A Theory of Blame

Abstract

When judging a voter's decision, does that voter's reason for casting their vote influence moral and interpersonal judgments about them? In the context of the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election, past research suggests two competing predictions. First, people regularly account for an actor's intentions when forming judgments of the actor, indicating that judgments may vary according to a

Blame the shepherd not the sheep: Imitating higher-ranking transgressors mitigates punishment for unethical behavior

“…The rank-dependent imitation effect may also depend in part on observers' understanding of what is typical behavior 1 Malle et al (2014) argue that their conceptualization of blame subsumes and extends prior work on responsibility (e.g., Jones, 1991;Treviño, 1992;Weiner, 1995). They avoid the term "responsibility" because they believe its usage in the literature is varied and at times imprecise.…”

“…in a given situation. People compare behavior with norms to identify whether or to what degree a violation has occurred (Malle et al, 2014;Treviño, 1992). The focus theory of normative conduct indicates that two different types of norms can be salient in a given situation (Cialdini et al, 1990;Cialdini & Trost, 1998).…”

“…To determine the appropriate level of punishment for an offense, people evaluate the extent to which the actor deserves blame (Darley & Pittman, 2003;Malle, Guglielmo, & Monroe, 2014;O'Reilly & Aquino, 2011;Shaver, 1985;Weiner, 1995). Blame is a negative evaluation of an actor based on a judgment that the actor intentionally engaged in unwarranted, norm-incongruent, negative behavior (Malle et al, 2014). To assign blame, people perform a complex set of appraisals that consider whether the actor intentionally caused the event (e.g., Cushman, 2008;Fragale et al, 2009;Malle & Knobe, 1997;Shaver, 1985;Sloman, Fernbach, & Ewing, 2009) and whether there are mitigating circumstances or reasons that may justify the action (e.g., Malle, 2004;Riordan, Marlin, & Kellogg, 1983;Scanlon, 2008).…”

Perceived intent motivates people to magnify observed harms

“…Some researchers accord motivated cognition a central role in shaping moral judgment (2)(3)(4)(5)(6). Others accord much less importance to motivated processes, and correspondingly more weight to inferential reasoning processes and bounded rationality (7,8), and still others sit somewhere between these two positions (9)(10)(11).…”

“…Rather, the theories tend to treat harm as either an antecedent to the "real action" (e.g., ref. 8) or as a fixed component within the model around which other factors can be organized (e.g., ref.…”