Shell companies have their own separate identities. In this paper the collective expressions "Shell" and "Group" and Royal/Dutch/Shell Group of Companies" may be used for convenience where reference is made to the companies of the Royal Dutch/Shell Group in general. Those expressions are also used where no useful purpose is served by identifying the particular company or companies. Abstract Many tools and techniques are promoted for the analysis and management of hazards and their effects. The proliferation in the last 5-6 years of these tools has resulted in an overload on designers, engineers and operators of E&P activities and assets to the extent that they are unsure what to do when and how this fits together. This paper starts from the basic E&P business (a business model) the basic structure of any accidental event (bow tie) and maps the tools and techniques to analyse the hazards and effects for both asset and activity HSE management. The links to developing an HSE case within the HSE-MS for assets and activities are given. Introduction The analysis of any accident shows that a hazard was present, that hazard was released and developed into a accidental event. The release of the hazard and the development is due to failures of barriers which were in place to control the hazard. In reviewing an incident a single line of what happen can be followed, however in pro active prediction there are many potential cause that may allow the hazard to be released. Also the development may follow a number of different routes dependent on which barriers work and which fail. These can be depicted graphically in a "bow tie" shown in figure 1. A number of causes lead to an event and there are a number of potential outcomes from that event. The same basic model applies to the release for hydrocarbons causing the loss of a platform with multiple loss of life or to a cook cutting a finger. Successful HSE Management ensures that applicable tools and techniques are used, the information available is analysed in order to design systems such that the chance of releasing the hazard is minimised and that should the hazard be released the effects can be contained or reduced. The key in the successful application of HSE tools is to ensure that the right technique is used at the right time to the right level of detail. The complete quantitative risk assessment taking two days per event for every potential cut finger in a proposed new offshore installation at the concept design stage would be impractical for the operator and would not have any significant effect on the HSE management of the asset under development. Designing a novel complex process plant in deep water by pure experience and judgement would overlook significant issues. The decision on which tools or technique to use relies on the risk of the hazard in terms of its potential frequency and consequences. Qualitative judgement using a matrix to represent risk, is extremely useful in ensuring that hazards are analysed to the appropriate level and that time is spent in the most efficient way, concentrating on the things that really matter. The Business Model To manage Hazards and effects in E&P operations it is essential to have a clear understanding of the business. To assist in that understanding Shell has developed a business model (fig 2) that maps our business initially at a high level and then at successively more detailed levels. P. 727
A study into different HSE tools reveals why some tools may be better than others. Tools can be structured along two dimensions. One dimension loads on how much a tool is a managerial, long-term aid, providing information for improvement. The other dimension loads on the extent to which a tool is applicable at the workforce level, helping to manage immediate hazards and make current practices better. The appropriateness and acceptability of tools is also strongly determined by the company's safety culture and the national culture. The analysis of why tools work found four crucial dimensions: Proactive vs Reactive - Reactive tools are more appropriate in early stages, proactive tools are needed and effective only when the safety culture is sufficiently advanced. Hazard Recognition vs Hazard management - Some tools help people recognise the presence of their hazards, other tools help them to manage and prioritise. Behaviour vs Attitude - Early stages of safety culture require behaviour to lead attitude change; later stages are characterised by attitudes leading behaviour. Reward vs Punishment - Disciplinary methods have their place in abolishing specific bad practices, rewards help cultivate generally good practices but are easy to misapply. Continuous striving for improvement creates a tension between how people think and feel about HSE and how they actually behave. This tension can be structured by the right tools to generate real improvement. Internal or mental models of what HSE management is about can only develop slowly. Proactive approaches rely on such models as positive attitudes become internalised. Introduction There are many tools and techniques used to promote and improve safety. One of the experiences of many safety managers is that some tools appear to work, while others do not. It remains a continuing source of frustration that, despite copying all their tools and emulating their practices, many organisations are still unable to emulate Du Pont's safety performance. If we had a better understanding of what tools there are, and how they work, this frustration could be all eviated and safety performance improved.
Th!s paper was sebded for presentation bj an SPE Prcgram Commtfee following review of mformatmn c.mtamed m an Astract submitted w the author(s) Controls of the paper as presented have rid ken rewewod by {he Society of Petrobum Engmws and are subject to correctmn h the author(s) Tfw mater{al, as presented does not nu=essardy reflect any postt!on 01the %mty of Petroleum Engineers ifs offrmrs or nwmbecs Papers presented at SPE n-metmgs are subpcf to pubhcatlon revmw by Ed!torial Ccinmctfoas of the Soaety of Petroleum Engineers Permcmon to mpy IS restricted to an abstract of nof more than TWO words Illustrations may not be mpmd Tlw abstract should mntam conspicuous acknowdedgenwnt of where and by whom the pap+r was presented Write Lbrar! an, SPE P O km 8338%, 11.hardwafi, TX 75C83.35% U S A lax 01-214-952-9435Shell cowantas have therr own saparate tdenltms h Ih!s paper the mllecttve expfesswns 'SheH and 'Group' and 'Royal Dulchkhell Group of (%qmmes may be used tor mnven!ance where reference IS made to the compan!es of the Royal Outch/Shell Group m general Three exprasscms are also used where no useful PUVSB IS *wed by ukmfiying the parhcu far ccmpmy or cowanles Abstract This paper sets out the necessary strategic issues that must be dealt with when setting up a management system for HSE. It touches on the setting of objectives using a form of risk matrix ,and the establishment of corporate risk tolerability y levels. Such issue management is vital but can lx seen .as yet another corporate HQ initiative. lt must therefore be linked and made relevant to those in middle management tasked with implementing the system and also to those at risk 'at the sharp end of the business.Setting acceptance criteria is aimed at demonstrating a necessary and sufficient level of control or coverage for those hazards considered as being within the objective setting of the Safety or HSE Case.Critical risk ,areas addressed via the Safety Case, within Shell companies at least, must show how this coverage is extended to critical health and environmental issues. Methods of achieving this ,are warious ranging from specific Case deliverables (like the Hazard Register and Accountability Matrices) through to the incorporation of topics from the hazard :malysis in toolbox talks and meetings. Risk analysis techniques 'are increasingly seen as complementary rather than separate with environmental assessments, health risk assessment sand safety risk analyses tahng place together and results being considered jointly.The paper ends with some views on the way ,ahead regarding the linking of risk decisions to target setting at the workplace and views on how Case information may be retrieved and used on a daily basis,
The Hearts and Minds program is intended to move the basis for HSEperformance past the mechanical implementation of HSE Management Systems. Thispaper describes an evolutionary approach to HSE culture and reports on abrochure that enables organisations and individuals to understand the HSEculture and their personal behaviours in the context of the culture. The papergives examples of characterisations of organisational and personal behavioursand discusses how improvement can be generated and maintained inorganisations. Introduction Society requires increasingly high standards for Health, Safety andEnvironment in the Oil and Gas industry. Prior to the Piper Alpha disasterthere was an unstructured approach to improvement based upon trying to ensurethat commitment is turned into performance. The Piper Alpha disaster led to theobligatory development of safety management systems. Safety management, implemented in a systematic approach, has since been generalized to HSEManagement Systems (HSE-MS) as the skills required to implement such systemsimproved. The problem with all these approaches has always lain in theirtop-down nature; commitment at the top has to be driven down to ensure that theworkforce behaves safely and responsibly, both in their own interests, in theinterest of the organisation of the wider community of stakeholders. Despiterequirements made by regulatory bodies, real workforce involvement has oftenproven difficult in practice and continued management effort has been required. The implementation of HSE management systems has tended to be mechanical, setting and meeting minimal requirements, but not going further. The result hasbeen initial improvements in performance that has plateaued and has requiredradical new approaches to develop. The question is: How is further improvementpossible beyond HSE-MS? The answer appears to lie in the active and willinginvolvement of all concerned, going beyond the merely perfunctory to activeinvolvement. The Hearts and Minds program is intended to move the basis for effective HSEperformance past the mechanical implementation of HSE management systems andreliance upon top-down control of the workforce1. The original remitfor the research program was to create a workforce that is sufficiently wellmotivated to behave in safe and responsible ways without external control. Sucha workforce would be intrinsically motivated to act in ways that were safe, environmentally responsible and fundamentally healthy. This is a large andrather nebulous target, so it has been operationalised as the development of atrue culture of safety. Such a culture is one in which HSE is part of theself-image of all involved in the enterprise, from top to bottom. The Heartsand Minds Program has been aimed at the development of such a culture withinShell1. Organisational culture is not a simple concept2,3 and hastraditionally been notoriously difficult to define. Safety culture, with itslogical extension of an HSE culture, is equally hard to define. One concept, safety climate has been coined to cover the expectations and perceptions of theworkforce4, but the idea of a culture is one that only partiallyoverlaps with climate. Culture represents the unspoken, and often invisible, sets of beliefs and assumptions that everyone shares, climate refers to theexperience that must be tempered by the expectations5. Culturereflects "what we do round here" Climate reflects "How we feel about whathappens round here". We have found that measures of safety culture andreadiness to change, as a measure of the climate, are uncorrelated6, implying that climate refers to the extent to which current expectations aboutsafety are being met, but that such scores are independent of thoseexpectations. What might make a workforce happy in a Reactive culture (seebelow for the definitions), would be regarded as unsatisfactory in a Proactiveculture.
This paper reports a study carried out on the perceptions of supervisors, technicians and operators of the procedures for seven safety-critical activities. Using a questionnaire in which the subjects rated a variety of attributes, and ranked the different procedures in terms of dangerousness, controllability, susceptibility to violation, a mental model was constructed within which the different procedures can be placed. It was found that there are few differences between supervisors and operators, but where there are these probably relate to the time-scale over which control is exerted. The rated quality of procedures was found not to be related to the perceived Susceptibility to violation. One important finding was that, contrary to the expectations of safety management systems designers, concurrent operation were rated as both less dangerous and more controllable. The conclusion is that such techniques can uncover major differences between how the workforce see procedures and how management believes they are being used.
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