Application of Hazard and Effects Management Tools and links to the HSE Case

Abstract

Shell companies have their own separate identities. In this paper the collective expressions "Shell" and "Group" and Royal/Dutch/Shell Group of Companies" may be used for convenience where reference is made to the companies of the Royal Dutch/Shell Group in general. Those expressions are also used where no useful purpose is served by identifying the particular company or companies. Abstract Many tools and techniques are promoted for the analysis and management of hazards and their effects. The proliferation in the last 5-6 years of these tools has resulted in an overload on designers, engineers and operators of E&P activities and assets to the extent that they are unsure what to do when and how this fits together. This paper starts from the basic E&P business (a business model) the basic structure of any accidental event (bow tie) and maps the tools and techniques to analyse the hazards and effects for both asset and activity HSE management. The links to developing an HSE case within the HSE-MS for assets and activities are given. Introduction The analysis of any accident shows that a hazard was present, that hazard was released and developed into a accidental event. The release of the hazard and the development is due to failures of barriers which were in place to control the hazard. In reviewing an incident a single line of what happen can be followed, however in pro active prediction there are many potential cause that may allow the hazard to be released. Also the development may follow a number of different routes dependent on which barriers work and which fail. These can be depicted graphically in a "bow tie" shown in figure 1. A number of causes lead to an event and there are a number of potential outcomes from that event. The same basic model applies to the release for hydrocarbons causing the loss of a platform with multiple loss of life or to a cook cutting a finger. Successful HSE Management ensures that applicable tools and techniques are used, the information available is analysed in order to design systems such that the chance of releasing the hazard is minimised and that should the hazard be released the effects can be contained or reduced. The key in the successful application of HSE tools is to ensure that the right technique is used at the right time to the right level of detail. The complete quantitative risk assessment taking two days per event for every potential cut finger in a proposed new offshore installation at the concept design stage would be impractical for the operator and would not have any significant effect on the HSE management of the asset under development. Designing a novel complex process plant in deep water by pure experience and judgement would overlook significant issues. The decision on which tools or technique to use relies on the risk of the hazard in terms of its potential frequency and consequences. Qualitative judgement using a matrix to represent risk, is extremely useful in ensuring that hazards are analysed to the appropriate level and that time is spent in the most efficient way, concentrating on the things that really matter. The Business Model To manage Hazards and effects in E&P operations it is essential to have a clear understanding of the business. To assist in that understanding Shell has developed a business model (fig 2) that maps our business initially at a high level and then at successively more detailed levels. P. 727

Management of Competence in HSE and Application in Training Redesign

“…Skills portfolios have recently been formulated, covering the technical disciplines and business skills for individuals and teams. These skill requirements are supplemented with the required competencies to execute the tasks and maintain the barriers identified in the Hazard and Effect Management Process [1]. Results from a case-study confirm the value of the approach in the development of learning and training programmes as well as provide a tool to assess and demonstrate the extent to which the existing competence assurance programmes match the requirements identified in HSE cases.…”

“…For the aspect-controls in the risk domain of HSE, the aggregate of relationships between all elements is described in a HSE Management System (MS). Models of HSE Management Systems can be found, with minor variations in terminology and elements, in a range of publications from the oil and gas industry [1], [2], [3]. Fig.…”

Bowtie Methodology for Risk Analysis of Visual Borescope Inspection during Aircraft Engine Maintenance

“…The exact origin of the Bowtie remains to be fully clarified, but it was first mentioned in 1979 in the lecture notes of a hazard analysis class presented by Imperial Chemical Industries at the University of Queensland, Australia [22]. It is accepted that the first company to integrate the Bowtie method as a risk management tool was the Royal Dutch Shell Group in the early 1990s in response to the Piper Alpha oil and gas platform explosion in the North Sea (1988) and after the introduction of the Seveso Directive [23][24][25]. This new risk analysis and assessment approach was developed as the main component of the "hazard, effect, and management process" (HEMP) and was communicated internally by Shell as a "Bowtie diagram" [25].…”

A New Mode of HSE Risk Management for Construction Projects

“…We have been exploring a suitable method to apply the risk management theory to the daily production and operation of grassroots organizations since the introduction of HSEMS [1]. When we got to know the HSE case [2], we found it was a good method to prevent accident beforehand at least in theory, but many problems aroused during our application of the method in our daily HSE management of the construction projects in the frontline organizations.…”