Spectrum sharing mechanisms have evolved to meet different needs related to increasing spectrum use efficiency. At first, decentralized and opportunistic cognitive radios (and cognitive radio networks) were the primary focus of research for these mechanisms. This gradually transitioned towards the development of cooperative sharing methods based on databases, typified by TV White Spaces databases. Spectrum sharing is now the basis for the dynamic and fine-grained spectrum rights regime for the Citizen's Band Radio Service (CBRS) as well as for License Shared Access (LSA).The emergence of the cryptocurrency Bitcoin has stimulated interest in applying its underlying technology, blockchain, to other applications as well, such as securities trading and supply chain management. This paper explores the application of blockchain to radio spectrum management. While blockchains could underlie radio spectrum management more broadly, we will focus on dynamic spectrum sharing applications. Like the cooperative approaches currently in use, blockchain is a database technology. However, a blockchain is a decentralized database in which the owner of the data maintains control. We consider the benefits and limitations of blockchain solutions in general, and then examine their potential application to four major categories of spectrum sharing. The use of blockchain technology in spectrum management could have significant implications for stakeholders.

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Abstract-Spectrum Access Systems (SAS) are emerging as a principal mechanism for managing the sharing of radio spectrum. The design of the SAS depends on the specification of spectrum property rights and the governance system by which those rights are enforced. Current perspectives on SAS design have been too limited, focusing narrowly on the technical components without adequate consideration of socio-technical factors that will impact the likely success of any SAS design.In this paper, we apply the social science literature on the management of common pool resources (CPR) to the design challenge for the SAS. Heretofore, too much of the discussion has focused on an overly simplistic characterization of the spectrum rights design space as a dichotomous choice between licensed v. unlicensed, markets v. government, and exclusive v. open. The CPR framework forces consideration of a wider class of design options, positioning the specifications of spectrum property rights more appropriately along a multi-dimensional continuum of rights bundles. The CPR framework highlights the importance of considering formal and informal, multi-layered institutional and market-based interactions among SAS stakeholders when designing a resource management system. We will explain how this leads one to view the SAS as a polycentric governance system (using the terminology in the CPR literature). By examining the economic and social context of spectrum sharing, we assert that these emerging systems must be sufficiently flexible to adapt to various forms of resource governance, which refers to the process by which rights are distributed among stakeholders, how those rights are enforced, and how the resource is managed. We illustrate how the insights from the CPR literature might be implemented in a prototype SAS architecture.

This article describes a new concept for an international climate regime for differentiation of future commitments: the 'common but differentiated convergence' approach (CDC). Under CDC, Annex-I countries' per-capita emission allowances converge within a convergence period to a low level. Individual non-Annex-I countries' allowances converge to the same level also within the same period ('common convergence'), but starting when their percapita emissions are a certain percentage above global average ('differentiated'). Until then they may voluntarily take on 'positively binding' targets. This approach eliminates two concerns often voiced in relation to gradually converging per-capita emissions: (i) advanced developing countries have their commitment to reduce emissions delayed and their targets are not the same as Annex-I countries with equal per-capita emissions; (ii) CDC does not provide excess emission allowances to the least developing countries. Under CDC, stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations at 550 and 650 ppm CO 2 -equivalent can be reached with participation at roughly 0% and 50% above global average and convergence to around 3 and 4.5 tCO 2 -eq/cap within 40 years. Even if the CDC approach is not implemented in its entirety, it is possible that the step-by-step decisions on the international climate regime can be guided by the principles provided in the CDC approach.

Among the many new phenomena that have arisen since the divestiture of AT&T in the United States, and the liberalization of information technology markets worldwide, the emergence of consortia explicitly related to the standards setting process. While R&D consortia and user groups have existed for many years, consortia in the standards-setting process possess unique properties. This article develops a classification of the standards-setting consortia and develops a theoretical basis for their emergence. This theory is based on the confluence of two classical economic theories: political theory and the theory of markets where network externalities exist. We also consider the implications of these consortia on the standards-setting process from theoretical and practical perspectives. Over the past five years, the number of consortia in the Information Technology (IT) standards arena has grown significantly. Barry (1992) provides an overview of many of these consortia and their memberships. They have had a profound impact on IT standardization and standards. This article examines these consortia from both a practical and a theoretical viewpoint.This article also considers industrial consortia that are formed explicitly to complement or influence the standards development process. Thus, R&D consortia are outside the scope of this analysis, as are most user groups.' The consortia we will address range from organizations whose primary role is to facilitate the adoption of existing standards through promotional actitivies and conformance testing to those that are actively developing new technologies that are intended to form the basis for either de facto or voluntary consensus standards. 'R&D consortia have been treated elsewhere in the literature (see, e.g., Dimancescu & Botkin, 1986; Evan & Olk, 1988; Smiler & Gibson, 1991 We also develop a taxonomy of IT consortia and examine the theoretical basis for their emergence. Additionally, the impact that a consortium might have on a particular standards development process is examined along with associated policy issues. An Overview of Information Technology ConsortiaTo appreciate current trends in IT standardization, it is necessary to examine the industry that drives that activity. While much has been written on the transformation of the IT industry over the past several years, the two major factors that stand out with respect to the standards process are the advent of the concept of open systems and the democratization of the technology that drives the revolution.Open systems refers to a computing philosophy that allows the interworking and or substitution of any component of an IT system, from the basic hardware through the user.' The emergence of end user computing drove the "democratization" of the IT industry because the operations of the centralized "glass room"3 were demystified. With this change in perception came the need for networks and, subsequently, open systems. This change caused a fundamental shift in the needs and perceptions in the market, and an ev...

To promote economic growth and unleash the potential of wireless broadband, there is a need to introduceii

The spectrum access rights granted by the Federal government to spectrum users come with the expectation of protection from harmful interference. As a consequence of the growth of wireless demand and services of all types, technical progress enabling smart agile radio networks, and on-going spectrum management reform, there is both a need and opportunity to use and share spectrum more intensively and dynamically. A key element of any framework for managing harmful interference is the mechanism for enforcement of those rights. Since the rights to use spectrum and to protection from harmful interference vary by band (licensed/unlicensed, legacy/newly reformed) and type of use/users (primary/secondary, overlay/underlay), it is reasonable to expect that the enforcement mechanisms may need to vary as well.In this paper, we present a taxonomy for evaluating alternative mechanisms for enforcing interference protection for spectrum usage rights, with special attention to the potential changes that may be expected from wider deployment of Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) systems. Our exploration of how the design of the enforcement regime interacts with and influences the incentives of radio operators under different rights regimes and market scenarios is intended to assist in refining thinking about appropriate access rights regimes and how best to incentivize investment and growth in more efficient and valuable uses of the radio frequency spectrum.