their chamber with delegation members in the other chamber. Using data that isolates appropriations of each chamber, we test a model of the strategic incentives contested credit claiming creates. Our empirical analysis indicates that the Senate electoral cycle induces a back-loading of benefits to the end of senatorial terms, but that the House blunts this tendency with countercyclical appropriations. Our analysis informs our understanding of appropriations earmarking, and points a way forward in studying the larger consequences of bicameral legislatures.
Legislators claim that how they explain their votes matters as much as or more than the roll calls themselves. However, few studies have systematically examined legislators' explanations and citizen attitudes in response to these explanations. We theorize that legislators strategically tailor explanations to constituents in order to compensate for policy choices that are incongruent with constituent preferences, and to reinforce policy choices that are congruent. We conduct a within-subjects field experiment using U.S. senators as subjects to test this hypothesis. We then conduct a between-subjects survey experiment of ordinary people to see how they react to the explanatory strategies used by senators in the field experiment. We find that most senators tailor their explanations to their audiences, and that these tailored explanations are effective at currying support-especially among people who disagree with the legislators' roll-call positions.
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