When judging a voter's decision, does that voter's reason for casting their vote influence moral and interpersonal judgments about them? In the context of the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election, past research suggests two competing predictions. First, people regularly account for an actor's intentions when forming judgments of the actor, indicating that judgments may vary according to a

People's concept of free will is often assumed to be incompatible with the deterministic, scientific model of the universe. Indeed, many scholars treat the folk concept of free will as assuming a special form of nondeterministic causation, possibly the notion of uncaused causes. However, little work to date has directly probed individuals' beliefs about what it means to have free will. The present studies sought to reconstruct this folk concept of free will by asking people to define the concept (Study 1) and by confronting them with a neuroscientific claim that free will is an illusion (Study 2), which invited them to either reconcile or contrast free will with determinism. The results suggest that the core of people's concept of free will is a choice that fulfills one's desires and is free from internal or external constraints. No evidence was found for metaphysical assumptions about dualism or indeterminism.

Stigma by association represents the process through which the companions of stigmatized persons are discredited. Conduits for stigma by association range from the strong and enduring bonds of kinship to the arbitrary occasions of being seen in the company of someone who is stigmatized. A theoretical model is proposed in which both deliberative and spontaneous processes result in the spread of stigma to the companions of stigmatized persons. Support for this model was found across 3 studies that examined how explicit and implicit stigma-relevant attitudes moderate stigma-by-association effects. When social relationships were meaningful (e.g., kinship), both explicit and implicit attitudes moderated the devaluation of stigmatized persons' companions. On the other hand, when social relationships appeared coincidental only implicit attitudes moderated companion devaluation.

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