The Senate Electoral Cycle and Bicameral Appropriations Politics

Shepsle, Kenneth A.; Houweling, Robert P. Van; Abrams, Samuel J.; Hanson, Peter

doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00374.x

Cited by 84 publications

(99 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…The existence of this recency bias is supported by a broad theoretical literature (e.g. Fiorina, 1981;Weingast et al, 1981;Ferejohn, 1986;Shepsle et al, 2009) and by empirical and experimental studies (e.g. Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000;Huber et al, 2012;Healy and Lenz, 2014).…”

mentioning

confidence: 89%

Suspiciously timed trade disputes

Conconi

DeRemer

Kirchsteiger

et al. 2017

Journal of International Economics

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This paper shows that electoral incentives affect the occurrence of trade disputes. Focusing on WTO disputes filed by the United States during the 1995-2012 period, we show that U.S.presidents are more likely to initiate a dispute in the year preceding their re-election date.Moreover, disputes filed by the U.S. tend to target industries that are important to swing states in the presidential election. To explain these regularities, we develop a theoretical model in which an incumbent can file a trade dispute to appeal to voters motivated by reciprocity. The incumbent's ability to initiate a dispute during the re-election campaign provides an advantage over the challenger, who cannot commit to file the dispute if elected. If voters' ideological preferences are not too strong in favor of either candidate, the incumbent will file a trade dispute to increase his re-election chances. To explain these regularities, we develop a theoretical model in which an incumbent can file a trade dispute to appeal to voters motivated by reciprocity. The incumbent's ability to initiate a dispute during the re-election campaign provides an advantage over the challenger, who cannot commit to file the dispute if elected. If voters' ideological preferences are not too strong in favor of either candidate, the incumbent will file a trade dispute to increase his re-election chances.JEL classifications: F13, D72, D78, D63.

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mentioning

confidence: 89%

Suspiciously timed trade disputes

Conconi

DeRemer

Kirchsteiger

et al. 2017

Journal of International Economics

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“…As Farrell and Webb underline "changes in campaign personnel reflect a general shift in the internal power relations within parties, with the parliamentary face -and especially that part of it intimately associated with the party leadership -emerging as the main power house" (2000: 121). Thus, there is an increase in opportunity costs as election day approaches, in that the parliamentary leadership must decide whether to devote its human resources and time to monitor backbenchers or to invest in campaign activities (Shepsle et al, 2009). We assume that the leadership chooses to focus on campaign activities.…”

Section: Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Election proximity and representation focus in party-constrained environments

Fernandes¹,

Leston‐Bandeira²,

Schwemmer³

2017

Preprint

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“…This is a variation on the "What have you done for me lately?" principle identified by Shepsle, Van Houweling, Abrams and Hanson (2009). Just as voters pay more attention and give more credit to legislators for pork projects provided in close proximity to elections, they pay more attention to legislative votes as elections draw near.…”

Section: Dynamic Partisanshipmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic Elite Partisanship: Party Loyalty and Agenda Setting in the US House

Lindstädt¹,

Wielen²

2013

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

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Legislators and legislative parties must strike a balance between collective and member-level goals. While there are legislative and reputational returns to coordinated behavior, party loyalty has a detrimental effect on members' electoral success. We argue that members and parties navigate these competing forces by pursuing partisan legislation when the threat of electoral repercussions is relatively low -when elections are distant. We test our theory by examining House members' likelihood of casting a party vote over the election cycle, assessing whether members strategically alter their levels of party loyalty as elections approach. We also explore whether majority parties strategically structure the agenda according to variation in members' electoral constraints. Our approach allows elite partisanship to follow a dynamic process, which we term dynamic partisanship. We find that with increasing election proximity, members are less likely to cast party votes and parties are less inclined to schedule votes that divide the parties. * Please send all correspondence to Ryan J. Vander Wielen.

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The Senate Electoral Cycle and Bicameral Appropriations Politics

Cited by 84 publications

References 28 publications

Suspiciously timed trade disputes

Suspiciously timed trade disputes

Election proximity and representation focus in party-constrained environments

Dynamic Elite Partisanship: Party Loyalty and Agenda Setting in the US House

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