An empirical investigaton of political economy factors behind structural reforms in OECD countries

Høj, Jens; Galasso, Vincenzo; Nicoletti, Giuseppe; Dang, Thai-Thanh

doi:10.1787/eco_studies-v2006-art3-en

Cited by 23 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 64 publications

(38 reference statements)

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“…The growth rate is statistically significant in one additional specification and the EU dummy is also significant twice. 35 31 A similar result is reported by Høj et al (2006). 32 This result is not unexpected.…”

Section: 3supporting

confidence: 63%

The Inverse Domino Effect: Are Economic Reforms Contagious?

2008

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This paper examines whether a country's economic reforms are affected by reforms adopted by other countries. A simple model of economic reforms is developed to motivate the econometric work. Unsurprisingly, the model predicts that reforms are more likely when factors of production are internationally mobile and reforms are pursued in other economies. More interesting is the finding that reforms are not driven by greater trade openness. Using the change in the Index of Economic Freedom as the measure of marketliberalising reforms and panel data 144 countries and the years 1995-2006, we identify the most important channels through which reforms are transmitted from country to country.We find evidence of the importance of reforms in other countries. Moreover, consistent with our model, international trade is not a vehicle for the diffusion of economic reforms, rather the most important mechanism is geographical or cultural proximity.

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Section: 3supporting

confidence: 63%

The Inverse Domino Effect: Are Economic Reforms Contagious?

2008

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“…As the rest of this chapter argues, the system needs to be reformed in several dimensions, and piece-meal reforms have less chance of success than broader, integrated ones, notably because they impose the up-front cost of reform on a well-defined category of stake-holders (teachers and schools in this case), but do not spread the benefits across a sufficiently large group of citizens (Høj et al, 2006). Successful reforms 6 are often those that bring stake-holders on-board for both the principles of a reform and its implementation.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Towards better Schools and more Equal Opportunities for Learning in Italy

Boarini

2009

OECD Economics Department Working Papers

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Compulsory school education in Italy produces poor results in terms of 15-year olds' performance on PISA tests, compared with other OECD countries, despite a relatively high level of expenditure. While the influence of social background is smaller than in many OECD countries, it is largely transmitted through a kind of self-segregation resulting from family choices among the different types of upper secondary school. Large differences in pupils' performance between regions cannot be explained by the quantity of resources available; separating the influence of socio-economic conditions from school efficiency is difficult and must be treated carefully in plans for extending fiscal federalism. The Italian government is rightly concerned to get better value for money and this chapter argues that policies to improve the information available to schools and teachers on the results they are achieving, while giving them appropriate incentives, responsibility and power to respond to such information, are necessary accompaniments to expenditure-saving policies. An improved focus on good quality training, both for new recruits and experienced teachers, and recruitment procedures themselves, should also pay dividends on efficiency. This Working Paper relates to the 2009 Economic Survey of Italy. (www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/Italy)JEL classification :I21; I28 Key words : education; school outcomes; Italy; PISA data; fiscal federalism ***************************************************** Améliorer l'école et l'égalité d'accès à l'éducation en ItaliePar rapport aux autres pays de l'OCDE, les résultats des tests PISA des élèves italiens de 15 ans sont médiocres, et ce, malgré des dépenses d'éducation relativement élevées. Si l'incidence du milieu social est moindre que dans de nombreux autres pays membres, elle passe essentiellement par une sorte d'autodiscrimination résultant du choix des familles entre les différents types d'établissements secondaires du deuxième cycle. L'importance des écarts de résultats scolaires entre les régions ne peut s'expliquer par le volume des ressources disponibles. Il est difficile de faire la distinction entre l'impact des conditions socioéconomiques et l'efficience des établissements, et cela doit être étudié avec soin dans le cadre des projets d'extension du fédéralisme fiscal. Le gouvernement italien souhaite, à juste titre, optimiser les dépenses publiques et le présent chapitre défend l'idée selon laquelle des mesures visant à améliorer les informations à disposition des établissements scolaires et des enseignants concernant leurs résultats -tout en leur apportant les incitations, les responsabilités et les pouvoirs nécessaires pour agir en fonction de ces résultats -doivent accompagner les mesures d'économies budgétaires. Une attention plus grande accordée à une formation de qualité pour les enseignants, qu'il s'agisse des nouvelles recrues comme des enseignants chevronnés, ainsi qu'aux procédures de recrutement elles-mêmes, devrait également favoriser l'efficience.Ce document de travail se r...

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“…The first one provides side payments, in one form or another, to reform losers while implementing the reform according to first principles. The second one includes exemptions or long phase-in periods to protect incumbents (see Høj et al, 2006, for examples).…”

Section: Compensating Losers?mentioning

confidence: 99%