There are many stories of democracy but little consensus over which variables robustly determine its emergence and survival. We apply extreme bounds analysis to test the robustness of 59 factors proposed in the literature, evaluating over 1.7 million regressions of the emergence of democracy, and over 1.4 million regressions for the survival of democracy. The most robust determinants of the transition to democracy are the number of past transitions (a positive effect), whether the country is a member of the OECD (a positive effect), and GDP growth (a negative effect). There is also some evidence that fuel exporters and Muslim countries are less likely to see democracy emerge, although the latter finding is driven entirely by oil producing Muslim countries. Regarding the survival of democracy, the most robust determinants are level of economic development (a positive effect) and, interestingly, the number of past transitions (a negative effect) -indicating that both supporters and subverters of democracy learn from history. There is also some evidence that having a former military leader as the chief executive has a negative effect on democratic survival, while having other democracies as neighbors has a reinforcing effect.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractThis paper analyzes whether the educational and professional background of a head of government matters for the implementation of market-liberalizing reforms. Employing panel data over the period 1970-2002, we present empirical evidence based on a novel data set covering profession and education of more than 500 political leaders from 73 countries. Our results show that entrepreneurs, professional scientists, and trained economists are significantly more reform oriented. Contrary, union executives tend to impede reforms. We also highlight interactions between profession and education with time in office and the political leaning of the ruling party.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractThis paper analyzes whether the educational and professional background of a head of government matters for the implementation of market-liberalizing reforms. Employing panel data over the period 1970-2002, we present empirical evidence based on a novel data set covering profession and education of more than 500 political leaders from 73 countries. Our results show that entrepreneurs, professional scientists, and trained economists are significantly more reform oriented. Contrary, union executives tend to impede reforms. We also highlight interactions between profession and education with time in office and the political leaning of the ruling party.

This paper analyzes the impact of the media on consumers' inflation expectations.We distinguish two channels through which media can influence expectations. First, the intensity of coverage of inflation reports plays a role (volume channel). Second, the contents of these reports matter (tone channel). Employing a unique data set capturing media reports on inflation in Germany comprising 01/1998-09/2007 we are able to discriminate between these two effects. We find that the volume effect generally improves the accuracy of consumer forecasts while the tone channel induces a media bias. JEL classification: E52; D83

We investigate the impact of the European Central Bank's monetary policy communication during the press conference held after the monthly Governing Council meeting on the EUR-USD exchange rate in high frequency. Based on the method of Content Analysis, we construct communication indicators for the introductory statement and find that communication with respect to future price developments is most relevant. In response to statements about increasing risks to price stability the EUR appreciates on impact. To the contrary, communication about economic activity and monetary aggregates does not generate significant exchange rate reactions. Copyright (c) 2010 The Ohio State University.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in April 2009Abstract This paper investigates the effects of media coverage and macroeconomic conditions on inflation forecast disagreement of German households and professional forecasters. We adopt a Bayesian learning model in which media coverage of inflation affects forecast disagreement by influencing information sets as well as predictor choice. Our empirical results show that disagreement of households depends on the content of news stories (tone) but is unaffected by reporting intensity (volume) and by the heterogeneity of story content (information entropy). Disagreement of professionals does not depend on media coverage. With respect to the influence of macroeconomic variables we provide evidence that disagreement of households and professionals primarily depends on the current rate of inflation. JEL classification: E31, E37, D83

Little is known on how and whether central bank announcements aect consumers' beliefs about policy relevant economic gures. This paper focuses on consumers' perceptions and expectations of ination and interest rates and condence therein. Based on a sound identication (running surveys shortly before and after communication events), and relying on above 15 000 observations, spanning over 12 FOMC press conferences between December 2015 and June 2018, we document the impact of the central bank communication on ordinary people. While announcement events have little measurable direct eect on average beliefs, they make people more likely to receive news about the central bank's policy. In general, informed consumers tend to have lower perceptions and expectations, higher condence and, to an extent, better quality beliefs.

There are many stories of democracy but little consensus over which variables robustly determine its emergence and survival. We apply extreme bounds analysis to test the robustness of 59 factors proposed in the literature, evaluating over 1.7 million regressions of the emergence of democracy, and over 1.4 million regressions for the survival of democracy. The most robust determinants of the transition to democracy are the number of past transitions (a positive effect), whether the country is a member of the OECD (a positive effect), and GDP growth (a negative effect). There is also some evidence that fuel exporters and Muslim countries are less likely to see democracy emerge, although the latter finding is driven entirely by oil producing Muslim countries. Regarding the survival of democracy, the most robust determinants are level of economic development (a positive effect) and, interestingly, the number of past transitions (a negative effect) -indicating that both supporters and subverters of democracy learn from history. There is also some evidence that having a former military leader as the chief executive has a negative effect on democratic survival, while having other democracies as neighbors has a reinforcing effect.