A Property System for Market Allocation of the Electromagnetic Spectrum: A Legal-Economic-Engineering Study

Vany, A. S. De; Eckert, Ross D.; Meyers, Charles J.; O’Hara, Donald J.; Scott, Richard C.

doi:10.2307/1227522

Cited by 106 publications

(59 citation statements)

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“…"Access" and "Withdrawal" rights are referred to as usage rights whereas the remaining are referred to as collective action rights. In this context, collective action rights are implemented in the SAS 5 , and these, in turn, govern the usage rights. Locally determined spectrum policy, then, means a (hyper) local SAS.…”

Section: Requirements and System Operationmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Can Polycentric Governance of Spectrum Work?

2016

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Abstract-Spectrum policy in the US (and throughout most of the world) consists generally of a set of nationally determined policies that apply uniformly to all localities. However, it is also true that there is considerable variation in the features (e.g., traffic demand or population density), requirements and constraints of spectrum use on a local basis. Global spectrum policies designed to resolve a situation in New York City could well be overly restrictive for communities in rural areas (such as central Wyoming). At the same time, it is necessary to ensure that more permissive policies of central Wyoming would not create problems for NYC (by ensuring, for example, that relocated radios adapt to local policies). Notions of polycentric governance that have been articulated by the late E. Ostrom [16] argue that greater good can be achieved by allowing for local autonomy in resource allocation.Shared access to spectrum is generally mediated through one of several technologies. As shown in [21], approaches mediated by geolocation databases are the most cost effective in today's technology. In the database oriented Spectrum Access System, or SAS, proposed by the FCC, users are granted (renewable) usage rights based on their location for a limited period of time. Because this system grants usage rights on a case-bycase basis, it may also allow for greater local autonomy while still maintaining global coordination. For example, it would be technically feasible for the database to include parameters such as transmit power, protocol, and bandwidth. Thus, they may provide the platform by which polycentric governance might come to spectrum management. In this paper, we explore, through some case examples, what polycentric governance of spectrum might look like and how this could be implemented in a database-driven spectrum management system. In many ways this paper is a complement to [20], which evaluted emerging SAS architectures using Ostrom's socioeconomic theory. This paper explores how a SAS-based system could be constructed that is consistent with Ostrom's polycentric governance ideas. Our approach is to address spectrum management as an emergent phenomenon rather than a top down system. This paper will describe the key details of this system and present some initial modeling results in comparison with the traditional global model of spectrum regulation. It will also discuss some of the concerns associated with this approach.

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Section: Requirements and System Operationmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Can Polycentric Governance of Spectrum Work?

2016

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“…However, these technologies which can make WAPECS more feasible are costly and complicated and the industry does not want to be in charge of that "flexibility is fine, but somebody has to pay for it". It should be noted that WAPECS is already perceived by many as a friendly concept to CRS technologies and opportunistic access Doyle, 2013, Veenstra andLeonhard, 2008). In addition, one opinion that was expressed during the interviews is that WAPECS could be introduced for systems such as short range devices where flexibility in use of unlicensed bands could benefit spectrum users.…”

Section: Influence Of Wapecs On the Marketmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Furthermore, there have been several theoretical attempts to define spectrum property rights (Cave and Webb, 2012, Cave and Webb, 2003, Vries and Sieh, 2012, Vany et al, 1969. However, for many decades, there have been no practical implementations of such idea until the convergence between the different services has brought back to life the notion of spectrum property rights called by Coase more than 50 years ago.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Wireless access policy for electronic communications services (WAPECS): Collision between theory and practice

El-Moghazi

Whalley

Irvine

2016

Telecommunications Policy

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Fifty five years ago, Coase suggested in his seminal article "The Federal Communications Commission" that spectrum assignments should be treated in a similar way to property rights where market forces allocate these flexible tradable rights to users with the highest valuations for it. While Coase's idea was appealing and gathered huge momentum in academia scene, the practice did not show much success. Terms of use: Documents inOne of the first practical implementations was initiated in Europe in 2005 under the name "Wireless Access Policy for Electronic Communication Services (WAPECS)". WAPECS aimed at providing more flexibility in the European spectrum management framework by allowing using the spectrum on a technology and service neutral basis. At the international level, the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT) have been keen to introduce more flexibility at the international service allocation framework via different measures.One of the main findings of this paper is the identification of different negative perceptions and disagreement on WAPECS and that WAPECS was driven mainly by the European Commission (EC) and few European countries. In addition, concerns over WAPECS include that the flexibility associated with WAPECS may contradict with spectrum use efficiency and that the responsibility of resolving interference moves from the regulator to operators.The assessment of WAPECS influence on the market shows that while WAPECS concept aimed mainly on removing the spectrum usage restriction for the industry, the later did not appreciate nor welcome that due mainly to the high cost and uncertainty associated with flexibility. On the other hand, the interviews revealed several positive impacts of WAPECS including removing technology designation from CEPT decisions.

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“…Further research on spectrum auction, lottery, and marketable-rights alternatives will be necessary (De Vany, Eckert, Meyers, O'Hara, & Scott, 1969;Geller & Lampert, 1989;Levin, 1971;Schilling, Milstein, Pickholtz, Kullback, & Miller, 1991).…”

Section: Limited Spectrummentioning

confidence: 99%

The politics of a paradigm shift: Telecommunications regulation and the communications revolution

1993

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As a result of the convergence of telecommunications and mass communications technologies, American policymakers face a series of critical decisions about infrastructural investment, technical architecture, and regulation that will determine the character of the U.S. electronic industrial base. This article develops the argument that the current policy trajectory will likely lead to some awkward choices. Powerful vested interests have distorted the communications policy process. Regulatory inertia has come to tie the hands of the regulators as well as the hands of industry leaders.We argue that there exists a critical opportunity for independent communications policy research to make a difference and to anticipate and facilitate a paradigm shift in telecommunications regulation.

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A Property System for Market Allocation of the Electromagnetic Spectrum: A Legal-Economic-Engineering Study

Cited by 106 publications

References 0 publications

How Can Polycentric Governance of Spectrum Work?

How Can Polycentric Governance of Spectrum Work?

Wireless access policy for electronic communications services (WAPECS): Collision between theory and practice

The politics of a paradigm shift: Telecommunications regulation and the communications revolution

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